ART. IL-REFORM IN PARLIAMENTARY RÉGIME* THE friends of liberty throughout the world are greatly grieved at the plebiscitory movement that has appeared in France in favor of a man whom nothing seems to recommend to popular favor. It will, perhaps, not be futile to study the causes of this extraordinary phenomenon, which now imperils republican institutions in France. And among these causes there are three that are easily discerned; namely, universal distrust, hero-worship, and the detestable operation of parlia mentary régime.

The First Cause.-When, on the downfall of the Empire, the Republic was established, this ideal régime, this longed-for crowning of all political progress, the people thought that the Golden Age was commencing. And, indeed, the first years, until toward 1875, were astonishingly prosperous. France was proud of having been so easily able to pay the ten milliards that the war had cost her, and all Europe admired this prodig ious recuperation. But soon there commenced an economical crisis: all values fell, and all revenues were diminished, while the people attributed to political mistakes a situation which was wholly due to a general economical cause--a financial contraction from which other countries suffered much more than France.

The Second Cause.--Universal suffrage should not have obtained without at least twenty years of universal instruction. The masses are still imbued with monarchical traditions, the heritage of a thousand years of absolutism. These belong to a man rather than to an institution; and they need a military hero, even though they can find him nowhere but on the boards of the "Café-Concerts." One needs to read again the marvelous article written by Proudhon when Louis Napoleon, a stranger, and only known by two ridiculous fiascos, obtained ten times more votes than the genuine and sincere republican, General Cavaignac. One thinks to hear the old story again on seeing General Boulanger elected in three departments after the disasters induced by the plebiscite of 1870.

* Emile de Laveleye, the author of this article, is the most famous politico-economist in the liberal ranks of Europe at the present time; a Belgian by nationality, but a cosmopolitan progressive.-EDITOR.

The situation of France recalls for a moment that which preceded the 18th Brumaire, and which Napoleon himself described at St. Helena in the following terms: "When a deplorable weakness and an endless versatility are manifested in the councils of power; when, yielding turn by turn to the influence of hostile parties, without a fixed plan and without a certain course, it has given the measure of its insufficiency; and when the most moderate citizens are forced to concede that the State is no longer governed: when, in short, to its nullity within the administration adds the gravest fault that it can have in the eyes of a proud nation, namely debasement without: then a vague weariness spreads through society, the need of self. preservation agitates it, and, regarding itself, it seems to seek a man who may be able to save it."

The Third Cause.--The evil working of parliamentary régime. And it is of this that I wish mainly to treat, for it is here alone that a remedy can be pointed out and applied without too great difficulty. Having been a student of the play of parties in Italy since 1871, I thus characterized the vices of parliamentary rule: "Parliament is a kaleidoscope; no two sessions offer the same situation. The groups are incessantly undergoing a process of transformation. An interpellation, an order of the day, a crisis and a change of ministry—that is the whole of governmental mechanism." (Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1871.)

At a later period, seeing the same instability, the same incoherence reproduced in France under a still worse form, I thought myself able to say: "The omnipotence of the Chambers in a republic constituted as an empire, but having no great constitutional parties, is a source of sterile agitations and a cause of unrest that a nation given to labor, and anxious as to its future, will not always tolerate. The greatest, and perhaps the only danger that threatens the existence of the Republic in France is, then, the imperfection of parliamentary rule." (Revue des Deux Mondes, December 15, 1882.)

Since these lines were written the evil has done nothing but increase. The ministers have scarcely had time to be installed in their new duties before a coalition of the Extreme Left overthrows them. It has been computed that the average length of a cabinet is about six months. In the year 1881-82 four ministries followed one another, giving to each ministry

be

It reminds one of the

the term of three months of existence. sharp saying of M. de Léry in the Caprice of Musset: "Your ministries are a strange kind of hostelries! One goes in and goes out without knowing why. It is a veritable procession of puppets."

It is impossible that these ephemeral governments, incessantly attacked by the Chambers, and always busy in maintaining a majority in the midst of hostile groups, can seriously apply themselves to the affairs of state. The evil is real for all branches of the administration; however, for internal affairs the numberless wheels of the administrative machine continue to move with a certain regularity. But when it comes to the interests of the army and those of foreign affairs, this instability becomes a veritable danger. How can such a migratory minister, without previous preparation, called abruptly to control the policy of a great country like France, meet the chancellors of rival states, who fully know all the frightfully complicated situation of the Europe of to-day? It is here that the very salvation of the country is at stake.

When the Count of Paris and General Boulanger attack parliamentary rule they do but voice the general sentiment of the nation. It is said that the people desire to be governed. But this is not so, for the entire nation loves liberty, and consequently desires to be governed as little as possible, and it prefers even to attend to its business itself. But that which is fatiguing and irritating are these discussions without issue, these sterile agitations, these parliamentary crises, and this continual downfall of ministries. The recess of the Chambers affords a general release and a universal relief. Every one can then attend to his own affairs in peace, or even his pleasures. Parliamentary rule has thus become a veritable nuisance.

Bismarck said some twenty years ago, "Cabinet government is a folly and a scourge, of which Europe will cure itself as soon as possible." Will this prediction, alas! be realized?

We know how the United States has obviated these vices of parliamentary rule. The president, with the approbation of the Senate, chooses ministers who do not come from the Chambers, and who have no power to appear there. The bills which they wish Congress to pass must be introduced by one of its own members. There is neither interpellation nor votes overthrowing the cabinet. The ministers keep their port

folios four years, or even eight, if the retiring president be reelected.

This system is much superior to ours. It is peculiarly appropriate to a democracy. Under a monarchy it would re-estab.lish absolutism, since the sovereign could always retain the same ministers in spite of the wishes of the people. But in a republic the people, if they desire, can by their own vote change the administration at each election.

These, then, are the advantages of the American régime. And, indeed, it is more conformable to the political theory whose essential phase, according to Montesquieu, is the separation of the powers. In the governmental system of the English cabinet the legislative power absorbs and annihilates the executive power; for it is the votes of the Chamber which designate the ministers, and these latter govern only under its incessant control. Not only does the Parliament vote the laws, but it also watches over their execution, and in reality it directs every thing, even into details, by means of the interpellation and the order of the day. In America the ministers, when once authorized by the Senate, administer independently, of course within the limits of the law.

In this way we need not fear that abuse of the influence of members and politicians in the appointments and the management of affairs which is, by common consent, one of the greatest evils of our system; and an evil which is on the increase everywhere, to the point of introducing disorder into all branches of the service, the weakening of the springs, and a peculiar and very unfortunate species of corruption.

In the American system the president can choose for each department the man the most capable to manage it, thus apply. ing a principle on which depends success in any undertakinga specialist for each special function-that is, "the right man in the right place." With us the necessities of parliamentary régime and the government of parties do not permit the choice for each portfolio of the most competent man. One must yield to opinions rather than to capacities. The demands of the different groups dictate the choice. If a party succeeds to power those who have secured success must be rewarded.

And this evil increases in proportion as the changes are more frequent. It then becomes quite impossible to find each time in

the group or faction called to power by the vote of the majority men prepared for the duties that are to be confided to them. A lawyer, not a diplomat, is appointed to foreign affairs, and to war not a soldier, but an engineer; to finance not a politicoeconomist, but a legislator. The witticism of Beaumarchais is more true to-day than formerly: "A mathematician was needed, but a dancer gained the place."

In America, when the ministers are once appointed they can exercise peaceably and with attention and assiduity the affairs of state. With us they have not even time to become initiated into the most important questions of their department. Their entire morning is taken up with visits from the deputies, whose solicitations must first be listened to and then means must be found to satisfy them. The afternoon is occupied with the sessions of the Chamber and the incessant labor of negotiations and compromises indispensable in order to preserve the ma. jority. In the evening they must receive and go out under penalty of passing for a misanthrope and compromising their popularity. What a cause for inferiority in a parliamentary minister, even were he a genius, to that chancellor of a neighboring power, who from the retirement of his closet or his rural retreat can follow and unravel with a tranquil eye all the complications of European politics!

There are public affairs on which depends the very future of the country, and which consequently demand a spirit of continuity the army, the navy, public instruction, and especially foreign affairs. A minister who can retain his portfolio during one entire presidency, as in the United States, can carry to completion a plan maturely prepared and assiduously followed; but what can a transient minister accomplish who has scarcely six months at his disposition, and what foreign state can, with confidence, begin with him an alliance, or even the preliminaries of a negotiation?

The chronic instability of governments, which appears inevitable when the parties are numerous and transitory, especially when there are two of them always irreconcilable and hostile, is an evil so great that it must end in the contempt and ruin of free institutions.

Americans, still preserving the admirable foresight which led the authors of the Constitution to create extra-parliamentary