XVI

ON WHAT BASIS CAN ETHICS JUSTIFY PRIVATE PROPERTY?

WHAT is it that authorizes a person to say of anything with a clear conscience, "This is mine"? The thought is sure at times to press on the consciousness, "What gives me the right to what I possess?" This is not an issue that pertains exclusively to one element of human society. Strictly speaking, we cannot divide the world into a "possessing" and a "nonpossessing" class. We all own something, although it may be only a very small amount and not for very long. Whether it be a labourer who is paid his wages. on Saturday night, or the stockholder who receives. his dividends at regular periods in the year, they each, for the time being, will say of the money or coupons in their hands, "This is mine."

But if they think at all, they must have some conviction in mind, which satisfies them of the justice of their claim. The individual who draws a salary, whether as an office clerk or as a bank president, whether as a clergyman or as the head of some vast corporation, will now and then be led to ask, "Where does this salary come from? Why is it mine? To what extent is it right for me to dispose of it as I please?" It is for each and all of us, irrespective

of our condition in life, to answer the query as to what justifies us in speaking of anything as "my property." At this point economics forms a part of the science of ethics; and ethics, a part of the science of economics.

The question is before the world, but the solution is not at hand. It would be idle for any one individual to attempt to settle the matter on his own judgment. Society comes to an agreement on vital problems of this kind, only by a long, slow process of mental disturbance and agitation. One fact, however, is very plain: people are thinking about this subject as they have never done before.

Human nature is becoming more refined. It is not only more sensitive to pain and pleasure; it not only responds more quickly to beauty of form and colour and music; but it has a more delicate conscience. Its peace of mind is more easily disturbed. Men are troubled over this question of property. They believe they are right in possessing it, and yet they are uncomfortable about it. Some one may say to people of wealth, "You are not justified in owning so much. You ought to give it up in part or altogether." On the other hand, the wage-earners who may be almost in a starvation condition in some of the cities of Europe, might say to the more prosperous wageearners in America, "You ought to divide with us. Is it right that you should receive more than we do? Surely we labour as hard as yourselves." The more prosperous mechanic and the still more fortunate men with private incomes, do not feel that they are altogether in the wrong in refusing to "divide," and yet it kindles a sense of discomfort in their minds.

We can appreciate how important the subject has become at the present day, by observing what a variety of scruples prevail on the one point as to what kind of property a man would be unwilling to possess or to claim as his own. Most men would draw the line somewhere. Their peace of mind would be disturbed if they knew their property was of a certain kind, however secure they might feel themselves in keeping it. But when they come to specify what kind, they are often wide asunder. They do not agree at all in their particular scruples.

We know of men, like Ruskin, who would refuse to take interest on money. They may believe in private property; but if it came in that one special form they would not say, "This is mine." Then, on the other hand, there are conscientious persons who would be quite ready to receive money or wealth in the form of interest, but who would not think themselves justified in owning land. They look upon that form of ownership as a crime against society. There is also a class who would not like to hold wealth acquired through speculation, although they would be only too ready to possess it if it came as the legitimate profits of a manufacturing business. Still others would be quite content to own property gained through speculation in stocks and bonds, but who would be troubled in mind if it came through speculation in the necessaries of life. Some persons, too, would be disturbed to receive their wealth as the direct owners or managers of certain forms of business; but they would have no anxiety in drawing wages or salary from such firms, or at knowing that their income is reaped from the interest on the bonds

of such companies. Many a person may hold his property with equanimity, although it has indirectly come through a community whose prosperity depends very largely on forms of trade of which he would emphatically disapprove. There is also a great variety of scruples with reference to wealth received by inheritance. Men may be conscious that a part of the property which has come to them in that form, was acquired through methods which they would not be willing to themselves use. But they are ready to say with composure, "This is mine" of wealth gained through questionable methods by those who have gone before them, while they would not be at peace with themselves if they had acquired it by such means through their own efforts.

But the scruples exist, and they are growing in force and influence; although it is painful to reflect that, in spite of ourselves, each man's scruples pertain to just those forms of property which he does not happen to possess. This element of responsibility for the kind of property we may hold or receive, certainly opens up a sphere of ethics which as yet has only been imperfectly explored. There are persons with a most refined conscience, who do not seem to have thought of the matter at all. And yet the majority of people will at times have a sense of compunction as to what justifies them in their private possessions. They would like to be clear in their own minds on the subject. We cannot look at those less fortunate than ourselves without a sense of uneasiness. For every living person there is always some other person lower in the scale than himself, to whom he can look as a being less well off than him

self. From the top to the bottom of society, this feeling of compunction may exist. ourselves entirely in the wrong more fortunate than others. sense of wrong somewhere.

It is not that we feel solely because we are But there is a lurking There is a kind of un

easiness of the race-conscience, which we have to account for, in reference to this whole subject of property.

What a change has come about in the very idea or meaning of private property since it first became established in history! The very conception of it is different from what it was twenty centuries, or even one century ago. At one time the privilege of ownership implied the right to do with a thing exactly as a man pleased. He might consume it, waste it, preserve it, throw it away, destroy it, do anything whatsoever with it. That was law; that was right; that was justice. The conception appears to have applied to almost every kind of private property. A man could deal in that way with his cattle, his slaves, and his family. There was at first only one slight qualification. He could do all this, he had the right of use and abuse within the limits of law. But that one qualification, so trifling at first in the earlier stages of society, was destined practically to transform the very idea of property.

If we were to retain the old conception, the thing itself could scarcely be said to exist as an institution; there would be no private property. We would need to find a new term to describe the present situation. Restrictions came first with reference to the family. A man was the owner of his children, but he was not allowed to take their lives. And then as to his slaves;