officio, but only in pursuance of the Praetor's instructions. But in respect of the 'bonae fidei iudicia,'a in which bona fides forms an essential element of the intentio itself, the iudex had already ex officio to entertain every plea giving to the plaintiff's claim the appearance of contravening bona fides; so that here exceptiones were in processual significance only requisite in case either, notwithstanding the plea, the plaintiff's claim was consistent with aequitas, or no certain expectation could be entertained that it would be considered by the iudex. Iul. iudicium fidei bonae : continet in se doli mali exceptionem.-1. 84, § 5, D. de leg. I. 30.1 1 Paul. Bonae fidei iudicio exceptiones pacti insunt.-D. 18, 5, 3.2 2 Exceptiones are divided: (a) according to the law-source from which they are derived, into 'civiles' and 'praetoriae,'d so that with the former the respective rule of civil law was actualised through the legal aid of the Praetor, by means of an exceptio given to the defendant; (3) according to their conception, or wording, into exceptiones vulgares' and 'in factum'; (y) according to the scope of their operation, into exceptiones peremptoriae' and 'dilatoriae.'f Gai. iv. § 118: Exceptiones autem alias in edicto praetor habet propositas, alias causa cognita accommodat; quae omnes vel ex legibus vel ex his, quae legis vicem obtinent, substantiam capiunt, vel ex iurisdictione praetoris proditae sunt." 1 A bon. fid. action embraces a plea of fraud. In a bon. fid. action are comprised pleas derived from an agreement. 3 Some pleas have been put forth by the Praetor in his Edict, some he vouchsafes after investigating the matter. All of them are derived either from leges, or enactments that acquire the force of leges, or are derived from the Praetor's jurisdiction. The plaintiff's replicatio contains the assertion of an exception as concerns the exceptio, and thus appears in the formula as a rule-but not without exceptionin the affirmative style, and so in the form of a positive condition of the condemnatio. Gai. iv. § 126: Si verbi gratia pactus sim tecum, ne pecuniam quam mihi debes a te peterem, deinde postea in contrarium pacti simus. i.e. ut petere mihi liceat, et, si agam tecum, excipias tu, ut ita demum mihi condemneris, SI NON CONVENERIT NE EAM PECVNIAM PETEREM, nocet mihi exceptio pacti conventi: namque nihilominus hoc verum manet, etiam si postea in contrarium pacti simus; sed quia iniquum est, me excludi exceptione, replicatio mihi datur ex posteriore pacto hoc modo: SI NON POSTEA CONVENERIT, VT EAM PECVNIAM PETERE LICERET.' BOOK IV. Chapter 11. $ 199. PRAESCRIPTIONES. 'Praescriptio' designates in general an addition to the formula in the form of a preliminary note; thus in the older Law some pleas also had the form of a praescriptio." In later times 'praescriptio' in the Gai. iv. 133. wider sense is often synonymous with 'exceptio.' ' § 25. The following are praescriptiones in the strict sense. (1) The praescriptiones pro actore. By these is understood a proviso annexed to the formula, which 1 If, for example, I have agreed with you not to proceed against you for money you owe me, and afterwards we make an agreement to the contrary, that is, that I shall be at liberty to sue you, and if on my taking proceedings against you, you meet me with a plea that you ought to be condemned to pay me only if there have been no agreement that I should not sue for the money,' this plea of agreement made is to my prejudice; for this agreement none the less remains a fact, even if we have subsequently agreed to the contrary. But as it is unfair for me to be defeated by the plea, a replication is allowed me upon the later agreement, thus: if there have been no later agreement enabling me to sue for the money.' a BOOK IV. Chapter 11. a § 26; D. 4, 34.4. it required in the enforcement of a particular claim -especially now arising for the first time-from an incerti obligatio, in order that the action should be kept up for the remaining performances-or such as become due later on-arising from the same obligatio; these would otherwise be consumed by Litis Contestatio," since the 'una et incerta obligatio' itself is brought in iudicium by the intentio, which comprises its whole content. Gai. iv. §§ 130-131a: Videamus etiam de praescriptionibus, quae receptae sunt pro actore. § Saepe enim ex una eademque obligatione aliquid iam praestari oportet, aliquid in futura praestatione est, veluti cum in singulos annos vel menses certam pecuniam stipulati fuerimus: nam finitis quibusdam annis vel mensibus huius quidem temporis pecuniam praestari oportet, futororum autem annorum sane quidem obligatio contracta intelligitur, praestatio vero adhuc nulla est; si ergo velimus id quidem, quod praestari oportet, petere et in iudicium ducere, futuram vero obligationis praestationem in integro relinquere, necesse est, ut cum hac praescriptione agamus: EA RES AGATVR CVIVS REI DIES FVIT: alioquin si sine hac praescriptione egerimus, ea scilicet formula qua incertum petimus, cuius intentio his verbis. concepta est: QVIDQVID PARET NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTERE, totam obligationem id est etiam futuram in hoc iudicium. deducimus. § Item si verbi gratia ex empto agamus, ut nobis fundus mancipio detur, debemus hoc modo praescribere: EA RES AGATVR DE FVNDO MANCIPANDO, ut postea si velimus vacuam possessionem nobis tradi, . . . [rursus ex empto agere possimus; nam si praescribere obliti] sumus, totius illius iuris obligatio illa incerta actione QVIDQVID OB EAM REM NVMERIVM NEGIDIVM AVLO AGERIO DARE FACERE OPORTET per intentionem consumitur, ut postea nobis agere valentibus de vacua possessione tradenda nulla Cic. de or. 1, 37, 168: -homo ex numero 1 Let us also consider the subject of the praescriptiones which are admissible on behalf of the plaintiff. § For often, in consequence of one and the same obligation, there is something to be furnished at once and something at a future time. For instance, when we have stipulated for a certain payment every year or every month; for then upon the completion of a certain number of years or months, the money for that period must be paid, but whilst an obligation is held to have been certainly contracted in respect of future years, yet there is no need for payment. If, therefore, we wish to sue for that which is actually payable and to carry the matter before the iudex, but to leave the future discharge of the obligation untouched, it is necessary to sue with this praescription: 'Let that be the matter of action, the time for performance of which is past'; otherwise, if we have proceeded without this praescription, that is, with the formula by which we sue for an uncertain thing, and the intentio is couched in these words: Whatever it appears that Num. Neg. ought to give or do to Aul. Ag.,' we have included the whole obligation, that is, even the future part of it, in this action. § Likewise if, for instance, we bring an action upon a purchase, for the conveyance to us of land by mancipation, we ought to employ a praescription thus: Let the matter of action be the conveyance of the land by mancipation'; so that if we afterwards wish to have vacant possession delivered to us . . . [we may be able to sue again upon the purchase; for if we have forgotten to prescribe,] the obligation in respect of the entire right is destroyed by the intentio in the uncertain action: 'Whatever on account of such thing Num. Neg. ought to give or do to Aul. Ag.'; so that if we afterwards wish to sue for the delivery of vacant possession, there is no action remaining. 2 An advocate applied for the allowance to the defendant of the old and accustomed plea: 'for such sum as was already due'; from not being aware that the plea was provided on BOOK IV. Chapter II. BOOK IV. Chapter II. Paul. Cum stipulamur ' quidquid te dare facere oportet,' id quod praesenti die dumtaxat debetur in stipulationem deducitur, non, ut in iudiciis, etiam futurum.-D. 45, 1, 76, 1.1 Iavol. Non quemadmodum obligatio in pendenti potest esse et vel in futurum concipi, ita iudicium in pendenti potest esse, vel de his rebus quae postea in obligationem adventurae sunt.— D. 5, 1, 35.2 In respect of the action against the surety, the relation of suretyship was set forth in the form of a praescriptio. Gai. iv. § 137: Si cum sponsore aut fideiussore agatur, praescribi solet in persona quidem sponsoris hoc modo: EA RES AGATVR QVOD AVLVS AGERIVS DE LVCIO TITIO . . incertum . . . STIPVLATVS EST, QVO NOMINE NVMERIVS NEGIDIVS SPONSOR EST, CVIVS REI DIES FVIT; in persona vero fideiussoris EA RES AGATVR QVOD NVMERIVS NEGIDIVS PRO LVCIO TITIO . . . incertum ... FIDE SVA ESSE IVSSIT, CVIVS RES DIES FVIT; deinde formula subiicitur.3 behalf of the plaintiff-so that, if the party repudiating should have proved to the iudex that the proceedings had been taken before the money became due, when the plaintiff again sued, he should not be estopped by the plea that ‘such matter had been already before the iudex.' 1 When we stipulate for 'whatever it is incumbent upon you to give or to do,' that alone which is due at the time being is made the subject of the stipulation, not, as in judgments, future liability also. 2 A judgment cannot remain in suspense as an obligation, which may perhaps be framed in view of the future, even concerning those points which are in the future to come within the range of the obligation. 3 If proceedings are taken against a sponsor or fideiussor, the praescription in the case of the sponsor is usually in this form: Let the matter of action be the amount now due upon the stipulation which Aul. Ager. took for something indefinite from Luc. Tit., on whose behalf Num. Neg. was sponsor, the time for |