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last into social chaos, religious know-nothingism, and worthlessness.

As to the real meaning of Christ's words, Archdeacon Farrar well says:

The Scriptures were written in human language, and all human language must be interpreted with reference to its idioms, limitations, and recognized methods, as well as in its relation to those who use it, and those whom they address, and the purposes which they have in view. Even language which at first sight seems to be perfectly clear is found to be susceptible of the greatest ambiguities. Nothing is more common than for Christians to tell other Christians who differ from them that they are rejecting the plain words of Christ, forgetting that to their opponents the "plain words of Christ appear to have an entirely different significance. Hundreds of instances might be quoted in which, by the confession of all Christians alike, the superficial meaning of Scripture is very far from being its real meaning. It is a mark of ignorance and provincialism when a controversialist acts according to the sar castic advice of Kant: "Go to your Bible; but mind you find there exactly what we find; for if you do not you are wrong." The evidence of Scripture must be tested by reason, no less than the evidence of the senses. The sun does not go round the world, though it appears to do so; and Scripture in many cases does not signify that which its words seem literally to mean. In the world of Scripture, as in the world of nature, we may be misled by appearances into erroneous conclusions; not because the phenomena are, in either case, intended to mislead, but because in both spheres they are left to the interpretation of the trained intellect.

Christ said: "Ask and ye shall receive;" but his teachings, and those of the men who were personally taught by him, as well as the experience of Christians ever since Christ's day, have not failed to prescribe the necessary limitations and explanations of a promise which could not be fulfilled in the letter without disarranging the machinery of the entire universe.

Christ also said: "Give to him that asketh thee;" but by laying down the general principles which must regulate Christian charity and alms-giving he took good care that the disciple who comprehends the spirit of his teaching shall be in no danger of falling into the ridiculous absurdities consequent upon a literal interpretation, at all times, of this command. Literalism, at this point, would lead one to give oftener to men's hurt than to their good, and thus defeat the very purpose to promote which the Master laid down this "divine and lovely precept."

After years of study Tolstoï has reached the conclusion that the central principle of all Christ's teachings is, "Resist not evil," or "him that is evil." In the fourth chapter of My Religion he says:

I understand now that in saying "Resist not evil," Jesus not only told us what would result from the observance of this rule, but established a new basis for society conformable to his doctrine, and opposed to the social basis established by the law of Moses, by Roman law, and by the different codes in force to-day. He formulated a new law whose effect would be to deliver humanity from its self-inflicted woes. His declaration was: "You believe that your laws reform criminals; as a matter of fact they only make more criminals. There is only one way to suppress evil, and that is to return good for evil without respect of persons. For thousands of years you have tried the other method; now try mine. Do as I command you; follow my example and you will know that my doctrine is true." Not only in words but by his acts, by his death, did Jesus propound his doctrine, "Resist not evil." They are very simple, those words, but they are, nevertheless, the expression of a law divine and human. Men may turn aside from it, they may hide its truth from others, but the progress of humanity toward righteousness can only be attained in this way. Every step must be guided by the command, "Resist not evil."

In a recent visit to Tolstoï Mr. George Kennan recounted to him many instances of cruelty, brutality, and the most flagrant violation of the private and sacred rights of weak women by the Russian officers in Siberia, which had come under his observation, and at the end of every harrowing recital said to him, "Count Tolstoï, if you had been there, and had witnessed that transaction, would you not have interfered with violence?" Tolstoï invariably answered, "No." Mr. Kennan asked him the direct question whether he would kill a highwayman who was about to murder an innocent traveler, provided there were no other way to save the traveler's life. Tolstoï replied: "If I should see a bear about to kill a peasant in the forest I would sink an ax in the bear's head; but I would not kill a man who was about to do the same thing."

Now, in all this Tolstoï has overlooked certain facts necessary to a complete understanding of Christ's command, "Resist not evil." Christ himself put an interpretation upon it with which neither Tolstoï's precept nor example harmonizes. In the Sermon on the Mount, immediately after the words

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"Resist not evil," Christ says: "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." But nothing can be clearer than that Christ meant here to inculcate the duty of suppressing angry resentment when wronged or injured, and by no means meant that the injunction should always be obeyed literally, since when unjustly smitten on the cheek in the high-priest's hall he promptly and emphatically gave a practical illustration of his own teaching by remonstrating with his assailant. (John xviii, 23.)

Cannot this great man see that non-resistance to evil, at all times, on the part of men or nations, would soon bring in the complete reign of selfishness, wolfishness, robbery, oppression, and lust, wherein all the rights of virtue and intelligence and weakness would be ruthlessly trampled down by men whose unrestrained passions had transformed them into demons?

The more we study and analyze Tolstoï's religion the stronger is our conviction that it is eminently of this world, and based largely upon terrestrial considerations. Even Christ is to him. more of a philosopher than a Saviour. Tolstoï's strong character and lovable personality pervade all that he writes, and give a charm to his theories which makes them very plausible and attractive on paper, but directly one has subjected them to dispassionate investigation and applied the test of real life he is deeply impressed with a sense of their utter impracticability so far as society in general is concerned. Notwithstanding this, we look for notable results from his efforts in Russia, where he is more generally talked of and widely read than any other author of modern times. He is loved and hated, loudly praised and soundly abused (as all men are who are worth any thing to the world), but all candid men can see that he is the unfeigned friend of humanity; and few things are more likely to happen than that his opinions will, indirectly at least, work out some important changes in Russian society and politics. The world knows that there is need enough of this, and will not be very particular as to the agency by which it shall be accomplished.

Boss & Houghton

ART. V.-PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM.

It is very common in histories of philosophy to find traditional misinterpretations abiding from one generation of critics to another, because the critics tend to study criticisms rather than the original works themselves. It is about equally common to find philosophical doctrines studied, not in their origin and meaning in thought itself, but in verbal and hearsay interpretations, which have nothing but words in common with the doc trine they claim to express. This has been pre-eminently the case with idealism. There is a mass of amorphous criticism of this doctrine scattered about in text-books on psychology and in theological treatises which is so irrelevant to what most idealists profess as to be little more than a beating of men of straw or a belaboring of lay figures. Let our first question then be, What is idealism?

In casting about for an answer to this quest we remember that idealism exists in many forms. There is an idealism springing from the sensational philosophy. This allows things to be only groups of sensations, real or possible. There is the Berkeleian idealism, which views things as a system of presented ideas without any material substance. There is an idealism which reduces things to phenomena, and makes them only a projection of our mental states under the forms of reality. There are idealisms which depend upon our theory of knowledge, and there are others based upon a study of the objects of knowledge. One idealism emphasizes the fact that the ontological existence of things cannot be proved; another insists that an analysis of things as known demonstrates that they have neither existence nor meaning except with reference to intelligence. This is the highest form of idealism. It does not question the universality of the object or its independence of our thought, but it holds that the existence of the object being defined and constituted by rational relations is unintelli gible, and impossible, except with reference to a cosmic intelligence by which those relations are constituted, and in and for which alone they exist. This fact that idealism has many forms-explains the indifference with which reputed idealists often regard the most Titanic belaborings of idealism by some

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realistic Boanerges. If now we look for some common element in these forms we find it in the claim that things, and the whole world of things, exist only for, and in relation to, mind and consciousness. The realistic contention, on the other hand, is that things exist by themselves as lumpish material realities ontside of, and apart from, mind, and in antithesis to mind and consciousness. This, at least, is to be the meaning of the terms in the following paper; and our aim is to give some idea of the arguments used for the respective claims and of their speculative value.

For spontaneous thought the question itself does not exist; and if by any chance it should be raised, it would be dismissed at once as absurd. Things are so manifest in their real exist. ence that only an unbalanced mind could doubt it. From this stand-point of unreflective thought things are real, and are immediately known as such. There is nothing obscure in the process; indeed, there is no process, but the mind stands over against the thing, and forthwith knowledge results as a matter of course. This naïve confidence in perception is invaluable for practical life, but a little reflection serves to disturb it. To begin with, perception itself admits of being viewed in two ways. It claims to be an apprehension of something objectively existing, and it is also an event in our subjective experience. In the latter sense perception is an effect produced within the mind by the action of something other than itself. If now it were possible to connect perception, as effect, with the alleged object as its only possible cause, then our assurance of the object would be as immovable as our intuition that every event must have a cause. Many have thought this to be possible, and have sought to refute idealism by the law of causation and by the fact that we are coerced in our experience. This might do if the aim were to prove that there is something beyond the individual thinker, but it is quite irrelevant to the question as to the nature and existence of the apparent object. The law of causation only says that this psychological occurrence must have a cause, but it does not tell us where to seek it or what it must be. Leibnitz found the cause in the nature of the soul itself, and not in any external action upon the soul. If we are not satisfied with this view, and determine to look for a cause other than the soul, we are quite at a loss to connect the effect

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