versant with volitions and voluntary acts. And as the volitions and the voluntary acts in question are themselves the virtues in question; this is as much as to say, the self-regarding virtues are entirely conversant with themselves; in which, he adds, they resemble the other constituents of conscience. Remember that, just before, we had found the constituents of conscience to be motives. The self-regarding virtues, therefore, resemble motives in this, that they are entirely conversant with themselves.

3. By this resemblance, they become fitted to coalesce with them; that is, by being conversant entirely with themselves, they are fitted to coalesce with other things which are entirely conversant with themselves. Surprising aptitude!

4. The self-regarding virtues may be fixed on the means of promoting their ends. Their ends, according to Sir James, are themselves; they are therefore fixed on the means of promoting themselves; a volition fixed on the means of promoting itself!

5. From the perfect blending of all the sentiments of which the final object is a state of the will, results conscience.

Does this, after what we have seen, need any comment? No.

And thus, Reader, have you received Sir James's instructions in the mysteries of moral approbation. But whether it is an emotion, or a desire,

or an affection, or a motive, or a volition, one or other, or all, or a delightful contemplation, or an entire blending of the sentiments which regard the will, whatever those sentiments may be, which Sir James says not-he has left you in the dark; and whether you are less or more wise about the matter, than when he began with you, determine and speak for yourself.

APPENDIX A. (See p. 95.)

"THE moral sentiments are a class of feelings which have no other object but the mental dispositions leading to voluntary actions, and the voluntary actions which flow from those dispositions." This Sir James sets down as his thesis, and marks for peculiar emphasis, by printing the words in Italics.

The genus under which he arranges the moral sentiments, is that of feelings. They are a class of feelings. Well, and what class?

Sir James tells us one thing about them; viz. what is their object; and nothing else whatsoever. It is

The mental dispositions leading to voluntary action, and the voluntary actions which flow from those dispositions.

First of all, we have to inquire, what it is for a feeling to have an object? One can understand what is meant by the cause of a feeling, or the effect of a feeling. But what is the object of a feeling? In the case of some feelings, we say that something is felt; if we see, there is something seen; love, there is something loved. In other cases the feeling itself is all: the feeling, (if we may use the expression), is the thing felt. Pain, for example, is a feeling; but it is the only thing felt.

In the cases in which we say that something else is felt, as when we say, in the case of admiration, that something is admired, we call the thing felt the object of the feeling; that is, we call the cause of the feeling by that

name. The thing seen is the cause of the seeing; the thing admired is the cause of the admiration.

In the case of those feelings which the Professors Reid and Stewart class under the title Appetite, there is a complexity, which obstructs the conception. An uneasy sensation precedes the desire. Thus, what we call hunger is a complex feeling. It includes an uneasy sensation, and the desire of food. The mind therefore, in turning to the cause of the desire, is apt to think of the uneasy sensation. But an uneasy sensation does not, in itself, imply the desire of any thing but relief; the desire of a particular object is caused by the object itself. The desire of water when a man is thirsty, includes the idea of the water, and its agreeable effect. It is that idea which determines him to the water, i. e. constitutes (causes) the desire.

The case is more clear as regards the complicated affections. What we call the object of the love, is the cause of the love. What we call the object of the pity, is the cause of the pity, and so on.

If this be general, then Sir James's indistinct words must mean, that the moral sentiments are caused, or made to exist, by certain things.

We shall not doubt that they are caused. Let us next see what they are caused by.

The feelings of this class, he says, are caused by dispo sitions, and actions. So far there is not much information. Every body knows, that certain of the feelings, excited by actions with the dispositions from which they proceed, are the very feelings to which the name moral sentiments is given. The proper expression therefore is-not that there is a class of feelings which have for their object actions rising out of dispositions; but that such and such actions, rising out of such and such dispositions, excite such and such feelings; to which feelings, as a class, the name moral sentiments has been given.

Now then there are two things placed before us; cer

tain things which cause certain feelings, and the feelings themselves which are thus caused. Our business, therefore, is to ascertain correctly; that is, to distinguish and define; first, the class of causes; secondly, the class of effects in more particular terms, to what actions, flowing out of what dispositions, is the term moral applied? and next, what are the feelings which these actions, when performed, are found to excite or to cause?

The solution of these two problems being the business of moral inquiry, let us see how Sir James goes to work, for satisfying the demand of philosophy in this respect.

He sets forth the class of causes in these words:-" the mental dispositions leading to voluntary action, and the voluntary actions which flow from these dispositions."

This is not very distinct. First of all; "the voluntary actions flowing out of the mental dispositions leading to voluntary action," are all voluntary actions whatsoever. Is that Sir James's meaning? Are all voluntary actions, without exception, moral or immoral? Next; "mental dispositions leading to voluntary action," is about as vague and undistinguishing a description as can well be made. No man with the least tincture of philosophy could have used such an expression on such an occasion; his nature would have revolted at it.

A mental disposition means some state of the mind; the mental dispositions leading to voluntary actions, must mean every mental state which causes volition. Is every mental state, then, which causes volition, either moral or immoral? Is this part of his theory,-that every voluntary act, and every state of the mind causing it, excite the sentiments which he calls the moral sentiments?

Let us see what this doctrine amounts to. Sir James, proceeding to explain the moral sentiments, informs us, they are the sentiments excited by voluntary acts and the states of mind which cause them; making the term voluntary, and moral or immoral, co-extensive. If so, this is merely telling us that the moral sentiments are the