HE changes which the Political

practical application of these doc

has undergone, from the period when it first attracted the attention, and employed the researches and investigation of men of talent in this Island, to the present, are full of instruction and interest, as they point out, in a most palpable and satisfactory manner, the bent and influence of the national character, acted upon and modified occasionally by particular circumstances and causes. The doctrines of the divine rights of kings, and of passive obedience and non-resistance, as has been already shewn, lingered in Britain, certainly, after the levo lution; soon after this event, Mr. Locke's doctrine of a contract, implied at least, between the sovereign and the people, gained ground. The American Revolution, and subsequently, as we have also shewn, the French Revolution, led men to a bolder idea; and the doctrines of the divine right of the people, and passive obedience and non-resistance to them (if the expressions may be allowed), became popular, and were embraced, even by many men of clear views, profound investigation, and real lovers of their species.

The dreadful consequences which either actually flowed from the

from them, drove men back almost to the ancient and exploded doctrines of passive obedience, nonresistance, and the divine right of kings:-some from prudence, however, and others from conviction, modified and softened these doctrines in a considerable degree.

At present, Political Philosophy, strictly and properly so called, is not a favourite study in Great Britain; nor, since the fervor of the French Revolution passed away, are we aware of any treatises of high character or importance, that have been published on this subject, by our countrymen. We are rather to look for the exact state of this science, and the opinions held regarding it, in the debates of Parliament, in the newspapers (as they respectively hold forth and support the doctrines of the political parties to which they adhere), in such of our Reviews as enter into discussions on political and other subjects, and in fugitive and short pamphlets, which confine their pages to a cursory and general view of particular branches of it.

One grand and most important principle, however, seems to be adopted and to prevail in this

science,

science, amongst all parties, how ever they may be at variance on other points; and the prevalence of this principle is of itself a most pleasing and decisive proof, that for all practical purposes, this science has greatly advanced, and must hereafter shed a beneficial influence over the interests of mankind. We allude to the principle, that the real good of the people is the only solid right of all governments (however they may be classed into monarchies, aristocracies, and republics) to the powers and privileges with which they are invested. There is also another leading principle of great importance, though more liable to be mistaken, or to be urged in favour of measures, which, in its most enlarged and philo. sophical character, it will not be friend : we mean, the principle, that the forms of government must vary according to the peculiar character, manners, habits, and intelligence of the people; and that unless these are sufficiently advanced, the most liberal constitution, however guaranteed by the laws, will be merely a dead letter. This implies, that the best safeguard to the liberties of any nation consists in the intelligence, love, and knowledge of freedom, and moral character of the nation itself, and not in charters or constitutions. So far it is a sound and instructive doctrine, and one, by which governments may excuse themselves for not giving a greater portion of civil and political liberty to their subjects, so long as they are intellectually and morally unfitted for it. But it is also a doctrine that is liable to much misrepresentation and abuse; for though it may and does justify governments for withholding civil and political liberty, so long as the

people are not fit to receive it, from being either totally indifferent about it, or in such a state that they would unavoidably abuse it, so as to bring upon themselves a deeper despotism and greater misery than they previously laboured under, yet it cannot justify them for withholding those measures which will remove this unfitness, and still less can it justify them for continuing or adopting measures that manifestly tend to continue or increase that unfitness.

Such are the state and character of the Political Philosophy of the present age: it is certainly more liberal in its doctrines, and much more practical, than it was; and it is to be hoped, that as it has purged itself of the extravagant opinions regarding the divine right both of sovereigns and the people, which formerly prevailed, it will settle into a sound, healthy, and vigorous condition. The good of the people being now made the polar star by which the researches of political writers, as well as the conduct of most European governments are, at least avowedly, directed and governed, we may reasonably expect, that from the former we shall derive more useful and practical information, and less abstract, speculative, and inapplicable reasoning than formerly; and that the latter will not venture upon any measures, without deeming themselves bound to shew that they are not inimical to the interests of their subjects, and that the adoption of them rests not merely on the will or privileges of the sovereign.

The state and progress of the science of Political Economy, from the period of the publication of the Wealth of Nations, till the events of the French Revolution had produced their full operation upon it,

has

has been already detailed. The importance as well as the difficulty of this science are gradually becoming more and more apparent. The embarrassed state of the finances of most European countries, as well as the unsound condition of their circulation, necessarily directed the attention and investigation of political economists to those branches of the science which related to these topics; while the singular and unprecedented state into which commerce was thrown during the greater part of the French Revolution, caused this branch of political economy also to be particularly studied and explored. Yet such seems the difficulties enveloping the very elements of this science, that the most acute and well-informed political economists are not agreed among themselves regarding these important topics; and practical men, that is men whose concerns lie in the funds, in banking, in the money market, or in the various branches of commerce, agree on very few points with those who are merely speculative political economists. That this account of the state of this science is not inaccurate, must be evident to all who are acquainted with the discussions on the state of the currency, and on the corn trade, as they appeared, not only in the parliamentary debates, but in the publications on those subjects. It is foreign to our purpose (and if it were not, it would be a very difficult task) to assign the causes which thus retard the advancement of this most important science: that it does not advance nearly at the same rate with other sciences, is sufficiently evident from the undoubted facts, that the very first principles of the science are very differently laid down by dif

ferent writers; that even the definitions of the most common terms of the science are not agreed upon; and that, upon some of its most practically important topics, on which there is abundance of facts and experience, accessible to all, there is still great and irreconcilable diversity of opinion.

The Moral Philosophy of the present age may be classed into that which is abstract and speculative, and that which is practical: on the former, there are few writings of any considerable merit or character; this division of moral philosophy has indeed been much less cultivated during the last half century, than it was during the first portion of the eighteenth century; and the discussions on the abstruse and undeterminable points, whether moral obligation is founded on the fitness of things, the will of God, a moral sense, utility or happiness, have been wisely abandoned for more approachable and profitable discussions. The former discussions, like all those which relate to mind, were involved in much doubt and difficulty, from the various or the ambiguous meanings attached to the words employed in carrying them on; and it is no small proof of the real and beneficial advancement of the human intellect, in this country more especially, that verbal disputes,-not merely those that were palpably and almost avowedly verbal, but also those which seemed to relate to things, whereas they related merely to words,-have in a great measure, and on most topics, given way to discussions of a solid and tangible character, as well as of practicable solution and application to the concerns and actions of life.

The

The practical Moral Philosophy of the present age, in Britain, is deservedly of a very high character for its soundness and simplicity, and for the knowledge of mankind on which it is grounded. The instructive lessons for the regulation and government of the temper and passions, for the formation, of the manners, and for the discharge both of the greater and lesser duties, which all the various relative connexions of society impose and require, as they are given in a most pleasing and attractive form in some of our best works of fiction, will be afterwards noticed with more propriety at present we shall confine ourselves to the state and character of the Moral Philosophy of the present age in Britain, as they appear in the most celebrated of those writings which treat expressly of it as a science, or of particular branches of that

science.

On all these writings are decidedly and deeply stamped the most characteristic features of British intellect, as well as of the British national character. The most celebrated are those of Paley and Gisborne: but the writings of the former, not only on Moral Philosophy, but also on the evidences of Natural Theology, are, in our opinion, distinguished by much more undoubted and decided marks of British intellect, than those of the latter, or indeed of any other author on the evidences and duties of either Natural or Revealed Religion, in the English language. We cannot help regarding Paley, notwithstanding the laxity and casuistry of some of his doctrines on the subject of Moral Philosophy, as an author of whom this country ought to be proud, on account of the

powers of intellect, and the mode of applying them, which all his works, and especially his Natural Theology, display. He forces his way into the very heart of an argument by the very strength and directness of his understanding :topics which have been often discussed before in such a manner as apparently to have left them nearly exhausted, he exhibits in lights not only new, but which flash conviction on the mental eye by the steady and clear illumination which they throw round them. If an objection is to be met and repelled, he first meets it face to face; he gives it every advantage, sensible that if overcome, under these circumstances, his triumph will be the more complete and lasting.

The writings of Gisborne, and of other celebrated authors on the duties of man in society, are not marked by the acuteness of Paley, but they excel them in the mild and domestic tone in which those duties are explained and enforced. They are all practical; intended and calculated for real life; and removed at once from laxity, and a rigid and impracticable enforcement of a line of conduct which neither the feelings and habits of individuals, nor the state of society, admit or require.

Metaphysics, or that study which relates to the developement and explanation of the faculties of the mind, and in general to the nature of mind itself, has latterly, like the speculative and abstruse parts of Moral Philosophy, gone much into disuse several causes have probably operated to produce this effect. In the first place, great and not unreasonable doubts have been started regarding the utility of such speculations as Metaphysics em

braces

braces and pursues; and in the second place, it seems to be suspected that these speculations either turn on the meaning of words, or are beyond the faculties of man.

There are, however, still some metaphysical writers of note; these may be arranged under three divisions. The Scotch metaphysicians;-the English mataphysicians, who embrace, in whole or in part, the doctrines of Hartley;-and such British writers as are advocates for the Metaphysics of Kant, or other teachers of the German school.

The character of the Scotch Metaphyiscs presents rather a singular and unaccountable phenomenon; there can be no doubt that the distinguishing features of Scotch intel lect are acuteness, a tendency to scepticism, and to take for granted and believe rather too little than too much, and a fondness for subtlety, system, and pushing things to the fewest and simplest possible prin ciples; and an examination of the writings of Scotch authors, of the greatest celebrity, and who display the features of the national intellect in the most pure and marked manner, will (if we except their metaphysical authors) fully bear out and illustrate the picture we have drawn.

In Metaphysics, however, it is quite the reverse; the mode of philosophizing, which, assisted by their national acuteness, has enabled them to extend the limits of most branches of physical science, and to give even to Political Economy more of the dignity and simplicity of a science than it previously possessed, seems to be utterly abandoned when they enter the field of metaphysical inquiry. The writings of Reid, Beattie, and even of Dugald Stewart, sufficiently bear out the truth and justice of this obser

vation: in direct opposition to the principle which guides the authors of this nation in their researches on other subjects, and which principle is every day more and more confirmed, in proportion as science advances,-viz. that nature always works by the simplest and fewest means, and that her elements are not nearly so numerous as in the infancy of knowledge and experience they were believed to be,the Scotch writers on the subject of mind seem to delight in multiplying causes, and to be afraid to draw the veil from the operations of nature, so far as the moral and intellectual structure of man is concerned. Such, all must allow, is the doctrine of common sense, or that doctrine which teaches inqui rers to rest content with the discovery of moral and mental phenomena, and to regard them as ultimate and inexplainable princi ples in the constitution of man. That such a mode of philosophizing is at variance with the notions that all acquainted with other branches of Scotch science and literature, must form of the features of Scotch intellect, is undoubted:-it is, as we have already remarked, a curious circumstance, and therefore deserving, in our opinion, of being pointed out, in connexion with this short sketch of Scotch Metaphysics.

Between the doctrines of the Scotch metaphysical writers, and those of such of the English metaphycians as are followers of Hartley, there is an intermediate class: according to this class of doctrines, the former do not push their inquiries far enough, and the latter push theirs too far. There are, however, no very celebrated writers of this description. With respect to Hartley and his followers, it appears to

US,