cesse, ajoutent à la felicité publique, et sans lesquelles les sociétés ne peuvent subsister." In the beginning of the 11th chapter of the same Discourse, he says, "Ce n'est plus de la probité par rapport à un particulier ou une petite société, mais de la vraie probité, de la probité considerée par rapport au public, dont il s'agit dans ce chapitre. Cette espece de probité est la seule, qui réellement en mérite, et qui en obtient generalement le nom. Ce n'est qu'en considerant la probité sous ce point de vue, qu'on peut se former des idées nettes de l'honnêteté, et trouver un guide à la vertu." In the 23rd chapter of the same Discourse, where his object is to unfold the causes which hitherto have retarded the progress of morality, he says, "Pour hâter les progrès d'une science, il ne suffit pas que cette science soit utile au public; il faut que chacun des citoyens, qui composent une nation, trouve quelque avantage à la perfectionner. Or, dans la revolution, qu'ont éprouvé tous les peuples de la terre, l'intérêt public, c'est à dire, celui du plus grand nombre, sur lequel doivent toujours être appuyés les principes d'une bonne morale, ne s'étant pas toujours trouvé conforme à l'interêt du plus puissant, ce dernier, indifférent au progrès des autres sciences, a dû s'opposer efficacement à ceux de la morale." I shall quote but one other passage. It is in the 23rd chapter of the Third Discourse. "Ce n'est donc point sur le terrein du luxe, et des richesses, mais sur celui de la pauvreté, que croissent les sublimes vertus; rien de si rare que de rencontrer des ames élevées dans les empires opulens, les citoyens y contractent trop de besoins. Quiconque les a multipliés a donné à la tyrannie des ôtages de sa bassesse et de sa lâcheté. La vertu qui se contente de peu est la seule qui soit à l'abri de la corruption." And this is the man whom, in England, a writer, with a philosophical reputation, was found to call the "low and loose moralist of the vain, the selfish, and the sensual!” from saying a word about the value of them. If Sir James's epithets were all correctly applied, the truths might still be insignificant. Distinguishable from other men's truths; satisfactorily established; comprehensively applied; rationally connected with each other; all this may be affirmed of very trifling propositions. But Sir James says, that the properties, thus assigned to Butler's truths, entitled them to " the name of discovery." One wonders what idea Sir James annexed to the name discovery. The connexion between "the properties thus assigned," and discovery, in the usual sense of the word, it is not easy to perceive. Some, however, of these characteristics of Butler's truths, are a little wonderful; their being distinguishable, for example, from the doctrines of his predecessors. We should imagine, that the capability of distinction would depend upon the difference; and that every doctrine, which differed from other doctrines, would be just as distinguishable as those of Butler. He does not tell us what doctrines of Butler's predecesssors he differs from. Butler himself speaks of no difference he had with any body, but Hobbes; and with him, only on one point. 66 66 To judge of the pertinence of his other epithets, "satisfactorily established," " comprehensively applied," rationally connected with each other," we must first know what the truths are, to which they are applied. They are, according to Sir James's own account of them, in number, two. The first is, that man does not act from selflove, which is a regard to the sum of his enjoyments; but from his particular appetites and desires, each of which has its peculiar object, which is its end. The second is, that the faculty of conscience has a right of control over those particular propensities, either to forbid or allow their seeking their own gratification. The first proposition is "satisfactorily established," as Sir James says-upon what? Upon an abuse of language. Self-love, or selfishness, says Butler, and his follower, does not mean acting from a man's selfish propensities, but acting with a view to increase the sum of his enjoyments. All men who are acquainted with the English language know, that the word does mean what these two writers say it does not mean. According to them, there is no self-love but that which Dr. Reid is at pains to distinguish from ordinary self-love, by calling it rational self-love.-This is not a satisfactory method of proving that self-love is not the spring of man's actions. No man ever said it was in this sense. Their other instrument of proof is, also, an abuse of language; and a very copious source of error and delusion. They personify an abstract |