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states still contrived to keep their independence on or near times which went before them. The states which are most the coast of Asia, as the city of Byzantion, the island of important in these times, are not the same as those which Rhodes, and the eity of Herakleia, which last was some were most important in the old days of the Persian and times a common onwealth, and sometimes under tyrants.* Peloponnesian wars. First of all, we must remember that
Macedonia and Epeiros must now be reckoned as Greek AFFAIRS IN GREECE AND MACEDONIA.—The death of states, and that a large part of Greece, especially in the Alexander was followed by a time of great confusion in north, was now always, till the Roman conquest of MaceMacedonia and Greece. Even while Alexander was away donia, more or less subject to the Macedonian kings, or, at in Asia, the Spartans under their king, Agis, had tried to least, under their influence. And among the states of throw off the Macedonian yoke, but in vain. After Alex Greece itself, the division of power was very different froin ander's death another attempt was made by several of the what it had been in earlier times. In the days which we Greek states, especially the Athenians, who were again have now come to neither Athens nor Thebes was of very stirred up by Demosthenes and the Ætolians. These last great account, and though Sparta was of great importance were a people of Western Greece, the least civilized of all during part of the time, yet its greatness was only, as we the Greek states, but which now began to rise to great im may say, by fits and starts. We may say that the chief portance. This was called the Lamian war. In the end the powers of Greece now were Macedonia, Achaia, Ætolia, Athenians had to yield, and they were obliged by the Mace and Sparta. Achaia and Ætolia are states of which but litdonian general, Antipatros, to change their constitution, tle is heard in Grecian history since the heroic times.* making it much less democratical than before, and depriving many of the citizens of their votes. For many years there THE ROMAN POWER IN GREECE.-Philip of Macedon was the greatest confusion in Macedonia and Greece, and was at this time at open war with the Romans, and the all the neighboring countries; and things were made Romans brought armnies into Macedonia and from thence worse by an attack from an enemy with whom the Greeks into Greece. Nearly all the Grecians sided with the Rohad never before had anything to de. Greece and Mace mans, but this only served to engage them in war, not for donia were invaded by the Gauls. By these we need not themselves, but for a foreign power which did not in the understand people from Gaul itself, but some of those Celtic least care for their good. The Romans were then the most tribes which were still in the east of Europe. After doing powerful people in the world. Philip withstood them for a much mischief in those parts, the Gauls crossed over into long time, but they defeated him entirly at a battle in Asia, and there founded a state of their own, which was Thessaly, and from that time Macedonia was subject to them. called Galatia, and, as they too began to learn something of The Greeks thought that this event would be for their adGreek civilization, Gallo-græcia. Meanwhile kings were vantage. The Romans professed that they meant Greece to being constantly set up and overthrown in Macedonia, and be independent; and Flaminius, one of the Roman generals, each of them tried to get as much power and influence as caused the freedom of the country to be solemnly prohe could in Greece itself. At this time, too, Epeiros, a claimed at the Isthmian games. There was one circumcountry which hitherto had been of very little importance, stance, however, which soon taught the Greeks that this became a powerful state under its king, Pyrrhus, who at hope of freedom was vain. The Romans insisted upon one time obtained possession of Macedonia. He also waged keeping possession of three Greek cities: Chalcis in Eubea, wars in Italy and Sicily, and he had a great deal to do with Demetrios in Thessaly, and Corinth, which one of the Macthe affairs of the Peloponnesus, where he was at last killed edonian kings had been accustomed to call the fetters of in besieging Argos, B. C. 272. From this time things be- Greece, because whoever possessed them could keep the peocame rather more settled; a second time of freedom, if not ple in entire subjection. So it was now. The Roman power of greatness, began in Greece, and a regular dynasty of took the place of the Macedonian, and whatever Rome kings fixed itself in Macedonia. The old royal family was ordered Greece was obliged to submit to. Tne Romans quite extinct, and the second set of Macedonian kings were were so powerful in Greece, that when Perseus, king of the descendants of Antigonos, one of the most famous of Macedon, who succeeded his father Philip, made immense Alexander's generals. His son, Demetrios, got possession efforts to carry on a war against Rome, no city or state in of the crown of Macedonia in B. C. 294. Both he and his Greece except the towns in Bæotia dared to give him assistson, Antigonos Gonatas, were driven out more than once, ance. They dared not rebel against their great lords. Perbut in the end Antigonos contrived to keep the Macedonian haps it was well for them that they did not; for Perseus crown, and to hand it on to his descendants, who held it till experienced the same fate as every other monarch who rethe Macedonian kingdom was conquered by Rome.*
sisted Rome. He was defeated at the battle of Pydua, in
Macedon, and his country ceased to be an independent THE LEAGUES.—The oppression of Autigonos caused the
kingdom, anil became a Roman province. The Greeks revival of the Achæan League, B. C. 251. It was origin
were allowed to call themselves independent a few years ally for religious purposes; it now embraced Athens, Cor
longer, but Greece became a Roman province in the year
B. C. 146.7 inth, Megara, Ægina, Salamis and the Peloponnesus, except Sparta, Elis, and a few other states. In B. C. 221, Sparta opposed the League, but by the assistance of the CAUSE OF CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT.—The Athenians Macedonians was completely defeated. An Ætolian league were in fact the cause of the change in the government of had been formed in central Greece which defeated the the country. They had become so weak and so poor, that Achæans, and Philip, King of Macedonia, was called in they actually oppressed and pillaged one of their own by the latter. He gained several vietories, was defeated by towns. The other states interfered and a war was the conthe Romans, and soon made peace.t
sequence. But the Romans did not choose them to carry
on contests between themselves, and sent word that they LATER GRECIAN HISTORY.-The last days of Grecian would settle their disputes for them. This made the Greeks history, before the country came altogether under the power very angry, and for the last time the members of the Achof the Romans, are distinguished in several ways from the aan league declared war against Rome. The Romans sent
* Freeman's Outlines of History. + Henry C. Canieron.
* Freeman's Outlines of History.
an army into Peloponnesus,and the consul, Lucius Mummius, houses of the rich people who lived in the country were gained a victory, not far from Corinth, which put an end to much more magnificent than those in the town. Generally the Achæan league for ever. Corinth was first plundered, speaking, the Greeks, in their best days, lived in small, and then, on a signal given by the blast of a trumpet, it plain houses, and employed their money and their taste on was set on fire. The men were killed; the women and child the temples and public buildings. The Greeks usually parren, and any slaves who could be found in it, were sold.* took of three meals: The first commonly consisted of bread GREECE UNDER THE ROMANS.-All Greece, as far as
dipped in unmixed wine; the second-taken probably about Macedon and Epirus, was now formed into a Roman pro- twelve o'clock-was of a light kind, and varied according vince, and called Achaia, by which name it is frequently to the habits of different persons; the third and principal
meal was often not eaten before sunset. The Greeks drank mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. The name must
wine and talked after dinner as gentlemen now do; but have been derived from the Achæan league, which lasted as
they also diverted themselves by games, such as casting long as the country could in any way pretend to be independent. The history of Greece from this time is entirely dice, or throwing up huckle-stones, or draughts. Very mixed up with that of Rome. When the Roman empire often, also, they asked each other riddles, and the persons
who found them out were rewarded with a crown, or a garwas divided, the eastern division was called the Greek Em
land, or a kiss. Many private persons in Athens had large pire, but this was only for the sake of distinction. Greece
collections of books, and sometimes the public were allowed itself was st:ll only a province subject to the emperors.
the use of them. Aristotle is said to have taught one of the The Turks entirely conquered the Greek empire, when Con
kings of Egypt how to arrange a library; and after his time, stantinople, the capital, was taken by them in the year A.
the library at Alexandria in Egypt became the most celeD. 1453, and they then became the lords of Greece. Their
brated in the world. The dress of the Greeks was very government was very cruel, and the two nations felt the utmost hatred for each other . The Greeks often rebelled, the Spartan chiton and the Athenian were not alike.
simple. Their principal garment was called a chiton; but and at length several of the principal European kingdoms, Spartan chiton was made of woolen stuff, very short, and
The pitying their condition, and remembering their former
without sleeves, and it was fastened over both shoulders by glory, united together, and compelled the Turks to set them
clasps or buckles; the Athenian chiton was a long loose dress free. Otho, the son of the king of Bavaria, was chosen for their
with wide sleeves, and usually made of linen. The dresses monarch, and Greece was raised into a kingdom, A. D. 1828.*
of men and women were originally very much alike, for in GREEK CIVILIZATION.—The late President Felton has early days it was the custom for all to wear the Spartan, or, eloquently characterized the spirit of Greek civilization in as it was called, the Dorian chiton. The practice of baththe following words: During the long existence of the ing was as common amongst the Greeks as amongst the RoAthenian republic, amidst the interruptions of foreign mans; but they had no splendid public buildings for the and domestic wars,-her territory overrun by Hellenic and purpose. Persons of rank and wealth had private baths in barbaric armies, her forests burned, her fields laid waste, their own houses, and it was customary for them to use two her temples levelled in the dust, in these tumultous ages in succession, first a cold bath, and then a warm one. The of her democratic existence,-the fire of her creative Athenians were far more luxurious in their mode of living genius never smouldered. She matured and perfected the than the Spartans. The Athenians lived very much in art of historical composition, of political and forensic elo- public. They met in public places, and wandered about in quence, of popular legislation, of lyric and dramatic poetry, the public gardens, and cared but little for the pleasures of of music, painting, architecture and sculpture; she unfolded home; but the Spartans, although they dined together, bethe mathematics theoretically and practically, and clothed cause it was one of the rules given them by Lycurgus, kept the moral and metaphysical sciences in the brief, senten- | to themselves at other times. The Athenians were much tious wisdom of the myriad-minded Aristotle, and the hon the more agreeable, but the Spartans seem generally to eyed eloquence of Plato. Rome overran the world with her have been the more respected. The writing of the Greeks armies, and though she did not always spare the subjects, must have been like that of most other nations, before she beat down the proud, and laid her laws upon the pros paper was invented. Waxen tablets were in common use, trate nations. Greece fell before the universal victor, but which were written upon with an iron instrument very she still asserted her intellectual supremacy, and as even like a pencil in appearance.* the Roman poet (Virgil) confesses, the conquered became
CONCLUSION.—The history of Greece which we have thus the teacher and guide of the conqueror.t
run through, though it is the history only of a small part of LIVING IN GREECE.-It will perhaps help to fix the his- | the world for a few hundred years, is worth fully as mnch tory of Greece in our minds if we endeavor to learn some study as any later and wider part of history. It is, as it thing of the dwellings, the manners, and customs of the were, the history of the world in a small space. There is no people. A Greek house was always divided into two dis- lesson to be taught by history in general, which is not tinct portions, one for the men, and the other for the taught by the history of Greece. The Greeks, too, we women. The house-door opened into a narrow passage, on should never forget, were the first people to show the world one side of which were the stables, and on the other the what real freedom and real civilization were. And they porter's lodge. From the passage the peristyle or court, brought, not only politics, but art and science, and literawas entered. Round the peristyle were the apartments for ture of every kind, to a higher pitch than any other peothe men, such as large banqueting rooms, parlors, picture ple ever did without borrowing of others. In all these galleries, and libraries, sleeping rooms, and sometimes ways Greece has influenced the world forever.t storerooms. Usually there was an upper story to the house,
Gone are the glorious Greeks of old, occupied by the slaves; the roof of this sometimes projected
Glorious in mien and mind; over the lower story, and formed balconies or verandahs.
Their bones are mingled with the mold,
Their dust is on the wind; The stairs which led to the upper story were sometimes on
The forms they hewed from living stone the outside of the house. The roofs were generally flat, and
Survive the waste of years alone,
And, scattered with their ashes show it was customary to walk about upon upon them. The
What greatness perished long ago.
* Sewall's History of Greece. + Gilman's General History.
* Sewall's History of Greece.
known as to what mind is.
THE ALPHABET OF MENTAL PHIL Knowing things "in themselves” is a phrase that sounds OSOPHY.
deep, and means--nothing. Ask the next Knowitg things
philosopher you meet that uses this phrase to “in themselves. Mental philosophy treats of the mind, what it is, what
tell you what he means by it. Ask him to answer simply, Definition. things it does, and how it does thém.
directly, intelligibly. If he is an honest man he will either Mental philosophy has been long studied, deeply studied,
confess that he can not tell you, or else he will say, knowState of the sci- and ably studied, but it is still far from being ing a thing in itself means merely this, knowing all abouts
mastered. This little treatise claims to do thing. If the phrase means more than that, you may at nothing more than give the alphabet of the science. Even least safely defy anybody to tell you what more. But it has so much as this, it claims with misgiving, for precisely the the air of meaning more, and it therefore is a bad phrase. elementary part, or alphabet, of mental philosophy is that You will need now and again to cry halt to mental philosowhich down to the present moment remains most in dispute. phers, and ask them what they mean by their words and
Mind is that in man which perceives, feels, thinks, exer phrases. What is mind ? cises emotions, chooses, uses the body.
The various branches of mental philosophy have all of This definition tells all that anyone knows as to what them received long and hard names, mostly Mental phikso. Nothing further mind is. There has been beyond this a great derived from the Greek. The question we have phy has various
deal of guessing and supposing on the subject, just been considering, namely, what is mind? partments. but beyond this no one knows, or can know, anything. belongs to that branch of mental philosophy which is learn
Observe, we tell what mind is, by telling what mind does. edly styled ontology. Ontology treats of things Ontology. What mind is, What mind is “in itseif,” as the deep-seeming or existences, or beings "in themselves." It treats, theredefined by what mind does. phrase goes, we are unable to say. We may fore, of what nobody knows or can know. Studying ontolcall mind spirit, but what does “spirit” mean? Spirit means ogy may train your mind, but it will not increase your to us nothing in the world except not-matter. But saying knowledge. In the present primer of mental philosophy the mind is not-matter is merely saying what mind is not. we shall not deal much with ontology. Our chief concern It is not saying what mind is. We can not say what mind will be with psychology, which is the learned Psychology. is. Suppose we call it matter. We then have matter that name for the science that treats of the working of the huperceives, feels, thinks, exercises emotions, chooses, uses man mind. It may amuse, if it does not instruct, the matter (the body). What have we gained? What but a reader, to see a few of the names of "learned length and wider definition of matter? The distinction remains be thundering sound" that one famous philosopher uses in tween matter that thinks, and so forth, and matter that talking about the mind. does not. We have got mind reduced to matter. But how Sir William Hamilton, a great Scottish metaphysician, have we done this? Why, by making the term matter large
who died less than thirty years ago, gives us Sir William enough to take in mind. Say, then, mind is matter. This this for his division of mental philosophy: Hamilton, may help us, provided, now, we know what matter is. Phænomonology, Empirical Psychology, which deals with What is matter? Matter is force, says one definition, the the observed facts respecting mind; Nomology, Rational shortest, and perhaps the best. But this looks very much Psychology, which deals with the laws or methods of mind like reducing matter to mind.
We just now,
with some in action; Ontology, Inferential Psychology, which deals ado, reduced mind to matter; and, presto, here goes with the deductions or guesses suggested by the study of matter back again to mind. Mind is matter, and matter mind. I would not have the reader suppose that I make is force. Mind, then, is force. But what is force? Force
light of technical terms as if these were really value of technical is that which causes motion. "That which'-we had those of no use in mental philosophy. On the con- terms. words in defining mind at first. Force is "that which" trary, well-chosen technical terms are here, as everywhere does something. But mind is "that which” does something. else, highly useful. The commonest trade among men has We come round once more to our starting point. With all its stock of technical terms. The carpenter must have our endeavor, we have made no progress in the attempt to names for his tools, and for the several operations in which tell what mind is “in itself," as the phrase is. The truth his tools are applied. The mental philosopher certainly is is, we had better content ourselves to say only what we be to be praised rather than blamed for having, in part, a gan with saying, namely, mind is that in man which per dialect of his own. However, in these pages, peculiar ceives, feels, thinks, etc. We shall never get further on in words and phrases will, as much as possible, be avoided. defining mind.
The reader, I am sure, will appreciate being talked to as, for But we need not feel disquieted. Surely it is better to the most part, he here will be, in a language that he can
know only what mind can do than it would be understand. ought to satisfy us.to know only what mind is. Indeed, when we
CONSCIOUSNESS. know all that a power of any sort ean do, we then know in the Consciousness is a term of prime importance in mental most satisfactory way possible what that power is. Or, do philosophy. Let us define it. Consciousness Consciousness you still wish you knew something about mind over and is the mind's knowledge of what it does. above what mind can do? Well, what, for example, over Mental philosophers are very fond of using the word conand above this? Well, for example, you say, I should like sciousness figuratively. They personify it, and so talk alto know how mind is made up. But suppose it is not made most as if it were a real person, different from The term up. Suppose it is perfectly simple. Then I should like, the man himself. They say, consciousness used figuratively. you still urge, to know what that simple thing is. You “testities" so and so, consciousness makes such and such shall be gratified. I will tell you. That simple thing is- an "affirmation." Scottish Sir William Hamilton has mind. This not satisfactory? You feel trifled with? Why,
“consciousness” make "deliverances.” There is, of course, what would you have? Not, of course, just some different
no harm in all this. In fact, such use of language helps name for the thing. A new name merely for the old thing make our impressions lively. Still, it is very needful again would not add to your knowledge. The true way, then, is
and again to remember that consciousness, thus personified, to rest satisfied with knowing what the mind is, by know is just ourselves paying attention to ourselves-nothing ing what the mind can do. There is really no other way more, nothing less, nothing else. When we say, consciouseven conceivable of knowing what a thing is than by know ness informs me so and so, we simply mean, I am conscious ing all about that thing.
that such and such is the fact I know it. However, we
source of all our mental
never use the word consciousness, even in a figure, except | says, and doubting your observation of what consciousness when we are referring to what goes on within ourselves. says.
Often question whether you have ob- What we know is We never say, in literal language, I am conscious of this served right what consciousness says, but never true. inkstand, I am conscious of that landscape. We never, in question whether what consciousness says is true. God has figurative language, say, consciousness testifies to me of not made our nature a lie. What we know, is true. this inkstand, of that landscape. Sir William Hamilton, The question has been much discussed whether we ought indeed, puts a bold face upon it, and defends such ex to consider consciousness a separate faculty or not. We pressions. He admits that they are unusual, but insists shall best seek the right answer by getting a Is consciousness that they ought not to be unusual. Let us do as everybody clear idea of what we mean by a “faculty" of of the mind does—everybody but Sir William Hamilton, and as Sir the mind. The mind is not to be thought of as parted off into William does, too, for that matter, when he forgets himself different divisions called faculties. The mind is one, and and talks naturally-let us keep the word "conscious” for not many, which is the same as saying that we are, each, application to things that pass within our own selves. We
one person, and not many. For the mind is really nothing are conscious of seeing a tree, but we are not conscious of but the man himself. To be sure, we do sometimes say my the tree; we are conscious of touching a table, but we are mind," as if the “I” referred to in “my” were the owner, not conscious of the table. This is the ordinary use of lan- and the mind the thing owned, just as we also say my guage, and this expresses the fact. The fact, I say, but how body." Still, that the mind, and not the body, nay, that do I know to be a fact that which I have just called the the mind, and not the mind and body together, is really the fact? What warrant have I for making the assertion, for person, is shown in the fact that we can say, the mind uses example, I see a tree, or, I touch a table? A strange ques the body, whereas we could not say, the body uses the mind, tion, certainly, to raise, but a question fundamental in or even the body uses itself. The mind is the agent, the mental philosophy.
body the instrument. The mind acts, and, when the body I know that I see a tree, or that I touch a table, just as I is concerned at all in the matter, the mind acts by means of Consciousness the know anything else that pertains to mental the body. The mind, therefore, is the man. And as the
philosophy, from consciousness. Conscious man is one, so is the mind, one and undivided. A faculty, phy.
ness is the only source of our knowledge in then, is not a part or division of the mind. matters of mental philosophy. This, at least, is the way A faculty of the mind is simply an ability that the mind philosophers have of putting it. I like better to put it has to do a particular thing. It is the same Faculty defined. still more simply, and say, I know. Those two words mind all the time, and the whole of the same mind, but it express it all. It is longer, and perhaps it sounds more is the same mind having the ability to perform a particular learned, to say, I know thus and so about my mind, because kind of action. In the case of consciousness, the action of consciousness informs me of it. But what is saying, "con the mind is that of observing its own actions. Is the sciousness informs me of it,” but saying, “I know it?” And faculty to observe its own working a different faculty, on what is saying "I know it, because consciousness informs the part of the mind, from the faculty to observe anything me of it,” but saying, “I know it, because-I know it.” We else? That is the question. Does the general ability to obmight as well stop with the statement, “I know," since the serve include the ability to observe also the observation? reason, “because I know," with which we go on, is the Or is there a special faculty of observation needed, in addisame thing as the statement.
tion, for this purpose ? We can not, then, go behind our consciousness and find Some philosophers say yes, and some say no. Sir Wilsomething else than consciousness to prove consciousness liam Hamilton, for his part, says no.
But he, Different answers. true. Consciousness to
We must implicitly believe conscious at the same time, gives a somewhat peculiar sense to the be absolutely ness on its own credit. Except on this con word consciousness.
He is a little vague here, Sir William Hamseverely cross-ex- dition, we can have no mental philosophy. but the following is his language: "Con-ilton says no. amined. Still, it does not follow that we should not give sciousness can not be defined.
The reason is good heed to see that we understand consciousness right. plain. Consciousness lies at the root of all knowledge. Consciousness never lies, but consciousness may easily be Consciousness is itself the one highest source of all commisunderstood. That is to say, what you know about the prehensibility and illustration-how, then, can we find things that take place within yourself, is certainly true; but aught else by which consciousness may be illustrated or you may not know all that you think you know. It is nec- comprehended? * In short, the notion of consciousessary to look to it very closely. Consider: You are your ness is so elementary, that it can not possibly be resolved Chances of misun- self the thing to be known; you are yourself into others more simple.
But, though consciousderstanding consciousness. the source of the knowledge, and you are ness can not be logically defined, it may, however, be yourself the person that is to know.. It is all very compact philosophically analyzed.” and convenient. But this does not free you from the dan Just how a “notion" which is so elementary that it can ger of making mistakes. There has to be a kind of double not be "resolved” into others more “simple,” may yet be working of your mind. Your mind must be at work, and “philosophically analyzed,” most people would be puzzled then must watch itself at work. The very fact of its watch- to tell. I quote this great philosopher, for great philosopher ing itself will hinder it somewhat from working quite natur Sir William Hamilton is, thus saying mutually contrary ally. Thus the observations that it takes will need some things, in order that the student may see how easy it is for corrections. I can not spend the time that would be needed a famous man to make a slip. You must think for yourself, to mention all the difficulties that lie in the way of your and trust no man to do your thinking for you.
Of course, progress in mental philosophy, that is, in the way of your after saying that consciousness can not be defined, Sir Willearning accurately what your consciousness really does liam Hamilton gives us no definition of consciousness. But teach you, or, in other words, of your making what you he says of it vaguely, as I have already remarked, “Conknow and what you think you know about your mind, the sciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recognition by the
Suffice it to say, that you are at least as liable to mind, or ego, of its acts or affections; in other words, the mistake in observing the world within, as you are in ob- self-affirmation, that certain modifications are known by serving the world without. Be prepared, therefore, again me, and that these modifications are mine. But, on the and again, to find yourself wrong. But keep the distinction clear in your thought between doubting what consciousness * Lectures, P. 132, Boston ed.
Reid and Stewart say yes.
other hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything either the particular question, can you think, “ I am thinkdifferent from these modifications themselves, but is, in ing such and such a thought," at the very instant that you fact, the general condition of their existence, or of their ex are thinking that thought? or the general question, can you istence within the sphere of intelligence."'* Again, "Con- think any two different thoughts, do any two separate thinksciousness constitutes the fundamental form of every, act of | ings, at the self-same instant? This whole topic we will knowledge."'+
keep for discussion, if we discuss it at all, at a later stage; The student will perceive that it is not easy to get at Sir perhaps when we come to speak of comparison. William's precise meaning. It is even difficult to believe Observe, however, if we decide that the mind can notthat he had any precise meaning. Such labor of words with. think two thoughts at once, then of course the mind cap. out meaning is the natural result of seeking to be deep more not think, I am now thinking such or such a thought; itthan to be clear. Consciousness is a simple enough thing can only think, I was just now thinking such or such a if we are willing not to be profound. It is just the knowl- thought. So, Reid's definition of consciousness as knowledge that we have of what we do in our minds. Or if, by a edge of present thinking, falls to the ground. Conscious-slight use of figure, we make a faculty of it, then conscious ness becomes knowledge, not of thinking now in progress, ness is our faculty of knowing what our minds do. Reid but of thinking just past. Consciousness would thus be
and Stewart, great Scottish philosophers, pre- nothing but memory, limited in its application always to
decessors of Sir William Hamilton, make con acts of the mind, and to the act belonging to the last presciousness a distinct faculty. Reid says: "Consciousness is ceding moment. If Reid holds that we can do but onea word used by philosophers to signify that immediate mental act at a time, still teaching that consciousness is the knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and pur- | knowledge of present mental acts, then he seems to contraposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our dict himself. Or else he carelessly uses consciousness in minds.
As that consciousness by which we have two different senses--first, as the same with reflection, and, a knowledge of the operations of our ownʼminds is a differ secondly, as equivalent to intelligence, sound-mindedness. ent power from that by which we perceive external objects, “In order," Reid says, “to our having a distinct notion of
a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this dis any of the operations of our own minds, it is not enough tinction, and never to confound things so different in their that we be conscious of them, for all men have this connature.''! Note heedfully, and you will see that Reid here sciousness: she seems here to mean that men are always uses the word "consciousness" in two different senses, first conscious of what is going on in their minds. But he proas "knowledge," secondly, as "power," or, faculty of knowl ceeds to say) it is further necessary that we attend to them edge.
while they are exerted, and reflect upon them while they On the whole, observation of what exists or goes on within, are recent and fresh in our memory. Three things are here or consciousness, seems different enough from observation distinguished: first, consciousness; second, attention; third, of what exists or goes on without, or perception, to be con reflection. Now, if attention to our own thoughts is a difsidered a faculty separate from that. But now a question. ferent thing from consciousness of them, while Two different
senses of "know. Are we conscious Reid says, consciousness is the knowledge of still consciousness is knowledge of our ing” implied. of what is now the present operations of our minds. Hamilton thoughts, it follows that cousciousness must mean knowl
says, I know that I know is the formula of con- edge of a special sort, must, in short, mean, not that we actu-. sciousness. The question that I raise is this: Are we really ally know at the moment, but only that we know in the sense conscious of what is, this instant, going on in our minds ? of having it in our power to know,-as we say, for example, Or is it only of things just this instant done and past? The I know the history of that affair, when, what we mean is, I first instinct will, with everybody, be to say: Why, yes, cer can know the history; that is, can bring it up into conscious. tainly, I know my present thought. But ponder carefully. knowledge at will. Consciousness, in this sense, is, not In the very indivisible instant in which you are thinking a knowing, but being able to know. The word thus names thing, are you also thinking that you are thinking that not a mental act, nor a series of mental acts, but a continuthing? When you begin to think of your thinking, do you ous state of mind, a condition, namely, of mental sanity. not that instant stop the thinking that you think of? Can Such a use of the word is quite proper, but we ought not you have two thoughts at once? Certainly you can have then to define it as knowledge of present mental acts. It is.
two thoughts, following one the other, with in truth, then, ability to know acts of the mind not that inA necessary close
in an inconceivably short space of time, stant going on, but just that instant done and past-not following one another so swiftly that it is hard to separate knowledge of them, but ability to know them. In a word, them. But two thoughts at absolutely the same moment, consciousness is then ability to recollect, that is, memory, (as. is it possible? This is a different thing from asking, can distinguished from recollection). So, too, if we decide that you think of two things at once? That undoubtedly you the mind can not perform any two acts in the same indivisible can do. You can take in two things, or a greater number, instant, Sir William Hamilton's formula for consciousness, with one thought. But can you have two thoughts, can you I know that I know, must be changed to, “I know that I do two thinkings at once? Now, to think a thing, and to knew.” This, or else we must understand the second think that you think it, or to know a thing, and to know “know” in a different sense from the first, namely, as. that you know it, this is not an example of embracing two equivalent to, “I have it in my power to bring up into objects in one act of the mind. It is an example of per thought,” the whole formula meaning, "I now perform the forming two different acts of the mind. The question is, act of knowing that I can at will call up in my mind." can you perform these two acts simultaneously?
Thus we say of a man: he knows English grammar, mean. This question, and the general question, can you think ing not at all that he at the moment is engaged in the act. any two thoughts at one and the same instant? may serve of consciously recalling English grammar, but only that he to you as examples of cases in which you may misunder upon occasion is able to do so. In this sense, we can all say: stand consciousness; that is, mistake the fact as to what at least of some things, “I know that I know them," but you actually do in your mind. We will not now try to solve can we truly say of any one particular act of A test question.
knowing, “I this moment perform the act of knowing that * Lectures, p. 133.
I am performing at this moment that particular act ?” + Lectures, p. 183.
The student will find it useful to try himself with this + "On the Intellectual Powers," chapter 1.
question, giving all possible close attention to the facts of