ministers. It is even asserted in late newspapers, that letters have been intercepted, addressed by order of Ferdinand to the curate Merino, the leader of a horde of banditti in open rebellion against the government. However this may be, the occurrences attending the change of ministry leave no doubt upon the general fact above stated. At the opening of the cortes, the king, after delivering the speech which had been prepared and adopted in the council of ministers, concluded with a number of additional remarks on the dangers, which he conceived to threaten his own person. This imprudent and unconstitutional proceeding was necessarily followed by the resignation of the ministers; and in a country where the doctrine of ministerial responsibility was well understood, and habitually acted upon, the king would have met with some difficulty in finding any persons of high character to take their places. The fact proves to a demonstration, that he is under the influence of a private council, composed, beyond a doubt, of priests, who act upon his mind by the engine of fanaticism. The probable consequences of such imprudence and weakness to the tranquillity of the country, and to the safety of the unfortunate monarch himself, are but too evident.

One of the doubtful points in the present state of affairs in Spain is the part that may be taken by

Gen. Morillo. This officer has returned from his long campaign in South America with a high military reputation; and almost immediately after his arrival was appointed captain general of Madrid. His sentiments in regard to the revolution have not yet been declared with sufficient precision. On the one hand, his persevering struggle against the independence of Venezuela might be supposed to imply an aversion to constitutional principles; and the confidence which is now placed in him by the king would seem to prove, that he has given satisfactory evidence in private of his dislike to the revolution. On the other hand, his language, though mild and temperate, has been hitherto wholly constitutional. Should he attach himself decidedly to the king, and should a counter-revolution be attempted, its movers would then be sure of at least one military officer of distinguished talent; but it is hardly probable that Morillo would carry with him any considerable portion of the army. It appears not unlikely, that this officer is preparing to be the Bonaparte of Spain, should circumstances favour the playing of such a part. But in this, as in other matters relating to the immediate future prospects of this country, conjectures are worse than unprofitable. It may be sufficient, if we venture to anticipate from present appearances, as the general result

of the revolution, the establishment of political institutions founded in rational liberty, after an intervening period of danger, difficulty, and probably serious convulsion. This prediction, the only one that can be made with a good degree of confidence, is about as precise and edifying, as the prophecies in the almanac of snow in February and warm weather in June. Without dwelling any longer on this part of the subject, I shall add a few general remarks on the Spanish constitution, and on the probable effects of the revolution on the situation of the colonies. These observations will apply equally to Spain and Portugal, which are placed in both these respects in precisely similar circumstances; their constitutions and colonial system being substantially the same.

1. The Spanish constitution was drawn up at a period of great embarrassment; and there might be some reason for surprise, that it is as good as we find it, were it not that in reality there is very little difficulty in putting together upon paper the elementary principles of government, and tracing a form of practical administration. Of these forms an infinite variety may be imagined, and chalked out; and the practical effect of all will probably be in substance nearly the same; because they are all controlled in their operation by causes of a higher and more general nature, founded in the condition

and character of the people upon which they are to operate. The forms of government were the same at Rome under the emperors, as they had been under the consuls; although, from the alteration in the condition and character of the people, the substance had changed from an irregular democracy to a military despotism. The Spanish constitution, in its present form, will probably never have a fair trial; and will doubtless undergo many important alterations before the government assumes a settled and permanent shape. The intervening troubles, through which the country may pass, will perhaps be ascribed by superficial observers to the defects of the constitution, as they were in France; while, in reality, the cause of them in both cases must be looked for in the difficulties of the crisis.

The establishment of the cortes in the form of a single assembly is regarded by many of the friends. of liberty, as a very unfortunate arrangement. But this objection, founded in a great measure on an erroneous theory of the British constitution, has, in my opinion, very little weight. It supposes that the existence of a nominal aristocracy is a point of great importance. But even admitting the correctness of this idea, which might however be contested on various grounds, it may be asked with pertinence, whether the security of such an aristocracy depends

upon their being shut up in a separate room to deliberate on the public affairs; whether, like ciphers in notation, they are personally insignificant, and only acquire importance by their local position; whether their political weight does not depend, on the contrary, upon their property; whether, as long as they retain their property, they will not also retain their influence; and whether to form a part of the same legislative assembly is not the most favourable position, in which they can be placed for exercising the influence their property gives them, while they retain it, over their supposed enemies.

The king's prerogative is also said to be too much restricted; but this objection is not better founded than the other. In a constitutional monarchy the appointment of the ministers is the only function, which the king can really exercise; and this is attributed to him in Spain.

In one or two points of smaller importance, it would perhaps be possible to discover some real defects. There is an evident incongruity in the right granted to the cortes of summoning the king's ministers to appear before them, and give an account of the progress of public affairs. In a constitutional monarchy the ministers are responsible, as citizens, for their official conduct, and may be brought before the regular tribunals for any part of it; but, as min