the realization of this promise, which has been partially fulfilled in the "Data of Ethics," our author builds up a gigantic theory of society.

The plan of this sociology is to show the interdependencies of organic and superorganic phenomena and to trace their combined effects to the common principle which he denominates the persistence of force. The subject of Ethics is then introduced, the object still being to show that morality is relative, and that its laws are to be found in the human faculties, the submission of the individual to the general mind. Nothing can be more profound than this theory. In the persistency with which Mr. Spencer has labored to establish it, from the articles he wrote when a young man, now republished under the title of "Social Statics," a continuous thread of reasoning can be traced, a single purpose recognized.

We have seen that the intellectual faculties are merely names for the different phases of intellectual activity. A great memory, a great reason, or a great perception, means a mind that has acquired special powers by special circumstances. Balanced circumstances lead to balanced faculties; special circumstances, to special faculties. The needs of war produce heroes; the needs of society produce special casts of mind. The decay of Greek manhood produced Socrates; the irreligion of the Jews and the sufferings of humanity produced the prophets and Christ. The anarchy of European thought in the sixteenth century produced Bacon and Descartes, and the popular longing to unite pure reason with the love of God produced Spinoza. The need of vindicating reason against skepticism produced Kant and the German idealists, and the reaction of sentiment and common-sense produced the French and English psychologists. What, then, are faculties but the leaven of human character working out social developments?

As no deeper incentive to morality can be found than the symmetrical activity of our whole natures,' the balancing of

1 See argument on Morality, ch. xxiii.

human faculties which have their sources deep down in organic life, the principle of activity added to the fact of individual life comes to us as the result of the most careful analysis of our existence. Every synthesis begins with this principle of universal activity and brings us to the facts of social life. What limit does this suggest to perception but the moving limits of personal existence ?

Sociology teaches us that there is an aggregate human life and mind which springs from and is determined by the lives of individuals; that the atmosphere of this life is language. The quality of language determines the quality of the general mind, and reflects its influences upon every individual. Thus the world at large has a direct interest in the meaning of words, and this interest is proportionate to the range of their significance. Metaphysics, therefore, is closely associated with the science of Sociology; its object is to familiarize the general mind with the meaning of ultimate terms. In the success of this science over the errors of agnosticism and idealism, morality is deeply concerned, and the future will wonder at our slowness in reaching so important a result.

CHAPTER XIII.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES.

Belief in the Unknowable-Its Influence upon the Study of Psychology.

THE philosophic system of George Henry Lewes has the general title of "Problems of Life and Mind." The first two volumes are entitled "Foundations of a Creed"; the third deals with the problem of " Mind as a Function of the Organism"; and the last two are posthumous publications, -one being a comprehensive treatise on the "Physical Basis of Mind," and the other a comparatively short review of the author's favorite subject, "The Study of Psychology." In the preface to the opening volume Lewes says:

In 1862 I began the investigation of the physiological mechanism of Feeling and Thought, and from that time forward have sought assistance in a wide range of research. Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity, and the Science of Language, have supplied facts and suggestions to enlarge and direct my own meditations, and to confirm and correct the many valuable indications furnished by previous psychological investigators. ✶ ✶ ✶ When I began to organize these materials into a book, I intended it to be only a series of essays treating certain problems of Life and Mind; but out of this arose two results little contemplated. The first result was such a mutual illumination from the various principles arrived at separately, that I began to feel confident of having something like a clear vision of the fundamental ⚫ inductions necessary to the constitution of Psychology; hence, although I do not propose to write a complete treatisc, I hope to establish a firm groundwork for future labors. The second result, which was independent of the first, arose

thus: Finding the exposition obstructed by the existence of unsolved metaphysical problems, and by the too frequent employment of the metaphysical method, and knowing that there was no chance of general recognition of the scientific method and its inductions while the rival method was tolerated, and the conceptions of Force, Cause, Matter, Mind, were vacillating and contradictory, I imagined that it would be practicable in an introductory chapter, not indeed to clear the path of these obstacles, but at least to give such precise indications of the principles adopted throughout the exposition as would enable the reader to follow it untroubled by metaphysical difficulties." Here, then, is the great metaphysical problem confronted at the very outset.

In the beginning of the first chapter, we have this significant quotation from Mill: " England's thinkers are again. beginning to see, what they had only temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of all Science; that those difficulties can be quieted only by being resolved, and that until they are resolved, positively whenever possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations."

By this we are given in advance an idea of the direction of Lewes' thought: he is going to offer a negative, not a positive, solution of the Metaphysical problem; he is going to acknowledge the "existence of an unknowable" (which, be it remembered, is a distinct contradiction in terms; for to acknowledge an existence is to know it in some degree, and to know the unknowable in any degree is an absurdity). Notwithstanding this he is going to extend the known, the scope of definite knowledge, by means of a masterly physiological and psychological analysis, until it embraces the beginnings of organic life and shows a perfect interdependence between what are known as the physical and vital activities. His mind, however, is too sensitive to feel perfectly contented with this achievement; he is still haunted with the

"Problems of Life and Mind," vol. I., Preface.

idea that there is something yet to be done to complete an ultimate analysis, to establish the divine unity; and he expresses his unrest in these words:

"Science itself is also in travail. Assuredly some mighty new birth is at hand. Solid as the ground appears, and fixed as are our present landmarks, we cannot but feel the strange tremors of subterranean agitation which must erelong be followed by upheavals disturbing those landmarks. Not only do we see Physics on the eve of a reconstruction through Molecular Dynamics, we also see Metaphysics strangely agitated, and showing symptoms of a reawakened life. After a long period of neglect and contempt, its problems are once more reasserting their claims. And whatever we may think of those claims, we have only to reflect on the important part played by Metaphysics in sustaining and developing religious conceptions, no less than in thwarting and misdirecting scientific conceptions, to feel assured that before Religion and Science can be reconciled by the reduction of their principles to a common method, it will be necessary to transform Metaphysics or to stamp it out of existence. There is but this alternative. At present Metaphysics is an obstacle in our path: it must be crushed into dust and our chariot-wheels must pass over it; or its forces of resistance must be converted into motive powers, and what is an obstacle become an impulse."'

This promised conversion of Metaphysics, as will afterward appear, is but partially effected; the question is, whether, even as far as it goes, anything is accomplished by it. Lewes adopts the ingenious method of inventing another name for the science to which he attempts to attach all but the vital and reasonable part of Metaphysics, and thus effects for the old word Metaphysics a regeneration by freeing it from the superstitions which have so long been attached to it. This

1 "Problems of Life and Mind," vol. I., p. 4.

241

By way of preliminary, I will ask permission to coin a term that will clearly designate the aspect of Metaphysics which renders the inquiry objectionable to scientific thinkers, no less than to ordinary minds, because it implies a