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of the first of these philosophers-in vain had he exposed the presumptuous reasoning of the second. Whether the arguments of the Roman orator were not considered as convincing upon these topics; whether his speculations were too profound for his age; or whether his scepticism was too strong for it; it does not appear that he succeeded in making many converts to the doctrines of the new Academy, of whose philosophy he was the advocate. The licentious crowd still listened to the agreeable lessons taught by the followers of Epicurus; and the few but inflexible disciples of Stoicism adhered to their philosophy, in spite of the raillery of wits, and the subtleties of Dialecticians.

In the number of those who argued most warmly in favour of the dogmas of the Portico, our Author is to be placed. The heroic virtues of the Stoics seem to have suited" the habits of his soul." Their precepts were dictated in the highest strain of morality. Patience in misfortune, calmness in danger, insensibility to pain, indifference

to pleasure, and moderation in all things, according to them inseparable from wisdom, and necessary to virtue. They held, that the great object of man should be to sustain the dignity of his moral nature; and they acknowledged no perfect liberty but that, which entirely frees the mind from the thraldom of the passions.

It is in his fifth satire, that Persius treats of this stoical doctrine of liberty. In nothing did the sect of Zeno push farther its almost romantic philosophy. According to this theory, no man was either truly wise, or truly free, who suffered himself in any degree to be swayed by his passions. These, the Stoics considered as the tyrants of the soul; and they taught, that their usurpation ought to be resisted by every one, who aspired to the rank of philosopher.

To extirpate the passions altogether from the breast, and to leave the mind in a state of apathy, cannot but be contrary both to reason, and to

nature. The passions, which are so constantly the motives of conduct, and the springs of action, are implanted in us, in order to stimulate our minds, and to incite us to exertion. Those, who have studied human nature, not in the systems of philosophers, but in the world, need not be told, that as man is a being formed for society, so he must consequently be influenced by passions and affections. We are made susceptible of anger, in order that we may repel injury—of fear, in order that we may attend to the preservation of our existence of desire, in order that we may continue our species. It is not therefore against the passions, but against an improper indulgence of them, that good sense will direct us to guard. It is not against impulses, which Nature ordains, but against excesses which outrage her, that sound Philosophy cautions her disciples. If we see the existence of final causes demonstrated in the wonderful organization of the human body, can we suppose, that the constitution of the mind of man was less the work of design and intelligence? Shall we believe

that it is with no wise intention, and for no useful purpose, that Nature makes us susceptible of so many various emotions? The control of reason over the passions is indeed essential to happiness; and to restrain and moderate their violence will always be the task of philosophy, and the proof of wisdom. But they who teach us, that we ought to suppress all feeling—to be sensible neither to grief, nor to joy-to be indifferent to pain and to pleasure—to be moved neither by love nor by hatred, nor by ambition, nor by hope, nor by fear, nor by anger-recommend what cannot be practiced, and what, if it could, would be absurd and unnatural.

Cicero has ably exposed the doctrine of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Deity; and has ridiculed with his usual pleasantry their rotundum ardentem volubilem Deum. It is not a little difficult, indeed, to understand that part of their system, where they endeavour to make it appear, that the world is governed by the wisdom and providence of their igneous and material

god. If Persius has any where abandoned the principles of Stoicism, it seems to be upon this topic. It is evident from his second satire, that he had studied the writings of Plato, and that, like that philosopher, he had conceived an exalted notion of the Divine Intelligence. Whilst Idolatry lavished treasures upon the gods which she herself had created-whilst Superstition daily immolated victims upon her bloody altars—and whilst the capital of the world was divided between atheists and fanatics-or at least between those who thought, the gods interfered in every thing, and those who thought, they interfered in nothing, a heathen poet taught the sublime lesson, that a pure heart is the most acceptable gift which man can make to his Creator. Well might Bishop Burnet say of this satire, that it may pass for an excellent lecture in divinity.

From the remarks which I have made upon the object and tendency of my Author's writings, I flatter myself that the reader, who is yet unac

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