only instruction as it enables us to teach ourselves. A fact of consciousness, however accurately observed, however clearly described, and however great may be our confidence in the observer, is for us as zero until we have observed and recognised it for ourselves. Till that be done we cannot realise its possibility, far less admit its truth. Thus it is that, in the philosophy of mind, instruction can do little more than point out the position in which the pupil ought to place himself in order to verify by his own experiences the facts which his instructor proposes to him as true. The instructor, therefore, proclaims oû philosophia állá philosophêin; he does not profess to teach philosophy but to philosophise." 1 Briefly, in mental and spiritual science especially, nothing can be done even by the greatest teacher without the most earnest co-operation of the pupil-a Law which seems also to mark the relationship existing between God and Man. 14. This is not only a Rule but a Law.-This is not merely a rule, but it is a Law which necessarily operates in our intellectual and spiritual life. Every man's self is, and must be to himself, the chief witness and judge of the truth in all high things. Browning recognises this when he says that Truth-meaning, I suppose, the criterion of Truth "is within ourselves, it takes no rise From outward things, whate'er you may believe. Where truth abides in fullness . . This perfect clear perception which is truth.” 2 And, indeed, if men would but open their hearts to receive this doctrine frankly, they would have reason to rejoice over the possession of it; for it is quite clear that without such a possession, 1 Quoted by Hamilton, 'Lectures,' Vol. i. pp. 16, 378. 2 'Paracelsus,' Sc. i. they must, in their highest interests, be completely at the mercy of a thousand eager disputants, whose contending claims will be to them a source of sheer distraction. Do what he willwriggle as he may, the Final Court of Appeal touching every question of intellectual and spiritual conviction must be to the individual, even to his insuppressible and imperious self. In no ultimate question can the individual Human Mind demit its sovereignty and responsibility without committing a kind of intellectual suicide. 15. Philosophy must be founded upon principles apprehensible and appreciable, to some extent, by ordinary men.-There is a population of some fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of more or less muddled Human Heads inhabiting the Terrestrial Ball. Philosophy must be founded upon principles which, potentially, are common (explicitly or by implication) to all those fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of more or less muddled Human Heads-so great, so dignified, apparently, does our Maker wish the individual man to be. The Task of civilisation is to induce these fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of Human Beings to agree with one another. 16. This Law reigns in Esthetics, which might be defined as the Science of the Emotions.-Now this Law of which I have been speaking holds good, bears absolute sway, in the region of Esthetics or of Human Emotion. As Dugald Stewart says: In the constitution of Man there is an inexplicable adaptation of the mind to the objects with which its faculties are conversant, in consequence of which these objects are fitted to produce agreeable or disagreeable emotions." 1 Thus also Carlyle : 66 1 'Collected Works,' Vol. ii. p. 322. Baumgarten first applied the term aesthetic to the theory of the fine arts.-Hamilton, 'Lectures,' Vol. i. p. 124. Ruskin, I think, is somewhat inaccurate "Poetry is no separate faculty; no organ which can be superadded to the rest or disjoined from them, but rather the result of their general harmony and completion. The feelings, the gifts that exist in the Poet, are those that exist with more or less development in every human soul. The imagination which shudders at the Hell of Dante is the same faculty, weaker in degree, which called that picture into being. How does the Poet speak to men with power but by being still more a man than they? "There is an inward and essential truth in art-a truth far deeper than the dictates of mere mode, and which, could we pierce through these dictates, would be true for all nations and for all men." Poetry incorporates "the everlasting Reason of Man in forms visible to his sense, and suitable to it." 1 And Professor Bain takes it for granted that "beauty is not arbitrary—that there are effects which please the generality of men when once produced." In 66 "2 on this subject. He construes esthetic as sensual," and says, "I wholly deny that the impressions of beauty are in any way sensual: they are neither sensual nor intellectual, but moral."— Modern Painters,' Vol. ii. p. 13. I should say that they are neither sensual, nor intellectual, nor moral, but emotional. I take Esthetics to be the science of the Emotions, and, as such, a very valuable and almost indispensable word. 1 Miscellaneous Essays,' Vol. i. pp. 277-8, 230, 255. 2 The Senses and the Intellect,' p. 441. That there are axioms in the matter of Taste-see Reid, Works,' p. 453 (Hamilton's edition). That all have at least the rudiments of Taste-Campbell, 'Rhetoric,' p. 6. So Kames, 'Elements of Criticism,' Vol. i. p. 201. That esthetical principles are "drawn from human nature, the true source of criticism "-Ib., Intro., pp. 12-13. That proportion is founded in Nature, not in custom-Ib., Vol. ii. p. 465. That there is a common standard in Morals and Tastean excellent passage pp. 492-4. That Taste is "a faculty common in some degree to all men "-Blair, 'Lectures,' Vol. i. p. 19. So Dr Johnson, "By the common sense of readers uncorrupted with literary prejudices, after all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, must be finally decided all claim to poetical honours "-- Works,' Vol. iv. pp. 402-3. "He is the best critic who knows best the phenomena of thought other words, every man must experience the emotion (whatever kind it be) and judge of it for himself before he can say anything sensible about it. In Esthetics all that one can do for another is to point out the sources of emotion. Take a case. It is a wintry morning. The South-Eastern Sky is barred with dark clouds. The rising Sun is illuminating their edges and shining between them in golden glory. I can but direct you to look at it; I cannot reason you into a feeling of its glory. I cannot compel you to feel its glory any more than I can compel you to weep bitterly, or laugh hilariously, or sneeze obstreperously. If gazing upon that rising Sun you do not there and then spontaneously feel that it is a glorious object -if it does not come home to your own consciousness that it is a magnificent spectacle, my assertion that it is such must be to you as zero. Even if the assertion be made by the sweet singer of Israel, or by Isaiah, or Homer, or Dante, or, for that matter, by a full convocation of all the Bards, it must be as zero to you personally until your own consciousness consciously thrills with the splendour of the morning, and responds with silent music to its influence; so true is it, as already contended, that every man's self must be to himself the chief witness and judge of the truth of all high things. The "Soul that hath not music in itself " might be considered under Zoology—or worse. and feeling "-Thomas Brown, 'Philosophy of the Human Mind,' Vol. i. pp. 53-5. That "artistic activity " is the same in all epochs Baldwin Brown, 'The Fine Arts,' p. 5. Hume, as might be anticipated from his psychological eccentricities, is much confused as to the nature of the Beautiful. He thinks that "beauty is no quality in things themselves "Essays Moral,' &c., Vol. i. pp. 268-9. But in self-contradiction he allows that there are certain qualities in objects fitted to produce particular feelings— Ib., p. 273, in which remark we may discover a vague perception of the true theory that esthetical principles are drawn from Human Nature. 17. The teacher of psychological doctrine must address himself to the consciousness of his pupil. Nothing great can be achieved by proxy.-This being the case, every teacher of psychological doctrine of any kind, if he be a teacher of worth, must address himself to the actual consciousness of his pupil. As a teacher of psychological doctrine in any one of its branches-sensation, perception, judgment, volition, appetancy, passion, morals, emotion, I must call up my pupils as the chief witnesses, as far as they are individually concerned, of the truth of whatever psychological doctrine I may wish to teach, or of the falsehood of any psychological doctrine I may wish to refute. Fully cognisant that this principle should govern all our attempts to instruct or enlighten, we must never say to any one: "Believe this or that doctrine on my authority or on any other person's authority"; but rather: "Believe it because you yourself, if you will carefully study the intuitions of your own consciousness, will know it upon your own authority." And so with regard to any refutation, the final refuting authority, the last Court of Appeal in matters psychological, is necessarily yourself. "He who hath ears to hear, let him hear"; so taught the great Teacher. The doctrine is as divine as the Teacher. He himself -the person possessed of ears, let him hear,-not another for him. You cannot hear by proxy; you cannot see by proxy; you cannot understand by proxy; you cannot experience any emotion by proxy; you cannot do anything worth speaking about by proxy. The chief doer in all high things concerning yourself in particular must be yourself, just as your chief authority for believing anything to be true must be yourself. Thus Goethe: "In Art I must bring my affairs to such a point that all becomes personal knowledge, |