common intereft, has the house of Austria, most of the princes of Germany, and potentates of the North, for his friends and allies; who can, whatever interest he join with, do what he thinks fit in Europe; I fay, if a mercenary ftanding army be kept up, (the first of that kind, except those of the ufurper Cromwel, and the late King James, that Britain has feen for thirteen hundred years) I defire to know where the fecurity of the British liberties lies, unless in the good will and pleasure of the King: I defire to know, what real security can be had against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the corruption of both nations, the tendency of the way of living, the genius of the age, and the example of the world.

HAVING fhewn the difference between the past and present government of Britain, how precarious our liberties are, and how from having the best fecurity for them we are in hazard of having none at all; 'tis to be hoped that those who are for a standing

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standing army, and lofing no occafion of advancing and extending the prerogative, from a mistaken opinion that they establish the antient government of these nations, will fee what fort of patriots they are.

BUT we are told, that only ftanding mercenary forces can defend Britain from the perpetual standing armies of France. However frivolous this affertion be, as indeed no good argument can be brought to fupport it, either from reason or experience, as fhall be proved hereafter; yet allowing it to be good, what fecurity can the nations have that these standing forces fhall not at fome time or other be made use of to fupprefs the liberties of the people, though not in this king's time, to whom we owe their preservation? For I hope there is no man fo weak to think, that keeping up the army for a year, or for any longer time than the parliaments of both nations fhall have engaged the publick faith to make good all deficiences of funds granted for their maintenance, is not the keeping them up

for

for eyer. "Tis a pitiful fhift in the undertakers for a ftanding army, to say, We are not for a standing army; we are only for an army from year to year, or till the militia be made ufeful. For Britain cannot be in any hazard from France; at least till that kingdom, fo much exhausted by war and perfecution, shall have a breathing space to recover. Before that time our militia's will be in or

der; and in the mean time the fleet. Befides, no prince ever furrendered fo great countries and fo many ftrong places, I fhall not fay, in order to make a new war; but as these men will have it, to continue the fame. The French King is old and diseased, and was never willing to hazard much by any bold attempt. If he, or the dauphin, upon his decease, may be fufpected of any farther defign, it must upon the Spanish monarchy, in case of the death of that King. And if it be objected, that we shall stand in need of an army, in fuch a conjuncture; I answer, that our part in that, or in any other foreign

be

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reign war, will be best managed by sea, as fhall be fhewn hereafter.

LET us then fee if mercenary armies be not exactly calculated to enflave a nation. Which I think may be eafily proved, if we confider that such troops are generally compofed of men who make a trade of war; and having little or no patrimony, or spent what they once had, enter into that employment in hopes of its continuance during life, not at all thinking how to make themselves capable of any other. By which means heavy and perpetual taxes must be entailed for ever upon the people for their fubfiftence; and fince all their relations ftand engaged to support their intereft, let all men judge, if this will not prove a very united and formidable party in a nation.

any

BUT the undertakers must pardon me if I tell them, that no well-conftituted fuch men government ever suffered in it, whose interest leads them to imbroil the state in war, and are a useless and infupportable burden in time of peace.

Venice or Holland are neither of them examples to prove the contrary; for had not their fituation been different from that of other countries, their liberty had not continued to this time. And they suffer no forces to remain within those inacceffible places, which are the chief seats of their power. Carthage, that had not those advantages of fituation, and yet used mercenary forces, was brought to the brink of ruin by them in a time of peace, beaten in three wars, and at last fubdued

by the Romans. If ever any government ftood in need of fuch a fort of men, 'twas that of antient Rome, because they were engaged in perpetual war. The argument can never be fo ftrong in any other cafe. But the Romans well knowing fuch men and liberty to be incompatible, and yet being under a neceffity of having armies constantly on foot, made frequent changes of the men that ferved in them; who, when they had been fome time in the army, were permitted to return to their poffeffions, trades, or other employments.

And