LORD ELLENBOROUGH

A REPLY

SIR SPENCER WALPOLE, in the last number of this Review, has taken the occasion of the publication of Sir Robert Peel's Correspondence to put forward a severe criticism of the career of the Earl of Ellenborough, whose name, in his opinion, is hardly now remembered, but on whose character and actions some light, he thinks, is thrown by these letters. To my mind, one of the most striking features in the letters bearing on Lord Ellenborough's government in India is clear confirmation of the idea of Lord Ellenborough's friends, that Sir Robert Peel held one language about him in one quarter and a different one elsewhere. He always privately had professed a still more thorough support to him than in his public utterances; and yet it seems that when the Board of Directors pressed his recall Sir Robert Peel suggested that, if they desired it, they should take the responsibility of using their own power in that respect, a step which, when taken, he professed altogether to disapprove, and was probably sincere in so doing. His meaning may have been that, if taken at all, such a step must be theirs and not his. But it certainly has a suggestion of opportunism rather than straightforwardness.

Sir Spencer Walpole's indictment is, however, largely founded on passages founded on documents published by the present writer; one portion by the direct desire of Lord Ellenborough, the remainder at his own discretion. He also dealt with a later matter, the Oude question of 1858, which can only be satisfactorily studied in the debates and official papers of that time, and which, as I hope to show, he has treated in a manner wholly misleading.

It is quite true that Lord Ellenborough's ambition was to be a military statesman. A boy during the earlier part of the great war with Napoleon, approaching manhood at the commencement of the Peninsular struggle, he had originally desired to enter on a military career, and when at the wish of his father he gave up such aspirations for Parliamentary and political life, he desired to influence military as well as civil affairs by the power of speech, which, as he said, was the great instrument of an English statesman.

But when Sir Spencer Walpole asserts that the phrases intended to move the world only made him ridiculous,' one may ask to what does he attribute the position which he undoubtedly held in Parliament. The less he admits his possession of other great

qualities, the more he must allow for the influence of that Parliamentary oratory of the older type in which he was in his way unsurpassed. The further accusation that the man who desired to pose as a military statesman nearly fell into a great military disgrace requires a careful examination of the facts connected with the Affghan question as Lord Ellenborough found it.

When Lord Ellenborough arrived in India, the first news which reached him before landing was the total destruction of General Elphinstone's army. Never before in the history of British India, scarcely ever afterwards, in the darkest days of the Mutiny, had so crushing a disaster befallen us. It was natural that Generals Nott and Pollock should be eager at any hazard to endeavour to retrieve the credit of the British arms, to rescue the British prisoners, or perish in the attempt. But those in the highest authority were obliged to consider well before risking the possible loss of another army-a calamity which might have proved irretrievable.

What is most important in this matter, though Sir Spencer Walpole appears to overlook it, is, that Lord Ellenborough's unwillingness to allow the troops to remain in Affghanistan was approved and shared by the Duke of Wellington, in whose company he hardly could be blamed for erring. The Duke's only doubt appears to be whether even at a later time the permission to advance on Cabul was prudent.

He pointed out in one letter that even a successful movement would not necessarily insure the safety of the ladies and others in captivity, but might, on the other hand, lead to their being immediately put to death. As late as the 23rd of September he wrote:

'Having been in despair, and considering all lost, and deprecating the leaving of a British soldier beyond the Indus, the Press now begins to discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, vengeance. But I recommend to you to leave out of the question all this stuff.' He went on to observe that before February 1842 the Bengal Government had not made proper provision for transport, and, being unable to move, they must be withdrawn within the Company's frontier.

It was in the month of July that Lord Ellenborough decided, as he says, under the new circumstances, to place in General Nott's hands the option of retiring by Quetta and Sukhur or by Ghizni and Cabul. This phrase has often been attacked as an attempt to disguise the change from a retreat to an advance. It must, however, be understood in reference to the ultimate objects of his policy. He was altogether opposed to remaining in Affghanistan or attempting to force a Sovereign upon it not accepted by the nation.

Sir Spencer Walpole quotes the language he had used about. Cabul in 1829. He has the strange fancy that when, as head of the Board of Control, he spoke of what I would do,' he imagined he was to command in person the British Army in Asia. But, as Sir Spencer

Walpole himself points out, it was only on the occupation of Khiva by Russia that Lord Ellenborough proposed to advance to the Hindu Khoosh; and this occupation was not effected till after his death, more than forty years after he wrote the words quoted and thirty years after the period now under consideration.

It must be remembered that, by the wish of Lord Ellenborough himself, his letters of 1842-1844 were published as they stood. If they give to the world his first unfavourable opinion of General Nott, they also show what Sir Spencer Walpole does not mention-the full justice which he was ready to do him later. He wrote unreservedly his impressions from one time to another in this correspondence with the Duke of Wellington. If he made no such admission of altered opinion as to Sir G. Pollock, it is fair to assume that he honestly saw reason not to do so. He continued to the last to point out to General Nott what he thought the hazard of an advance. But there is no reason to suppose that he imagined he would escape responsibility if the movement which he had permitted had realised his worst fears. If at a later time he spoke of 'My Victory,' he may reasonably have referred to his own exertions on the North-West Frontier to secure proper means of transport to the army by whom the victory was won. Justice is done to these exertions by a not altogether friendly writer, Mr. Thornton. It is fair that Lord Ellenborough's Indian government should be judged by subsequent events. Peace and friendly relations with Dost Mohammed to the close of his reign in Affghanistan, Scinde, a flourishing and loyal province of our Empire, the war with China carried to a successful issue-these were its results.

The Sikh war, which Lord Ellenborough is spoken of as having contemplated, was not avoided by his successor. But under instructions he had discontinued Lord Ellenborough's preparations for war. Is it too much to assume that the terrible losses of the all but disaster of Ferozeshah were the consequence?

Sir Spencer Walpole passes on to Lord Ellenborough's action at the Board of Control in 1858. He had nearly thirty years before held the view which Sir Spencer Walpole seems to ridicule, that the government of India should be transferred to the Crown. In that, as in some other matters, he foresaw what came eventually to be recognised by public opinion. He was for a short time in charge of the measure which was to carry out this change. The publication of the Oude Despatch led to his resignation, to relieve his colleagues from responsibility for what was not altogether in accordance with their intention. But the assertion that the feeling of Parliament was with Lord Canning and not with him requires some examination. Lord Canning had issued a proclamation declaring that the proprietary right to the whole soil of Oude, with the exception of the estates of a very few excepted persons, was taken over by the British Government, and all existing rights extinguished. Vague hopes of favour

able consideration were held out to those who might promptly come in and aid the restoration of order; but they were to throw themselves on the justice and mercy of the British Government.

Lord Ellenborough had written a despatch strongly condemning this proclamation, which was intended to be recorded, not published. When, however, a question was asked by Mr. Bright as to the proclamation, the Secretary to the Board of Control, Mr. Baillie, announced that the papers concerning it would be given to the House. A copy, I believe, was sent to Mr. Bright himself. Mr. Disraeli at the same time announced that the Government disapproved the proclamation altogether. It seems that a Cabinet held after this decided to suppress certain passages relating to the circumstances of the annexation of Oude, which might seem as though excusing the subsequent revolt. But by some accident it was too late, and the despatch appeared in extenso. Mr. Cardwell gave notice of a resolution censuring the Government for sending and publishing the despatch, while definitely declining to express any opinion on the proclamation itself. Another notice was given in the House of Lords, and Lord Ellenborough, taking on himself the responsibility of the publication, resigned his office. But the matter did not drop here. One night's debate in the House of Lords ended in the defeat of the censure by a small majority. But the debate in the Commons, of which an account was given in a once celebrated pamphlet by Count Montalembert, Un Débat sur l'Inde, lasted for many days. It was eagerly supported by the members of the Ministry that had quitted office a few months before. But many independent Liberals, Mr. Roebuck, Mr. Bright, Sir De Lacy Evans, vehemently opposed it. For a time it was expected to be carried; but before its close a new turn of affairs took place. The mail brought the correspondence between Lord Canning and Sir James Outram, formerly the great opponent of Lord Ellenborough's views on Scinde, and now Chief Commissioner of Oude. It appeared that Sir James Outram's remonstrance included almost every objection which, without any possibility of knowledge of its existence, had been made by Lord Ellenborough.

If Lord Ellenborough said 'We are under the impression that the war in Oude derived much of its popular character from the rigorous manner which, without much regard to what the chief landholders considered their rights, the summary settlement had been carried out by your officers,' Sir James Outram said 'he was of opinion that the landholders were most unjustly treated under our settlement operations.' If Lord Ellenborough said that the hostilities carried on in Oude had more the character of legitimate warfare than rebellion-i.e. the 'bellum legitimum of jurists,' in which each party have the rights of war-Sir James Outram said 'they hardly ought to be considered as rebels, but rather as honourable enemies,'

If Lord Ellenborough expressed a wish for the willing obedience of a contented people, adding 'There cannot be contentment where there is confiscation,' Sir James Outram pointed out that, if only life and freedom were offered to the former landholders, they will resist,' and foresaw that 'we should only be at the commencement of a guerilla war for their extirpation;' while he added 'that if obliged he must act on his present instructions, satisfied that he has done all in his power to convince his Lordship that they will be ineffectual to re-establish our rule on a firm basis in Oude.'

To this Lord Canning had replied; but it was felt that the position in the House was altogether changed. Member after member urged the withdrawal of the resolution, and reluctantly Mr. Cardwell yielded. A witty squib-writer celebrated the collapse in a parody of Chevy Chase, describing how the leader stood in front,

With his tattered flag outspread,

and when bidden to charge

The men at arms said No!

A decided opinion on the controversy itself may seem out of place in anyone not personally familiar with Indian administration. I will therefore only refer to the words of Lord Roberts, in many respects an admirer of Lord Canning:

'That Outram and Ellenborough took the right view of the case is, I think, shown by the fact that Lord Canning cancelled the proclamation on his first visit to Lucknow. From that day the chiefs of Oude have been amongst the most loyal of her Majesty's subjects.'

It is neither necessary nor convenient to follow Sir Spencer Walpole through all his minor criticisms. When he sneers at the expression that the army in India in Lord Ellenborough's last year of government could have marched to the Dardanelles, he forgets General Nott's similar expression that his troops could march to the Caspian. When he refers to expressions in 1829 about the advance of Russia, and thirteen or fourteen years later about the importance of Egypt to England, he does not seem to see that they have been in a great degree fulfilled. He seems startled at anyone having suggested even as a possible contingency the dispossession of Mohammed Ali in Egypt, whose power rested on the sword, who had lately made a war of conquest on his acknowledged suzerain.

But enough, I trust, has been said to show those who might be disposed to accept his article as a trustworthy guide to facts with which they are unfamiliar that it cannot be accepted as a just and impartial picture of a great name in the political history of the century.

COLCHESTER.