ausus vana contemnere;' and the same happened to Columbus in the westerne Nauigation. But in intellectuall matters it is much more common; as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclyde which, till they bee demonstrate, they seem strange to our assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation (as the Lawyers speak), as if we had knowne them before. Another Error, that hath also some affinitie with the former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects, after varietie and examination, the best hath still preuailed, and suppressed the rest; so as, if a man should beginne the labour of a newe search, he were but like to light vppon somewhat formerly reiected, and by reiection brought into obliuion: as if the multitude, or the wisest for the multitude's sake, were not readie to giue passage rather to that which is popular and superficiall, than to that which is substantiall and profound; for the truth is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a Riuer or streame, which carryeth down to us that which is light and blowne up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is weightie and solide. Another Error, of a diuerse nature from all the former, is the ouer early and peremptorie reduction of knowledge into Arts and Methodes; from which time commonly Sciences receive small or no augmentation. But as young inen, when they knit and shape perfectly, doe seldome grow to a further stature; so knowledge, while it is in Aphorismes and obseruations, it is in groweth : but when it once is comprehended in exact Methodes, it may perchance be further pollished and illustrate, and accommodated for vse and practife; but it encreaseth no more in bulke and substance. . . . Another Error hath proceeded from too great a reuerence and a kinde of adoration of the minde and vnderstanding of man; by meanes whereof, men have withdrawne themselues too much from the contemplation of Nature, and the obseruations of experience, and haue tumbled up and downe in their owne reason and conceits. Vpon these intellectuallists, which are, notwithstanding, commonly taken for the most sublime and diuine Philosophers, Heraclitus gaue a iust censure, saying, 'Men sought truth in their owne little worlds, and not in the great and common world;' He did nothing more than per severe in his noble and well-conceived enterprise, despite of idle remon strances. for they disdaine to spell, and so by degrees to read, in the volume of God's works: and contrarywise, by continuall meditation, and agitation of wit, doe urge and, as it were, inuocate their owne spirits to diuine and giue Oracles vnto them, whereby they are deseruedly deluded. Another Error that hath some connexion with this later, is, that men haue vsed to infect their meditations, opinions, and doctrines, with some conceits which they have most admired, or some Sciences which they have most applyed; and giuen all things else a tincture according to them, utterly vntrue and vaproper. So hath Plato intermingled his Philosophie with Theologie, and Aristotle with Logicke; and the second Schoole of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the Mathematiques. For these were the Arts which had a kinde of Primogeniture with them seuerally. So haue the Alchemists made a Philosophie out of a few experiments of the Furnace; and Gilbertus, our Countreyman, hath made a Philosophy out of the obseruations of a Loadstone. So Cicero, when, reciting the seueral opinions of the nature of the soule, he found a Musitian that held the soule was but a harmonie, saith pleasantly, Hic ab arte sua non recessit,'" etc. Another Errour is an impatience of doubt, and hast to assertion, without due and mature suspention of judgement. For the two wayes of contemplation are not vnlike the two wayes of action, commonly spoken of by the Ancients; the one plain and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable; the other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after awhile faire and euen : so it is in contemplation; if a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but, if he will be content to beginne with doubts, he shall end in certainties. . . . But the greatest Error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge; for men have entred into a desire of Learning and knowledge, sometimes vpon a natural curiositie, and inquisitiue appetite; sometimes to entertaine their mindes with varietie and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to inable them to victorie of wit and contradiction; and most times for lukar and profession; and seldome sincerely to giue a true account of their guift of reason, to the benefite and vse of men: as if there were sought in knowledge a Couch, wherevpon to rest a searching and restlesse spirit; He did not step out of his profession. or a tarrasse for a wandring and variable minde to walke up and downe with a faire prospect; or a Tower of State, for a proude minde to raise it selfe vpon; or a Fort or commaunding ground, for strife and contention; or a Shoppe, for profite or sale; and not a rich Storehouse, for the glorie of the Creator, and the reliefe of man's estate. But this is that which will indeed dignifie and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nerely and straightly conioined and vnited together than they haue beene; a coniunction like unto that of the two highest Planets, Saturne, the planet of rest and contemplation, and Iupiter, the planet of ciuile societie and action: howbeit I do not mean, when I speak of vse and action, that end before mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lukar and profession; for I am not ignorant howe much that diuerteth and interrupteth the prosecution and aduancement of knowledge, like vnto the goulden ball throwne before Atalanta, which while shee goeth aside stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered; 'Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit," Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call Philosophy down from heaue to conuerse vpon the earth; that is, to leaue natural Philosophy aside, and to applye knowledge onely to manners and policie. But as both heauen and earth doe conspire and contribute to the vse and benefite of man; so the end ought to bee, from both Philosophies, to separate and reiect vaine speculations and whatsoeuer is emptie and voide, and to preserue and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitfull; that knowledge may not bee, as a Curtezan, for pleasure and vanitie only, or as a bondwoman, to acquire and gaine to her master's vse; but as a Spouse, for generation, fruit, and comfort. Advancement of Learning, book i. p. 27, 1605. He that cannot contract the sight of his mind, as well as disperse and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. Of the Proficience of Learning, book i. p. 30. Books, such as are worthy the name of books, ought to have no patrons but truth and reason. Ib., p. 32. It is the first distemper of learning when men study words, and not matter. Turns from the course, and grasps the rolling gold. Ib., p. 37. To seek philosophy in Scripture is to seek the dead among the living; to seek religion in Nature is to seek the living among the dead. It is therefore most wise soberly to render to faith, the things that are faith's. Novum Organum, Book of Aphorisms, p. 65. The only hope of science is in genuine induction. Ib., p. 14. Ib., p. 80. The real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human life with new commodities. Natural philosophy is, after the word of God, the surest remedy against superstition and the most approved support of faith. Ib., p. 89. In him, as in all men, and most of all in kings, his fortune wrought upon his nature, and his nature upon his fortune. He chose to provide clergymen and lawyers which were obsequious to him-which made for his absoluteness, but not for his safety. Of the three affections which naturally tie the hearts of the subjects to their sovereigns, love, fear, and reverence, he had the last in height, the second in good measure, and so little of the first, as he was beholden to the other two. He was a little poor in admiring riches. This excess had at the time many interpretations. . . . those perhaps come nearest the truth, that fetch not their reasons so far off: but rather impute it to nature, age, peace, and a mind fixed upon no other ambition or pursuit." History of Henry VII. They come home to men's business and bosoms. Dedication to the Essays, ed. 1615. He that hath a wife and children hath given hostages to fortune, for they are impediments to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Essay viii. of Marriage and Single Life. Rich soils are often to be weeded. Letter of Expostulation to Coke. No pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the 'vantage ground of truth. Essay of Truth. Bacon's History of Henry VII, is said by Hallam to be one of the earliest specimens in English of philosophic history. The philosophy is closely blended with the narrative, and it is not easy to separate the two. 75. John Donne, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's, 1573-1631. His poems are distinguished by subtlety and fervour. His prose is forcible and clear. Coleridge suggests that his verse must be measured not by syllables but by time, and that the time must be ascertained by the sense of Passions, Death. Death be not proud, though some have called thee For those, whom thou think'st thou dost overthrow, Much pleasure; then from thee much more must flow: Rest of their bones, and soul's delivery. Thou'rt slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men, And death shall be no more: Death, thou shalt die. Holy Sonnetts, I. The God-Man. Wilt thou love God, as he thee? then digest, My soul, this wholesome meditation, How God the Spirit, by angels waited on In heaven, doth make his temple in thy breast; Ib., XY |