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he was convinced that this theory had its origin in introspective, not in physical, researches; that it sought to separate the universal from the material, and put forth doctrines concerning things which did not correspond with phenomena. He denied to ideas an objective being, and could not, like Plato, give to qualities, such as weight, size, and color, separate existences. While Plato believed that from a single idea man could arrive at the knowledge of all ideas, Aristotle maintained that all knowledge comes through experience; that every idea is caused by a separate sensation, and that the universal principle is a principle of contradiction, man having power to perceive difference only through comparing like with unlike. His method was new, his conceptions just; but, in that early age of knowledge, and with such narrow data to generalize from, he could not accomplish much. Though both these philosophers admitted that science could only be derived from universals, one gave Experience as the basis of all science, and taught men to observe and question Nature; the other gave Reason as the basis, and taught men the contemplation of Ideas.

It will be asked: If Aristotle was a cautious thinker, and closely followed what has since received the name of the Scientific Method, how could he have been at the same time so famous a metaphysician?

This question will be answered by getting at the nature, not particularly of Aristotle's metaphysics, but of metaphysics in general. Perhaps the most exact metaphysical thought which the world has produced up to the time of the appearance of Lewes's "Problems of Life and Mind," is to be found in the writings of Herbert Spencer; and yet Mr. Spencer would, no doubt, be astonished were he called a metaphysician. The fact is, no one can take an intelligent view of life and its surroundings without becoming in some degree a metaphysician. The moment we attempt any thing like ultimate questions, we are in the midst of the most profound metaphysical problems. Aristotle stated what he took to be the ultimate realities or principles of all things, his ten categories of thought, as follows:

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It will be seen at a glance that there are repetitions in these principles. If we refer back to the beginning of Greek philosophy, we shall find that the ten double principles of Pythagoras, to whose school Aristotle gave a great deal of attention, probably suggested the above categories. However this may be, Aristotle reduced the number of these principles by one half, as those of the Pythagoreans were double or coördinates, making twenty in all. Modern thought has reduced these principles or ultimate realities to five. In Spencer's system, which agrees substantially with the best contemporaneous writings upon the subject, they are stated as follows:

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I contend that a generalization of these principles is possible; that they are all aspects of the single principle of Motion. There are so many repetitions, however, among the terms employed to represent them, that confusion inevitably results. It should be the aim of a true system of metaphysics to do away with this tautology. For as Matter and Space are but different aspects of the statical appearance of the universe, Time and Force are also the obverse aspects of the dynamical appearance of the universe. The greatest difficulty in making physics and metaphysics harmonize, or in making the experiences of phenomena agree with the ruling principles of all things, is to identify motion and the thing moved; or, in other words, to overcome what

'In Spencer's "First Principles" there are six ultimate realities postulated, as Consciousness is added to the five above cited; it is a fair inference from other parts of his works, however, that Consciousness is a relative, not an absolute, fact.

is simply a logical or subjective separation of an indivisible fact. A large class of scientists persist in imagining a force as the cause of motion; in imagining a matter in itself inert and propelled by this force; the two being in some way conjoined, they do not attempt to say how, make what we call Motion. They then introduce Time to the combination as another necessary element, and considerately supply an infinite Space for its convenience and occupancy. These logical preliminaries being arranged, the universe goes on without difficulty. Is it not wonderful that all these principles should work together so well in spite of the inartistic way in which they have been put together by human physicists?

Dr. Holmes says somewhere that whenever he comes in contact with a mathematician he imagines he hears the click of the wheels within his head; but if we must imagine that there are wheels in the heads of mathematicians, to account for the accuracy of their calculations, what shall be our symbol for the stupendous cohesive and organizing power supplied by the modern physicist who can make isolated principles hold together and work out all the wonders of evolution? How much more in accord with our attitude as students of the majestic sequences of evolution, having for their obverse aspects what we call infinite space and absolute time, would it be to recognize that divine unity, that universal principle, which we symbolize as power in so many ways, which we apprehend through the ever-increasing experiences of life. Let us not regard this principle as a veil which obscures reality from us, as a limit to knowledge, or a boundary of the "unknowable," for it is that of which Life or Knowledge consists.

Aristotle's metaphysics were about as coherent as the science or actual knowledge of his time; and this is the highest compliment that can be paid to any thinker. All the early thinkers sought with wonderful perseverance the knowledge of the First Cause. The Four Causes of Aristotle, though they had been separately recognized, had not

all been proclaimed necessary. Aristotle, like a true philosopher, while he considered nothing that happens unworthy of notice, yet gave his chief attention to the solution of the problem of First Causes. He maintained that there were four, as follows: First, the Material Cause, or Essence; second, the Substantial Cause; third, the Efficient Cause, or the principle of motion; fourth, the Final Cause, or the Purpose and End.'

After what has been said, it is hardly necessary to go into the merit of these speculations; they are obviously the expression of a very high order of reasoning power, making the best use of such materials as were at hand. We cannot help regarding them with respect, considering the opportunities of their author; and as they occur again in the works of later thinkers, we should maintain the same attitude toward them; for the superior advantage which we enjoy in the way of scientific knowledge is partly a product of these very speculations.

The progress of knowledge consists of an ebb and flow between hypothesis and verification, thought, and science; and it is the rivalry or interaction of these opposite modes of procedure repeated in the individual, the school, the epoch which constitutes the true progress of our race.

The strength of Aristotle lay in his marvellous command of facts and in his power of grouping them. Plato will always be regarded as a finer writer, and, in the literary sense, as a greater genius. Aristotle never reached the sublime heights of abstraction which we find in the theology of Plato; he rather occupied himself with bringing the results. of previous thought into harmony with actual knowledge, and enlarging this knowledge through the agency of new facts, a more patient and thorough method than Plato's.

The science of Logic is said to have been originated by Aristotle. If we admit this to be the case, we must be careful.

Ritter gives the four causes as follows: The Material, the Formal, the Moving, and the Final: and says that Aristotle sometimes speaks of only three Causes, identifying the Form with the End. He calls Form that which a thing is in truth and apart from matter,-it is the notion of the Essence.

to limit the definition of logic to an exposition of the laws and methods of reasoning, for it is clear that actual reasoning is little dependent upon a knowledge of this science. Some of the greatest feats of reasoning which history records occurred before Aristotle was born, before logic was recognized as a science. Logic enables us to compel assent to propositions, rather than to discover truth. In other words, it too often constitutes merely a training in the art of disputation. People are disconcerted and defeated more than convinced by its processes. In his treatment of logic Aristotle seems to have laid aside in part his distinct scientific character.

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He made the mistake of regarding logic as the art of thinking, instead of "a portion of the art of thinking." He saw the dependence of thought upon words, and imagined that truth or falsehood in logical processes wholly depended upon combinations of words, or propositions, instead of upon the facts or things which the propositions represent. The fine distinction that Aristotle made between the definitions of words and those of things is declared by Mill to be futile. As this theory of Aristotle involves a mistaken idea with regard to the scope of language, we will give the argument of Mill at length.

"The distinction between nominal and real definitions, between definitions of words and what are called definitions of things, though conformable to the ideas of most of the Aristotelian logicians, cannot, as it appears to us, be maintained. We apprehend that no definition is ever intended to explain and unfold the nature of the thing.' It is some confirmation of our opinion, that none of those writers who have thought that there were definitions of things, have ever succeeded in discovering any criterion by which the definition of a thing can be distinguished from any other proposition relating to the thing. The definition, they say, unfolds the nature of the thing: but no definition can unfold its whole nature; and every proposition in which any quality whatever is predicated of the thing, unfolds some part of its nature. The true state of the case we take to be this. All definitions are of names, and of names only; but, in some definitions, it is clearly apparent that nothing is intended except to explain the meaning of the word; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the word, it is intended to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to the word. Whether this be or be not implied in any given case,

1 See J. S. Mill's "System of Logic," p. 26.

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