cupy the entire ground with his theology, and thus perform the laudable feat of preserving the "harmony of science and religion!" In both instances the compound of compounds thus formed, being an utter distortion of two distinct systems of truth, gives us a true representation of nothing known to nature. The better way is by introspection to develop the science of psychology out of the elements of the mind without the least regard to theology or to any other science. Then isolated, alone, shining in its own light, and unmodified by any thing foreign to itself, we shall be able to see the mind as it really is. How it came to be or what its destiny is are questions that need not in this connection be raised. As the essence of mind is hopelessly beyond our reach the psychologist may begin his studies by inquiring: What are its powers? What are their relations to each other and to the body? and the more fully he studies mind as it is and nothing else, the clearer and more correct will be his conceptions of its phenomena and powers. In fact, we can see nothing distinctly unless it be made to stand forth alone, away from the shadows of other things. Theology should receive the same treatment, and nothing should be allowed to mar or modify its distinctive individuality.

Then when we have the two sciences well in hand it will be very proper by comparison and contrast to examine the relation they sustain to each other. As the most important inquiry that can be raised, we should ask: Do the two sciences, as separate and independent witnesses, testify to the same truth whenever they occupy the same ground?

The unity and harmony of the two sciences as the result of coalescence we should very much deprecate. If, in an attempt to bring about that result, we make pure psychology the standard of truth, then theology must be cramped, and stretched, and warped, and twisted in a thousand ways-in short, it must be mangled beyond recognition, and psychology left to stand alone as the embodiment of both; or if theology be made the standard of truth, then psychology must be subjected to like violence that agreement may be effected; or if both sciences are so modified that they will be able to blend and occupy common ground, then the compound will be neither, but form a nameless hybridous fiction. But this is

not all. If we allow theology to swallow up psychology, then the mind ultimately, under the power of a remorseless logic, will be led to recognize God as the only existence, and man's individuality will disappear; then there will be left us as the universe, the thought and "activity of the infinite,” with the capital "I" discarded. If in this process matter or extension is associated with thought, then we land in atheism or in the pantheism of Spinoza.

Whenever theology has felt constrained to adjust itself to any system of speculative philosophy it has suffered a loss of character and dignity by patronizing an interest which it should have regarded with indifference. The following facts will illustrate my meaning: Before embracing Christianity Augustine was thoroughly versed in Greek philosophy, and the fatalism it taught he had heartily embraced. He was seized with the "craving" for the unity of religion and necessity, and at once his vast and varied powers became enlisted in the work of its consummation. The most conspicuous and enduring labor of his life was his successful attempt in the interests of "harmony" to adjust the doctrines of Christian theology to the imperious demands of Greek philosophy. If at any point he failed, the deficiency was at a later day supplied by John Calvin. As a consequence of this effort at "reconciliation" the fair form of Christian doctrine has been torn and tortured for ages, in all lands, by such notions of "decrees," "predestination," "foreordination," "effectual calling," "perseverance," and "necessity" as caused millions of people to stand aghast and tremble, till many fled for refuge in some form of infidelity. How much better if he had, with a steady faith, adhered to plain Christian theology, and allowed heathen philosophy to take care of itself. Or, if in some of its Protean forms there comes up a philosophy that is worth fighting, we need not take the ark of God into the field, but use such weapons as we can easily capture from the enemy.

At the present time there is in many quarters an itching to push theology to the front and use it in the settlement of questions of geology, physics, evolution, chemistry, and anatomy. But since revelation touches these sciences only at a few points, and never attaches to any of them a moral quality, we care nothing for their teaching except when, as independent wit

nesses, they bear testimony to facts and doctrines which are fundamental in the Christian system. Theology fully recognizes the world of truth, but it is not amenable to any system of speculation nor responsible for it. Until a case of clear contradiction is made out we can take no interest in the labors of reconciliation. As there is no line of thought in the universe that can come up and share with theology its divine heights, so it should refuse to go down for the sake of being brought into harmony with any thing. Let theology hold its ground in the realm of the divine, the intellectual, the spiritual, and the moral, and its integrity will be preserved.

And why this "craving" for unity and harmony? The fact is, we don't want them. Would any thing be added to the value or beauty of the forest were all the trees so changed that in structure and appearance they would be like the pine or the chestnut? Who could wish that unity might be given to the fruitage of the orchard or the flowers of the field? The fact is, the unifying process demanded by philosophers and some theologians, if it could be made effective, would bring the confusion of chaos upon the whole realm of truth. Diversity and variety signify wealth of resources and not conflict of systems. Is not the unity of this universe the product of an infinite variety?

Some of the clamoring for harmony is made by modern philosophers. The theology of cosmology-a very gauzy substance is the form of religion they accept. The authorized exposition of this doctrine may be found in Spencer's evolution of his fanciful absolute. We are willing to put nature on the witness-stand and receive all the testimony it can give to facts that come within its knowledge, and we have not a doubt that the truths thus established will coincide with all the truths of theology that bear upon the same topics. As an illustration, nature teaches that virtue promotes happiness-theology teaches the same lesson.

A. H. Moore.

ART. IV. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS ON MORALS IN THE CHURCH OF ROME SINCE THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, BY DRS. DÖLLINGER AND REUSCH.* THE interest which will always attend a good account of how a body of men may think on the eternal questions of right and wrong, and of how they may solve the problem as to what shall be our guide in determining the right, attaches in no ordinary degree to the present volumes. It is not every school of which the teaching on matters such as pilfering or embezzlement, lying or perjury, wrongful contract or breach of the marriage vow, smuggling or treason, rebellion or assassination of rulers, is of moment to the moral health of families, cities, and nations in the same degree as the teaching of the Post-Tridentine Church of Rome. Neither is it every author who in equipment or repute is the equal of Drs. Döllinger and Reusch.

Needing no fresh monument of their lore, these great scholars, in supplying a public want, have reared one; for in nearly eleven hundred pages before us every paragraph is the handiwork of masters in knowledge and laboring-men in research. In the second of the two volumes, indeed, they do not appear as authors, but as discoverers. It consists wholly of documents in Latin, French, Italian, and Spanish, and therefore is not of their writing, although it is their book. Of these documents a large part has been discovered in the archives of Munich, and these now, for the first time, publicly appear. Some of the documents had been already printed by two Dominicans-Concina and Patuzzi-but were known only to a small number of clerical readers, mostly in Italy.

From these documents is drawn the history contained in the first large volume. That is a narrative scrupulously faithful to the authorities; clear as day; sober, but far from dull; acute, yet avoiding subtleties. The authors always move with that ease of carriage which bespeaks conscious knowledge of the ground and familiar command of the facts. Their work ought to be speedily translated into English.

* Geschichte der Moralstreitig Reiten in der römisch Katolischen Kirche seit dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert, von Ignatz von Döllinger und Fr. Heinrich Reusch. NördJingen, 1889. Two vols., octavo, pp. 687 and 398.

A history of conflicts between combatants fighting behind the shut visors of a dead language, within an inclosure so carefully fenced off as the modern Church of Rome, and on the delicate subject of esoteric moral teaching, is not easily traced by any one standing outside of that Church. In fact, it never could be traced with the same ease and firmness with which it is here traced, except by men whose perfect acquaintance with Romanism enables them to reconnoiter the ground with greater confidence than could be possessed by either a Protestant or Greek writer.

For our authors, two dangers whereby others are beset do not exist on the one hand, the danger of straining interpretations, so as to make Rome and Romanists say what they have not said; and on the other hand, that of too easily accepting disclaimers. Knowing just how far a given form of expression carries, Döllinger and Reusch push it no farther; and knowing also the proper value of disclaimers, they accept them now as meaning what they appear to mean, now as meaning little, now as meaning nothing at all.

The documents present the history in episodes, to which the narrative gives unity. In the Middle Ages discussion in the schools often turned upon the general principles of morals and their practical application in specific cases. Food for specula

tion on such points was constantly ministered by the theses of disputants and the lectures of professors. Certain ideas speedily were discountenanced, others gradually gained credit. These last passed into works now on canon law, now on moral theology. The works on canon law were for the guidance of practitioners in the forum externum, the ecclesiastical courts, in which bishop and archdeacon, holding acknowledged jurisdiction over church lands, tithes, and endowments, besides all matters affecting wills, marriage, or divorce, as well as all cases between clerk and layman, steadily sought to extend the range of their authority, and so held the civil courts in constant strife to keep up a precarious independence.

The writings on moral theology were at first only branches of works on theology in general, but after the Council of Trent they grew into regular hand-books for the guidance of practitioners in the forum internum, the solemn secret tribunal of the Church commonly called the confessional. In this tribunal the 34-FIFTH SERIES, VOL. V.