election is true now, it was always true, and always will be true, in human history, and it ought not to be changed to suit the modern clamor, or to harmonize with public opinion.

The initial work of the Presbyterian Church is a re-examination of the basis of the doctrine, not in its historical aspects, but in its scriptural character; and if it can see no reason for a change of faith it should resolutely refuse to change the creed. Besides, if after a careful study of the basis of the doctrine the Church is still satisfied with its scriptural soundness, it should affirm it with all integrity and enthusiasm, and insist that Christendom shall accept it as a revelation from God. The day has come when, if false, it should be eliminated from the Confession, but if true it should be heralded with the tremendous strength of the whole Church. The attitude of the Presbyterian Church respecting the doctrine is open to criticism, because the outside world is not certain whether it holds to it or has secrectly abandoned it. It seems that it does not deny the doctrine, but it refuses frankly to affirm it. It is evidently an integral part of the Confession, but it is heard no longer in the pulpit, except in Talleyrand's usus loquendi. Laymen unite with the Church with words of repudiation of the doctrine on their lips, and Arminian ministers are installed in their parishes without the slightest change of faith or opinion respecting the decrees. This Laodicean position of the Church is bid for the doctrine if it be true, and unfortunate for the Church if false. What is needed, therefore, is a firm, square affirmation of the truth, whether it shall confirm or reject the third chapter of the Confession, since the truth is of more value than the creed.

There are some arguments for revision that the most conservative of Calvinists can afford to weigh and appropriate in behalf of the truth, and which Arminians may modestly suggest to their respectful consideration. The popular impression is, that the section on the decrees is obsolete, and that Calvinistic bodies have entirely outgrown its meaning and application. That it still retains its place in the Confession is not astonishing, for nations outgrow laws and constitutions before they abandon them, and religionists often advance beyond their doctrines and ceremonies before they modify or reject them. The Roman augury lost its standing with the statesmen and common people years before it was declared useless and unavailable. The Lutheran Church still retains the inherited Roman Catholic doctrine of confession and priestly absolution, though it is of no influence in, and is not observed by, the Church. So the chapter on the "decrees" is rather the monument of the rejectable theological science of other days than the exponent of any preachable faith in these times. It is a relic of pious ingenuity rather than a living arithmetic in human thought; it is a theory of future vital statistics rather than a schedule of known or knowable facts pertaining to the distribution of eternal rewards and retributions. Whatever its influence in preceding centuries on the religious life of the people, it is now a quiescent factor and wholly inoperative both in religious people and human affairs. The advance of the Church itself beyond the teaching of the decrees is sig

nificant of their worn-out condition, their inability in these days of a broader knowledge of the Scriptures, and their probable untruthfulness as a doctrine.

From the Arminian view-point the doctrine is not only paradoxical but it is self-contradictory, and therefore absurd. If it were only paradoxical we should be cautious in objecting to it, for the Bible is a book of paradoxes. A miracle is a scientific paradox, but it is not self-refuting. Paul was weak when he was strong and strong when he was weak, but he was not absurd when he claimed to be in either paradoxical condition. That God fore-ordained all things to come to pass, yet so as not to be the Author of sin, which is the greatest thing, save redemption, that ever came to pass, is not a paradox, but a self-contradictory absurdity. Neither does theology require it nor logic justify it. That God foreordained all things, yet so as not to interfere with human freedom, is another equally incompatible statement, without justification in logic, and without confirmation in human history. We are not certain that the Arminian expression of the relations of divine sovereignty and human freedom is unimprovable, but we are certain that the Calvinian formulary is logically absurd and scripturally defective. And this, as we understand it, is the sentiment of our modern age respecting it.

If a doctrine may be judged by its utility, or its effects in human life, the doctrine of predestination may righteously be condemned, for it has been a stumbling-block in the path of progress, and a hinderance to the prosperity of Calvinistic bodies themselves in all lands. On the side of the elect it reads like Universalism; on the side of the reprobate it reads like fatalism; and taken together it destroys human freedom, paralyzing aspirations and achievements in proportion as it is received and incorporated in the history of the Church. The Arab is a fatalist, and the sultan's empire is an illustration of the effects of predestination when carried out in practical affairs. The Presbyterian Church might have been three times as strong as it is in the United States but for the blocking of its wheels by the "decrees" of its faith; and if these shall be removed in the near future we shall expect such success to this venerable Christian body as it has not had since the day it handicapped itself with paradoxes and absurdities. With these out of the way we even dream of the possibility of an organic union between the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches, for, bating superficial differences between them touching other doctrines, and an unlikeness of polity or church organization, which in the hands of wise men should not prove intractable, there would be no substantial ground for separation; and with Roman Catholicism menacing the republic there would be a strong reason for an early union. In the discussion in the Presbyterian Church over the "decrees" we voice the general hope that the minority may become the majority, and the majority act in the interest of that truth that is to save the world.

I HAVE read and meditated upon the brilliant, learned, and comprehensive article on "Philosophical Idealism," by Professor B. P. Bowne, in the May-June number of the Methodist Review, with a very lively interest; not only because of its intrinsic merit, but because it serves, in a degree, to clear up the mystery as to whether or not a defined system of idealism is being taught at the Boston University, and what the nature of that idealism is. Now that the enunciation of the Boston University idealism has, at length, been quite plainly made by its chief, if not sole, discoverer and expounder, one may, without impertinence, ask some direct questions about it, especially if it be his intent not so much to cast discredit upon it, or to express dissent from its declared character and postulates-secing that these have not, as yet, received any thing like an ample statement, and cannot, therefore, by the uninitiated, be fully understood as to draw out more extended explanations. And, seeing that the apparent reluctance to declare the quality of this Boston idealism has at last been overcome, we may reasonably look now for a very free and ready assertion of all its principles and implications.

The enunciation above referred to is given in the winding up of the aforesaid article of Professor Bowne, and is as follows: "It (the world) exists not only as a conception in the divine understanding, but also as a form of activity in the divine will. . . . The outcome of this activity is the phenomenal world, which is neither inside nor outside of God in a spacial sense, but which exists in unpicturable dependence upon the divine will. . . . This world, being independent of us, has all the continuity, uniformity, and objectivity which an extra-mental system could have, and, as distinct from individual delusion, is real and universal. Indeed, it is hard to say what this view should be called. In distinction from the idealism of sensationalism it is realism. . . . It is idealistic, on the other hand, in maintaining that this system is essentially phenomenal, and exists only in and for intelligence."

Concerning this peculiar "view," which is neither idealism nor realism, but both, we have to suggest, If the "outcome" of the divine activity, generating the world, is only an idea and not an act, it is purely mental; it does not result in a creation, does not realize an entity, but is solely a phenomenon, or a congeries of phenomena in God's consciousness. The world is merely the revelation to human intelligence of the processes of the mind of God. What ranker pantheism than this could find verbal expression?

But, again, if this "outcome” of the divine activity does not result in a real creation, does not give birth to a positive entity, not only is there no proper "objectivity" to the universe, but what becomes of its "continuity and uniformity," unless we suppose the divine activity to be exerting itself with an unbroken and everlasting flow upon the same lines?

For a phenomenon can last only during the continuance of the act or action producing it.

This Boston idealism would, then, seem to present God to us, not only in the irrational attitude of perpetually volitionating, to keep an everappearing and vanishing world in unreal existence; but, also, in the degrading and absurd light of an impotent absolute, fated forever to generate objectless phenomena within his own consciousness, but eternally shorn of the ability to give them substantial reality, and so rise to the dignity of a Creator. J. B. WENTWORTH. Buffalo, N. Y.

GOD'S BENEFICENCE IN NATURE.

The immediate effect of the almost unparalleled disaster in the Conemaugh Valley has been to produce doubt of God's ever wise beneficence. As said grim old Carlyle, in the midst of a scene of suffering, "If there is a God, why doesn't he do something?" Public calamity or great private sorrow sets us questioning, leading some to doubt and some to denial. Not only must faith confront these facts and questionings, but reason must confront them also. In all the shadowed scenes of life we are apt to judge God too narrowly, forgetting or overlooking the wider reach of his plans. That God is infinite in wisdom, in power, and in goodness is not only the declaration of revelation, but is it not, also, the voice of nature? It must be conceded that the facts and forces of nature, in their gencral adaptation, serve our highest good; but they may also at times bring to the individual loss and suffering. Possibilities for good permit of possibilities for evil. Yet much of personal evil is the result of man's ignorance as well as of man's sin. The great law of gravitation is absolutely necessary, and no one would presume to complain of it; yet this very force precipitated the awful avalanche of water upon the doomed valley. The law which governed was no freak of nature, but the very law by which our lives are served in a thousand ways; by which the oceans are held within their bounds; by which our ships are permitted to sail their surface; and by which the water is made to flow in secret through the hills and send its supply into our dwellings.

Who can improve upon the laws governing the rainfall, either as to frequency or quantity? For us to attempt improvement would be to come to grief, as did the fabled Phaeton, who, aspiring to drive the steeds of the sun but for a day, so severely scorched the earth that Jupiter unseated him with a thunderbolt. We have hills and valleys, and rainfall and gravitation, and all serve our good. Folly only requires hills without valleys, fire without the power to communicate itself, and water without the power always to flow. God's beneficence in the laws of nature is plainly seen; and this beneficence must be sought in plan and provision, in order and method and end; not in interruption and break. It must be found in nature's constancy, not in disturbance of law and uncertainty. Agents and forces wait on every hand to do man service, in unvarying and ascertainable order. Upon those unvarying laws man must rely for

knowledge and progress in the appliances of advancing civilization. In God's far-reaching providence for good, under the reign of law, the conditions of life are to be bettered, and the possibilities of life and knowledge enlarged.

Who can doubt that God's natural and moral administration is all that can be desired, and all that goodness and wisdom can devise for the benefit of men? In all things, let us be careful to ascribe "rightcousness unto our Maker." "Great is our Lord, and of great power: his understanding is infinite." LOUIS PAINE.

Warren, O.

THE GENESIS OF HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY.

A distinguished philosopher writes me, "I believe in the freedom of the human will, but I also believe in the sovereignty of God.”

But, it is pertinent to ask, if Adam's will was free in the choice of disobedience, how could the sovereignty of God affect in the slightest degree his wicked volition? If Adam was not the sole originator of his wicked volition, how could he be held accountable therefor without a disregard to right and justice? How could guilt attach to an act constrained by the sovereignty of God? How could an immaculate God constrain Adam to put forth a wicked volition? God has innumerable plans, but it is inconceivable and impossible for him to form any plan that would involve violations of moral law and a disregard of the immutable distinctions of rightness and wrongness.

"That cannot be right in God which is wrong in me," says John Greenleaf Whittier. This certainly is true relative to fundamental rightness. The Scriptures say, "It is impossible for God to lie." If this is true, it must be equally impossible for God to constrain me to lie.

Has God perpetrated upon me the flagrant meanness of so constituting my nature that I necessarily suffer for an act which his sovereignty constrained me to perform? Did he so constitute my instincts, my intuitions, my reason and conscience, as to bear false witness? This surely would be an instance of double-breasted duplicity and injustice in God's character. But if Adam was free he could originate a wicked volition, and if he was free he could refrain from originating that volition. If, therefore, he did originate a wicked volition he alone was accountable therefor. If he alone was accountable therefor the sovereignty of God could have had no possible agency, or desire, or purpose, or plan, in the genesis of that wicked volition. To say that Adam originated a wicked volition, and yet that the divine sovereignty controlled in the genesis of that wicked volition, is a manifest violation of the necessary laws of thought. Such an affirmation says that both Adam and God were responsible for the origin of the same sinful volition. To say that a wicked volition was put forth, self-originated by man, excludes the divine sovereignty from its genesis; and to say that the divine sovereignty extends down into the genesis of a wicked volition, excludes human agency therefrom, in every sense that involves accountability therefor.

48-FIFTH SERIES, VOL. V.