BOOK III. Pt. I. Ch. II. unde deiectum est, in quemvis haec actio dabitur, -et quidem in solidum. Sed si cum uno fuerit actum, ceteri liberabuntur-perceptione, non litis contestatione.-D. 9, 3, 1. 1, § 10, 1. 3 (Ulp.) and 1. 4 (Paul.).1 Ulp. Si apud duos sit deposita res, adversus unum quemque eorum agi poterit; nec liberabitur alter, si cum altero agatur: non enim electione sed solutione liberantur. Proinde si . . . alter quod interest praestiterit, alter non convenietur exemplo duorum tutorum.-D. 16, 3, 1, 43.2 But finally, an obligation may relate wholly and inseparably to several subjects, so that there is but a single performance in obligatione, and each of the several creditors or debtors stands related to the common debtor or creditor just as if he were the only creditor or debtor; and so one speaks of CORREAL obligation, whether active or passive, the subjects of which are described as duo (s. plures) rei credendi (s. stipulandi) debendi (s. promittendi) or correi. Correal obligations necessarily presuppose a single originative act, and always depend upon a legal transaction, either a contract (especially stipulatio) or testamentary provision. They are essentially distinguished from the purely solidary obligations by the fact, that the claim or obligation of the rest is discharged not merely by a single performance of the object owing, but already by litis contestatio with the one creditor or debtor. 1 If several persons live in the same loft, from which something has been thrown out, this action will lie against all,and that for the whole. But if proceedings have been taken against one, the rest shall be discharged-by satisfaction, not by the joinder of issue. 2 If a thing shall have been deposited with two persons, proceedings will be available against each of them; and the one will not be released if the proceedings be taken against the other, for they are not released by (such) choice, but by performance. Accordingly, if one shall have made good the damages, the other will not be sued, by the analogy of two guardians. Iavol. Cum duo eamdem pecuniam aut promiserint aut stipulati sint, ipso iure et singulis in solidum debetur et singuli debent; ideoque petitione, acceptilatione unius tota solvitur obligatio. -1. 2, D. h. t. (de duob. r. 45, 2).' Venulei. Si duo rei stipulandi sint, . . . convenit et uni recte solvi et unum iudicium petentem totam rem in litem deducere, item unius acceptilatione perimi utrisque obligationem: ex quibus colligitur unumquemque perinde sibi adquisiisse, ac si solus stipulatus esset, excepto eo, quod etiam facto eius, cum quo commune ius stipulantis est, amittere debitorem potest.-D. 46, 2, 31, 1.2 Ulp.: Ubi duo rei facti sunt, potest vel ab uno eorum solidum peti; . . . et partes autem a singulis peti posse nequaquam dubium est.-1. 3, § 1, D. h. t.3 Pomp.: Cum duo eandem pecuniam debent, si unus capitis deminutione exemptus est obligatione, alter non liberatur; multum enim interest, utrum res ipsa solvatur an persona liberetur: cum persona liberatur manente obligatione, alter durat obligatus.-1. 19 eod.* 1 When two persons have either promised or stipulated for one and the same sum, each individual is both entitled to and liable for the whole by the very operation of law; and so the whole obligation is discharged by the demand or the acquittance of one. 2 If there are two correal creditors. . . it is settled that payment can be rightly made to one, and that one, if he claim an action, makes the whole matter actionable; and likewise by the acquittance of one the claim of both is destroyed. From which we gather, that each has also acquired for himself as if he alone had stipulated, with the exception that the promisee can forfeit the debtor by the act also of him with whom he has a right in common. 3 Where two debtors have been constituted, the whole can be claimed even from oue of them; .. now there is no doubt whatever that parts also can be claimed from the individual debtors. 4 • When two owe the same sum, if one has been released from M M BOOK III. Pt. I. Ch. 11. BOOK III. Pt. L. Ch. II. a Or 'vow: see § 117, ad init. Et stipulandi et promittendi duo pluresve rei fieri possunt; stipulandi ita, si post omnium interrogationem promissor respondeat 'spondeo': ut puta cum duobus separatim stipulantibus ita promissor respondeat utrique vestrum dare spondeo'; nam si prius Titio spoponderit, deinde alio interrogante spondeat, alia atque alia erit obligatio nec creduntur duo rei stipulandi esse. Duo pluresve rei promittendi ita fiunt [veluti si ita interrogati]: 'Maevi, quinque aureos dare spondes ? Sei, eosdem quinque aureos dare spondes?' respondeant singuli 'spondeo.'-pr. I. eod. 3, 16.1 Pap. fiunt duo rei promittendi . . . testamento: ut puta si pluribus heredibus institutis testator dixit Titius aut Maevius Sempronio decem dato.'-1. 9 pr., D. h. t.? Cels. Si Titio aut Seio utri heres vellet,' legatum relictum est, heres alteri dando ab utroque liberatur; si neutri dat, uterque perinde petere potest, atque si ipsi soli legatum foret: nam ut the obligation by a loss of status, the other is not released; for it makes a great difference whether the debt itself is extinguished, or whether the person is released. When [one] person is released, but the obligation is kept up, the other remains liable. 1 Two or more persons can take part in the act of stipulation and promise. In stipulation, in such way that the promisor to the question of all makes answer, I do engage';" for example, if the promisor answers two persons stipulating independently of one another: 'I engage to convey to each of you.' For if he has first given the undertaking to Titius, and afterwards upon the inquiry of another, to him also, the obligations will be different; and it is not considered that two persons take part in the stipulation. Two or several persons can participate in the act of promise as follows: 'Do you, Maevius, engage to give five gold-pieces?' 'Do you, Seius, also engage to give five goldpieces?' Each must answer, 'I do engage.' 2 Two persons become liable by the promise. in a testa ment; stipulando duo rei constitui possunt, ita et testa- BEARING OF OBLIGATIONS UPON THIRD PARTIES. § 112. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES FROM CONTRACTS OF THIRD PARTIES." an BOOK III. Pt. 1. Ch. II. a Cf. Pollock, In keeping with the essence of the obligation, as individual relation between two definite subjects, the Savigny, ObliRoman Law imposes the following rules. (1) Representation is not allowed in the contracting of obligations. Every obligation is operative alone as between the persons who have created it, so that by it a third person can become neither creditor nor debtor. Paul. Quaecumque gerimus, cum ex nostro contractu originem trahunt, nisi ex nostra persona obligationis initium sumant, inanem actum nostrum efficiunt; et ideo neque stipulari neque emere vendere contrahere, ut alter suo nomine recte agat, possumus.-D. 44, 7, 11.2 If the performance be placed directly to the name of the third party, the obligation itself is invalid. Ulp. Alteri stipulari nemo potest, praeterquam si servus domino, filius patri stipuletur: inventae sunt enim huiusmodi obligationes ad hoc, ut unusquisque sibi adquirat quod sua interest; ceterum ut alii detur, nihil interest 1 If a legacy has been left to Titius or Seius, at the discretion of the heir,' the heir by payment to one is discharged by both; if he pay neither, both can sue just as if the bequest had been made to himself alone; for just as there can be two joint creditors constituted by a stipulation, so too this can happen by a testament. 2 Whatever we undertake, if it arise from our contract, makes our act of none effect unless the obligation originate from us personally; and thus we can neither make a stipulation, purchase, sale, contract, so that another lawfully sue thereon in his own name. gationenrecht,' §§ 54-59. § 20. ს წ BOOK III. Pt. I. Ch. II. mea. Plane si velim hoc facere, poenam stipulari conveniet, ut, si ita factum non sit, ut comprehensum est, committatur stipulatio.-1. 38, § 17, D. de V. O. 45.1 Gai. iii. § 103: Quaesitum est, si quis sibi et ei, cuius iuri subiectus non est, dari stipuletur, in quantum valeat stipulatio? Nostri praeceptores putant in universum valere et proinde ei soli, qui stipulatus sit, solidum deberi atque si extranei nomen non adiecisset: sed diversae scholae auctores dimidium ei deberi existimant, pro altera vero parte inutilem esse stipulationem.3 Si quis alium daturum facturumve quis spoponderit, non obligabitur, veluti si spondeat Titium quinque aureos daturum.'-§ 3, I. de inut. stip. 3, 19.3 At si quis velit factum alienum promittere, poenam potest promittere.-1. 38, cit. § 2.1 But the right can already by the contract be accorded to the debtor of performance to a definite 1 No one can stipulate for another, except it be a slave that stipulates for his master, a son for his father; for obligations of this kind have been invented for the purpose of every one acquiring what concerns his own advantage; but that it be given to another is of no advantage to me. Clearly if I wish to effect this, it will be meet for me to stipulate for a penalty, so that, if the thing be not done as was intended, the stipulation shall take effect. The question has arisen, how far is the stipulation valid, if a person stipulate for a sum to be paid over to himself and to one to whose power he is not subjected? Our teachers consider that it is good for the whole amount, and, accordingly, that the whole is due to the promisee alone, just as if he had not added the name of a stranger. But the authorities of the opposite school think that a moiety is due to him, that as far as the other half is concerned, however, the stipulation is void. If a man have engaged that another shall do or give anything, he will be under no obligation; for example, if he have engaged that Tit. shall give five aurei. But if a man would promise an act done by another, he can promise a penalty. |