of vividness in ideas, and of a certain degree of strength in their power of sug gesting one another. To me they appear to be things quite of a different nature, and I could as easily believe that a hat is a pair of shoes as that memory is a certain degree of vividness in ideas and of strength in their association." "A malefactor that is going to be hanged has a cluster of very vivid ideas, and very strongly associated, of what he is about to suffer, but it is not the object of remembrance but of foresight;" or, "It appears evident, therefore, that something more than association of ideas is required to produce memory, and consequently that association is not of itself sufficient to explain or account for memory." He shows that association cannot account for judgment; "for if there is a power in the mind of comparing ideas and of perceiving certain relations between them, such as those of universal concurrence and perfect coincidence, this power is not that of association; for it is evident that ideas may be associated with any degree of strength without being compared, without perception of any relation between them." He shows in much the same way that association cannot account for the passions and volition. He shows in the same paper that Priestley's attempt to get Locke's ideas of reflection from sensation utterly fails. Priestley had said, "got by abstraction." "We would be glad to be informed by Dr. Priestley whether a man, when he thinks, is not conscious of his thoughts? Whether he has not the power of reflecting upon his own thoughts and making them an object of thought," &c. III. On Liberty or Necessity. "The liberty of the will is a phrase similar to that of the liberty of speech. The last signifies not a power inherent in speech, but a power in the man to speak this or that. In like manner, the liberty of the will signifies not a power inherent in the will, but a power in man to will this or that." "This power is given by his Maker; and, at his pleasure whose gift it is, it may be enlarged or diminished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be independent of the Creator. The hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far as he sees fit, and when he pleases can restrain it or turn it whithersoever he will. Let this be always understood when we ascribe liberty to man or to any created being. Supposing it therefore to be true that man is a free agent, it may be true at the same time that his liberty may be impugned or lost by disorder of body or of mind, as in melancholy or in madness; it may be impaired or lost by vicious habits; it may in particular cases be restrained by divine interposition." He explains cause and effect, native and active power, liberty and necessity, standing up for efficient cause. In a fragmentary paper upon the same subject, perhaps a continuation: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced and ought to be influenced by motives. But the relation between a motive and the action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists and has power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent, and is what the schoolmen called an ens rationis, and therefore cannot possibly be the efficient cause of any thing. It may influence to action, but it cannot act. It is like advice or persuasion, which may have an influence of the same kind with that of motives; but they leave the man still at liberty and indeed suppose liberty. For in vain is advice given if the person be not at liberty either to follow or reject it. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all." IV. Of Constitution. Apparently a very old paper, not written with care for the press. "Every thing that is made must have some constitution, -some fabric, make, or nature, - from which all its qualities, appearances, powers, and operations do result." "It is one thing to say such a truth depends upon my constitution; it is another thing to say that my perception of that truth depends on my constitution, and these two things ought most carefully to be distinguished." "My perception of every self-evident truth depends upon my constitution, and is the immediate effect of my constitution, and of that truth being presented to my mind. As soon as this truth is understood that two and two make four, I immediately assent to it, because God has given me the faculty of discerning immediately its truth, and if I had not this faculty I would not perceive this truth; but it would be a true proposition still, although I did not perceive its truth. The truth itself therefore does not depend upon my constitution, for it was a truth before I had an existence, and will be a truth, although I were annihilate; but my perception of it evidently depends upon my constitution, and particularly upon my having as a part of my constitution that faculty (whether you call it reason or common sense) by which I perceive or discover this truth." "If it should farther be inquired how far the truth of self-evident propositions depends on the constitution of the being that perceives them, the answer to this question is no less easy and obvious. As every truth expresses some attribute of a thing, or some relation between two or more things, the truth depends on the nature of the thing whose attribute is expressed. The truth of this proposition, that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends upon the constitution of a lion, and upon nothing else. The truth of this proposition, that the sun is greater than the moon, depends upon the magnitude of the sun and moon, and upon nothing else." In like manner as to right and wrong. "Although the rectitude or depravity has a real existence in the agent in this case, yet it cannot be discerned by a spectator who has not the faculty of discerning objects of this kind." 'Why do I believe first principles?" "One philosopher says, Because I am so constituted that I must believe them. This, say some, is the only possible reason that can be given for the belief of first principles. But, say others, this is a very bad reason; it makes truth a vague thing which depends on constitution. Is not this the ancient sceptical system of Heraclitus, that man is the measure of truth, that what is true to one man may be false to another? How shall we judge of this controversy? Answer, This question admits of two meanings. I. For what reason do you believe first principles? 2. To what cause is your belief of first principles to be ascribed?" "To first, evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief, and he who desires a reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means." To the second the answer is not so satisfactory. It is, "that belief is a simple and original operation of the mind which always accompanies a thing we call evidence." "If it should be asked, what this evidence is which so imperiously commands belief, I confess I cannot define it." "If it should farther be asked, what is the cause of our perceiving evidence in first principles, to this I can give no other answer but that God has given us the faculty of judgment or common sense." The paper closes thus: "Q. Is there not a difference between the evidence of some first principles and others? A. There are various differences perhaps. This seems to be one, that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evidently contained in the subject: it is in this, two and three are equal to five; a man has flesh and blood. In these and the like self-evident principles, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it. There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject; as, where we affirm that a thing which begins to exist must have a cause. Here the beginning of existence and causation are really different notions, nor does the first include the last. Again, when I affirm that the body which I see and feel really exists, existence is not included in the notion of a body. I can have the notion of it as distinct when it is annihilate. The truth of principles of the first kind is only perceiving some part of the definition of a thing to belong to it, and such propositions are indeed of very little use: they may justly, as Mr. Locke observes, be called trifling propositions. One general maxim may include all first principles of this kind; viz., Whatever is contained in the definition of a thing may be predicated of it. But in reality the definition sufficiently supplies the place of such axioms. That the sides of a square are equal, that all the radii of a circle are equal, these do not deserve the name of axioms; for they are included in the definitions of a square and of a circle. Of the same kind are these propositions that an effect must have a cause, that a son must have a father. There is nothing affirmed in such propositions but what is contained in the definition or in the notion of the terms. There are other first principles wherein the predicate is not contained in the definition or notion of the subject. Of this kind is every proposition which affirms the real existence of any thing. Existence is not included in the notion of any thing. I"-here the paper abruptly closes. The paper is the dimmest and yellowest of all: looks old. Query: when written? The whole paper 11 pages. V. On the Axioms of Euclid. "It seems no man pretends to define sum or difference, or what it is to be greater or less. There are therefore some terms that frequently enter into mathematical reasoning, so simple as not to admit of mathematical definition. The mathematical axioms ought to be employed about these and only about these." VI. On the Muscular Motion in the Human Body. A paper worthy of constituting a chapter in "Paley's Natural Theology," showing a thorough knowledge of mechanical principles, and of the physiology of his time. VII. Some Thoughts on the Utopian System. In this paper he seems to amuse himself with describing the advantages of a community without private property. VIII. An Essay on Quantity. Royal Society of London, Oct., 1748, and published in works. -"P, S. When this essay was wrote in 1748, I knew so little of the history of the controversy about the force of moving bodies, as to think that the British mathematicians only opposed the notion of Leibnitz, and that all the foreign mathematicians adopted it. The fact is, the British and French are of one side; the Germans, Dutch, and Italians of the other. I find likewise that Desaguliers, in the second volume of his course of 'Experimental Philosophy,' published in 1744, is of the opinion that the parties in dispute put different meanings upon the word force, and that in reality both are in the right when well understood." INDEX. Abbadie, 41. Aberdeen Philosophical Society, Art. xxvii., Aberdeen Universities, 43, 92, 94, 95, 191, Abstraction and Abstract Notion, 137 (Hume), Alison, Art. xlii., 308-315, 225, 271, 280, Beauty, 34 (Shaftesbury), 36, 55-77 (Hutche- Being, 73 (Hutcheson), 139 (Hume). Bentham, 356-357, 373, 375. Berkeley, 13, 28, 29, 48, 55, 100, 104, 112, 120, 136, 137, 158, 183, 184, 187, 188, 192, Analysis, 333 (Brown), 378 (Brown and Blackwoods, 25. Blackwood's Magazine, 411-412. Analytic and Synthetic Judgments, 224, 474 Blair, 123, 129, 178, 269–270. (Reid). Anderson, Rev. George, 177, 179. A priori truths, 7, 160, 213, 216, 221, 274, Aristotle, 22, 26, 41, 70, 136, 215, 221, 248, Arnauld, 120, 215, 254, 432, 440. Boece, 24. Boston, Art. xvii., 109-110, 158. Brougham, Art. xlvii., 360-364; 21, 283, Brown, Thomas, Art. xliv., 317-337; 4, 6, 364, 365, 368, 389–391, 403, 418, 421, 432. Brutes, 253, 254 (Monboddo), 294 (Stewart). Buffier, 220, 226, 236, 242. Burnet, Gilbert, 57, 85. Burns, Robert, 246, 269–271. Butler, 13, 15, 20, 28, 29, 35, 53, 79, 106, Cabanis, 272. Calderwood, 422. Calvin, 180, 183, 265, 401. Campbell, Archibald, Art. ix., 89-90, 161. Cant, Andrew, 94. Carlyle, Alexander, 61, 65, 123. Carstairs, 24. Cause, 74 (Hutcheson), 142, 143 (Hume), Chalmers, Thomas, Art. liii., 393-406; 8, Clarke, Samuel, 7, 13, 28, 29, 42, 44, 45, 47, Coleridge, 325, 380. Collins. 177. Common sense, 31, 97 (Turnbull), 161, 217-| Conception, 216, 288, 381-382. Cousin, 1, 59, 159, 193, 225, 260, 267, 273, Cumberland, 178. Darwin, Erasmus, 319, 457. Dempster, 25. Descartes, 3, 4, 26, 31, 40, 42, 68, 71, 120, 192, 207, 209, 215, 273, 302, 305. | Dudgeon, Art. xviii., 111-113; 161, 176. Duncan, William, Art. xiv., 107. Edinburgh Review, 339-341, 353, 411, 421, Edinburgh University, 61, 107-108, 114, 348. Elliott, Sir Gilbert, 130, 156. Emotions, 332 (Stewart), 332 (Brown), 401 Epicureans, 78, 251. Evangelical Party, 86-88, 197, 198, 205, 270, Evidence, 236-237 (Beattie), 242 (Campbell), Dreaming, 46 (Baxter), 195-197 (Reid), 280 Helvetius, 272. (Stewart). Drennan, 64. Highlanders, 19, 63. Hobbes, 3, 26, 28, 55, 59, 79, 260, 335. |