universities and other places of public instruction. It follows, as a matter of course, that the public and authorized distinctions, the degrees and titles, which in some measure at least are the marks of proficiency in academical studies, and which are some test of intellectual attainments, ought to be awarded in the same unrestricted manner to all who are found to deserve them. The legislature, having thrown open situations in the State to persons of all religious denominations, cannot consistently refuse to remove all restrictions on education, which not only deprive, or tend to deprive, dissenters of such an education as will fit them for public life, but deprive them also of those honorary distinctions which are the public evidence of academical attainments, the passport to a certain sort of acknowledged rank in the several professions, and to a certain station in society.

But it is objected that, by giving the dissenters degrees, you give them votes in the universities, and thus entrust them with a dangerous power. Such an objection can be plausibly maintained only by those who are entirely ignorant of the practical working of the university constitutions. Those who are acquainted with the University of Oxford, and still raise this objection, deal unfairly with their opponents in urging that as an objection which they know to be of no weight at all; for their adversaries, if they are candid men, must needs acknowledge (being ignorant of the true state of the case), that the objection is not without its force. We will speak positively with regard to Oxford: but we believe remarks very similar will apply to the constitution of the University of Cambridge. In Oxford the whole governing power lies with the heads of houses, and the right of an absolute veto, which is vested in the vice-chancellor and proctors, is sufficient security against all innovations, however strong the supporters of them may be in convocation.* The constitution of the university affords no check upon the heads of houses, with whom every measure must originate; but if it did, the dissenters never can be more than a small minority, and the notion of any danger from their possessing votes is absolutely chimerical. For it is manifest, from a variety of combined causes, that under almost any conceivable condition of affairs the Establishment will possess an immense preponderance and ascendency in the university, and will be more united than the members of various communions, some

* At Cambridge any member of the Senate can propose a measure; but any one member of the Caput, which consists of the vice-chancellor and five other persons, (who are virtually nominated by the vice-chancellor,) can stop any

measure.

of which differ more from one another than each does rom the Church.

All the arguments which have been urged with regard to the practical difficulties attending the admission of dissenters refer to the religious character of the collegiate institutions, of the aggregate of which at present the university is made to consist. Now even here we have always been of opinion that the difficulties are greatly over-rated, and that the main thing wanting to overcome them is a little mutual accommodation. The lectures given by college tutors on the Greek Testament and theological subjects might be rendered such as a dissenter need not object to attend, and from which he might derive much instruction, though on some points he might entertain a different opinion from the lecturer. It is evident that such lectures never can be made to suit precisely the opinions of all even of those who now attend them, and they must be so framed as to be useful to the greatest number. The same may be said of the examination in the rudiments of religious knowledge at the degree. Even under the present system, an examiner would not venture to reject a man competently qualified because he should maintain a different doctrinal view of any passage from that adopted by the examiner. All that is wanting even in this part of the system, so often referred to as presenting an insuperable obstacle to the dissenter, is a due regard for the religious opinions of others, which is perfectly consistent with the most uncompromising adherence to our own. The real difficulties of the case, we venture to say, depend much less on considerations arising out of statutes and forms, than on the absence of this spirit of liberality. The alleged impossibility of so arranging matters as to admit the dissenters arises mainly from the want of a disposition to attempt it. We are persuaded that, if this disposition were really felt, all other obstacles would soon give way. We say this, even on the supposition that the existing system were to remain exactly what it is, that the Church were to retain its supremacy, and to be the only recognized form of religion in the university. We do not now consider whether this is necessary or useful; but we will rather suppose, what we are convinced must practically be the case (unless a most extraordinary change of opinions should take place), that the Establishment will always be the dominant party in the university. Still we say, if a truly liberal spirit actuated the heads and tutors, they might, if they pleased, admit dissenters without difficulty, mischief, or compromise. We greatly fear, however, that at present there is but little indication

of such a spirit. There are, indeed, one or two solitary instances of a tendency towards it; and it is always something if there be even a beginning made towards such a change in opinion. We here allude, more particularly, to a pamphlet which lately appeared, entitled A Review of the State of the Question respecting the Admission of Dissenters to the Universities,' by the Rev. E. Denison, M. A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.

This publication, though very far from taking so comprehensive a view of the subject as we are inclined to do, is yet widely and honourably distinguished, in tone and character, from other Oxford pamphlets that have lately appeared. It bears, throughout, the marks of coming from a candid, sensible, and liberal-minded man. The author is favourable to the abolition of subscription to the Articles, and would admit dissenters into colleges, provided they were willing in all things to submit implicitly to college regulations, and the established system of religious instruction. The tone and spirit in which these requisitions are contended for, show a strong disposition to diminish compulsion as much as possible, and to conciliate in every point where accommodation is practicable.

The author, with great candour, discusses the several modes by which the difficulties attending the religious part of the examination might be avoided. But, he concludes,

The best plan (provided always that the previous system of education give security for fitting religious instruction) would probably be to exempt dissenters from the examination in divinity altogether, on their producing certificates from their private instructors of a due proficiency therein. In this way, while the principle of the connexion of religion with education was retained for all, and the efficient practice of it secured as far as regards the members of our own church, the jealousies and difficulties which the examination in divinity of the members of one communion by those of another must almost necessarily create, would be removed, and the dissenter would proceed to his degree as freely, as far as the public examination is concerned, as if the above-mentioned peculiarity of our universities did not exist.'-p. 36.

In another place, speaking of the plan for abolition of subscription, the author says—

'In common with many other persons, I much regret that that plan has not been carried into execution; and I hope that, at no distant period, it may again be brought forward with success.

But though I should consider a declaration which was precisely equivalent to subscription a great improvement on the present practice, (and this, I believe, is all that was of late contemplated,) I should myself wish to see our doors of admission

opened somewhat wider than they are at present, by the terms of any declaration which might be substituted for the subscription, and our academical edifice constructed upon a more comprehensive plan. I would willingly admit to our colleges all who could conscientiously avail themselves of our institutions, such as they are; and a sincere conformity in worship, and willingness to receive instruction, is therefore the only test I should desire to see imposed, and the necessity for such conformity, and the required attendance on such instruction, the only means of exclusion. I would not give up one jot or tittle of our system of education, as now carried on. I would not sacrifice our social worship, nor any of our institutions, in order to accommodate those who may differ from us. But there are many persons who, though they might not be able to declare themselves members of our church, or to subscribe to all its articles, might still be able very conscientiously to join in our worship, and to share in the education we offer, with no injury to us, and great advantage to themselves. All such I would gladly see received among us.'-p. 49.

The author's views certainly fall short of what we think ought to be done; but as a symptom of the increasing liberality of the university, we receive the announcement of such opinions from Oxford with sincere pleasure. The whole pamphlet is well worth an attentive perusal.

With regard to the attendance at chapel so much insisted on, many persons are not aware that the use of the entire liturgy in college chapels depends on the authority of an Act of Parliament. In two colleges in Oxford (possibly in others) it has been long since discovered that the act does not prohibit other forms; and though their chapels are opened twice a-day for the church service, their junior members are only required to attend at certain short prayers in the morning and evening. How far considerations of this kind might help to get rid of some of the difficulties of the case, it is not our intention to discuss; indeed, the whole of this part of the question being beside our present purpose, it is enough to have made the above suggestion.

Much has been said on the question of legislative interference with the University Statutes. Nothing could exceed the exasperation of the heads of the University of Oxford at the introduction of those measures in the last Parliament, which they considered an unjust interference with their rights. It was much more this consideration than that of the particular nature of the proposed changes which stirred up their hostility. They totally forgot, in their zeal for their statutes and the legislative powers of the board of heads of houses, whence that authority was derived; and while maintaining the inviolability of the Thirty-nine Articles, they did

not recollect that subscription to those Articles-nay, the very existence of the Articles themselves-originated in the authority of an Act of Parliament, which was a far more daring invasion of the so-called rights of their predecessors than anything contained in the measures now referred to. They denied the right of the legislature to admit Dissenters into a Church University, but shut their eyes to the question by what right Protestants had been admitted into Catholic Colleges. The right in either case is the same; it was in the first case, and would be in the second, an act of the sovereign power of the State, which excludes all considerations of right as the Oxford opponents of the Dissenters' claims understand the term. If they wish to discuss the question on intelligible ground, let them show how far interference with their statutes will be right in the sense of being useful; and in their consideration of the question of usefulness let them not forget that other people besides themselves are interested.

The numerous absurdities that were broached on this subject during the late discussions, are curious as samples of the way in which such questions were viewed in one of our national universities. There were persons who fancied that they saw, in the attempts of James II. to force certain persons on the Universities, a parallel case to the changes recently proposed. They did not perceive the difference between the illegal attempt of the individual king, of one member of the sovereign power, and a proposition for a legislative enactinent to be made in the usual manner. They did not perceive the difference between a law properly so called and an attempt by one member of the sovereign power to do what requires the consent of all three; and this, too, even when the objects contemplated in the two cases were quite different.

Independently of the importance of the particular measure at issue, we have looked with considerable interest at the proceedings in parliament, with the hope of seeing established the principle of legislative interference in the government of the national universities. We are aware it has been laid down by high authority that it is most desirable that any measures affecting the Universities should be carried with the concurrence of the University authorities. In this we most cordially agree: that it is highly desirable we readily admit; but we do not believe that it is at all likely that any effective measures will ever be carried in this way. Not long since a proposition was made in Oxford by the very highest University authority to the heads of Colleges for the abolition of actual subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles at matri