CHAP. VII.

Reform of Parliament.

I WILL now consider that most important question, the Reform of Parliament. A decision on this question must, ere long, take place. The general attention of the nation has been called to it. The people must be subdued, or the subject must be fully examined, and some Reform consented to.

Let me first state the sense in which I use the words Reform and Revolution.

I consider Reform to be a correction of abuses without destroying the existing Constitution. I consider Revolution to be a correction of abuses, accompanied with the destruction of the existing Constitution.

In England, in 1688, the nation removed the existing dynasty, and established a new one. As the dynasty is considered as the most prominent part of the Constitu

tion, this change has been denominated a Revolution. Perhaps, according to my definition, it might more properly have been called a Reform; for the two other existing parts of the Constitution, viz. the House of Lords and the House of Commons, were left unaltered.

In 1789, that Government which had existed in France during the reigns of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. was swept away. A new Constitution was established; and when Louis XVI. accepted Royalty under this new Constitution, the same dynasty, but under a new title, was placed on the throne. I consider this proceeding in 1789, to have been, in the fullest sense of the word, a Revolution.

In 1800, the Irish Government was abolished, and the inhabitants of Ireland subjected to a new Constitution. This measure also I consider as a Revolution.

I have always dreaded Revolution. The crisis consequent on it is sometimes beneficial; I believe it will ultimately be found

to be so in France; but the paroxysms which precede the crisis, are terrifying. As an Englishman, I have always wished for Reform; because I have always been of opinion, that if Reform did not take place, Revolution would be a necessary consequence of the existing abuses.

I will state what I consider as the abuse which stands most in need of being corrected. It is this-that individual Peers have, in many places, usurped the nomination of Members of Parliament from those aggregate bodies of the Commonalty to which the Crown had originally granted it. I have said individual Peers; I am aware that, in many places, individual Commoners have usurped the property in boroughs; but the usurpation is most frequently by Peers; and if the acquisition is first made by a Commoner, the power which he has thereby acquired soon occasions him to be elevated to the Peerage. The mischief is also greater where the usurpation is by a Peer; for after he has acquired this unconstitutional power, he exercises functions inconsistent with each other; in impeachment, for exam

ple, the Commons are the accusers, and the Peers the Judges; but if the Members of the House of Commons, who prefer the accusation, are nominated by the Peers, and there is any truth in that maxim of the common law, Qui facit per alium, facit per se, those who are the Judges are at the same time the Accusers. Will any man say that this ought to be? By the principles of our Constitution, the Commons are to vote the taxes, and the Peers have only a right to prevent the proposed tax from being imposed, by refusing their consent. This regulation was introduced to protect the Commons from being taxed beyond what they could bear. But what becomes of this protection, if the Peers are allowed to name the Members of the House of Commons? Immoderate taxation is the real cause of our present distress; and men call for a Reform of the House of Commons, because they feel that the power of taxing has been abused.

Kings first summoned to Parliament Representatives from bodies of the Commonalty, that they might be protected against

their great vassals. The great vassals saw this, and endeavoured to deprive the King of this defence, by compelling these aggregate bodies of the Commonalty to depute to Parliament those men whom the several Peers might select. This attempt of the Peers seems to have been made at a very early period after Representatives of the Commons were first summoned to Parliament ; for in the first Parliament of Edward I. he enacted provisions to restrain this conduct in the Peers. The expressions in the act are these: "Forasmuch as Elections ought to be free, the King forbids, on pain of severe forfeiture, that any great man or other should, by force of arms, or by menaces, or by any subtle contrivance, disturb the freedom of Election."

The Commons of England now stand in need of this protection against the Peers, which was heretofore wanted by our Kings. I know it will be said, that the Peer, who nominates Members of the House of Commons, and afterwards sells their votes to the Minister, pays his proportion of those