torical School. He was a jurist at the same time theoretical and practical; and as an investigator of the sources, and an historian of Law and editor, distinguished by great learning. Joh. Christ. Hasse (1779-1830). G. Friedrich Puchta (1798–1846), eminent as a legal historian, but especially as an interpreter, for an acute method and exact development of legal conceptions, as well as by a spirited and elegant style. C. F. Mühlenbruch (1785-1843). H. E. Dirksen (1790-1868), legal historian, lexicographer, and original critic of the sources. Friedrich Ludw. v. Keller (1799–1860), of note as a legal historian, especially for his original treatment of the Roman Civil Procedure; eminent also as an interpreter, and in the exegesis of the sources by sagacity and practical insight. Carl Ad. v. Vangerow (1808-1870). Ed. Böcking (1802–1870), distinguished by comprehensive philological learning, as a careful, critical editor of the sources, and as treating the Roman classical Law with originality and depth of thought. C. Georg v. Wächter (1797-1880), especially an interpreter of Law of a more practical tendency, who has done good service to the scientific depth and many-sided development of the modern Law by the comprehensive value of his penetrating and profound investigations for the shaping of practical legal life. For a comprehensive survey of the history of Roman Law in various European countries since the Renaissance, and biographical notices, see Rivier, 'Introduction historique au droit Romain,' pp. 555-637. For England see Hale, History of the Common Law,' ch. ii.; Reeves, 'History of the English Law;' Savigny, 'History of the Roman Law during the Middle Ages,' vol. i. ed. by Cathcart, 1829; Spence, 'Inquiry into the origin of the Laws and Political Institutions of Modern Europe,' &c., 1826, and Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery,' vol. i. 1846; Güterbock, 'Bracton and his relation to the Roman Law,' ed. by Coxe, 1866; Clark, Practical Jurisprudence,' pp. 306–310; Hunter, Roman Law in the Order of a Code,' 2nd ed. 1885, pp. 107–116. For Scotland see Lord Mackenzie, 'Studies in Roman Law,' pp. 42, sq. Chronological résumé of principal matters noticed in §§ 7-16, from the Decemviral Legislation.' 4. Lex Iulia (de maritandis ordinibus). 131. SCtum giving effect to Edictum Sal 1 Comp. the comprehensive Tables in Rivier, pp. 129-33, 277-80, 437-40, or Roby, pp. cclxxiv., sqq. A.D. 212. Papinian put to death. 228. Ulpian 284. Accession of Diocletian. circ. 300. Gregorianus Codex. 330. Imperial Government transferred to Con- circ. 350. Hermogenianus Codex. 426. Law of Citations. 438. Publication of Codex Theodosianus. 527. Accession of Justinian. 529. Publication of Codex vetus. 565. Death of Justinian. 886-910. Publication of Basilica. circ. 1100. Rise of the Law School at Bologna; [1748-1832. Bentham.] 1803. Publication of Savigny's treatise on Posses sion. 1814. Foundation of the German Historical School [1828-1832. Delivery of Austin's Jurisprudence': English a See' Fortnightly Re Lectures on view, Nos. clxxix. pp. ANALYTICAL 475-487, clxxx. pp. 682, 897. Ibid., Nos. 'Ancient clxxix. pp. 1861. Publication of Sir H. Maine's 487-492, clxxx. pp. 114, 8qq. A.D. [1872. New scheme published by the Council of Legal Education: some knowledge of the Roman Civil Law rendered compulsory for Examinations at the Inns of Court.] COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF RIGHTS. tion of a 'legal § 17. IN GENERAL. right.' ს and Lindley, Intn. to Juris also the differ ology of EVERY right supposes a SUBJECT, or Person capable cr. § 6 of being subject of rights, an OBJECT which can be governed by Law, and a FACT with a legal basis, i.e., an prud. App. ii. ; external act or event by which, in consequence of an ent terminexisting rule of law, the Object is brought into relation Holland, pp. with the Subject, is brought under the control of his 69, 899. will. A right arises, is acquired by a person, when the Object is brought under the legal control of a Subject of rights; it terminates, passes from the person, upon the introduction of a Fact which destroys that control. Every acquisition of a right is either original, immediate, primordial,' i.e., the right in question arises altogether for the first time as a new one in the person of the party acquiring (e.g., acquisition of property by occupation or prescription); or it is 'derivative,' i.e., the right already exists in the person |