topicks, which also inspire genius by pleasant associations; accordingly Mr. Wordsworth gives an account of A Blind Highland Boy,' who living near the sea, could not be prevented from adventuring on the dangerous flood. He chose a singular vehicle of conveyance, and Mr. W. has introduced it with all the dignity of which it is susceptible. In such a vessel ne'er before

Did human creature leave the shore.
But say what was it?

A Household Tub, like one of those

Which women use to wash their clothes.

This sublime description is followed by sending out a real boat to bring back the boy, who sick of his adventure, promises never to do so no more, and so ends the tale.

If the reader is not already satiated, we think our concluding quotation, entitled Foresight,' will abundantly satisfy him. That is work which I am rueingDo as Charles and I are doing! Strawberry-blossoms, one and all, We must spare them-here are many; Look at it-the bower is small, Small and low, though fair as any: Do not touch it! summers two I am older, Anne, than you.

Pull the primrose, sister Anne;
Pull as many as you can.

Primroses, the spring may love them

Summer knows but little of them :

Violets, do what they will,

Wither'd on the ground must lie :

Daisies will be daisies still

;

Daisies they must live and die :

Fill your lap and fill your bosom,
Only spare the strawberry-blossom!

FASHIONABLE FOLLY.

At a certain rout which was given a few weeks ago, two young ladies of fashion exhibited their charms so lavishly luxuriant, that it became a question among the beaux of the drawing-room, which of them, whether Miss **** or Miss ******, better understood the position of Brest harbour; which of them, in other words, exhibited the greatest knowledge of the subject. The unanimous determination was, that though Miss **** showed all, yet Miss **** showed more.

It is not the disorder, but the physician; it is not a casual concurrence of calamitous circumstances; it is the pernicious hand of government, which alone can make a whole people desperate.

JUNIUS.

REVIEW of Mr. Giles's first Speech in the Senate of the United States, on the Resolution of Mr. Hillhouse to repeal the Embargo Laws.

Continued from page 22.

IN entering into an examination of the second branch of Mr. Giles's defence of the administration, for continuing the Embargo Laws, we confess ourselves disappointed and provoked, that the arguments of a man who bears the name of Statesman, should not be grounded upon any important series of facts, but depend for their support on theoretick and visionary calculations in national policy, which every test by which they can be tried, determines to be fallacious, and which sound reason and common sense must utterly disclaim. We are naturally surprised to observe a philosopher persist in maintaining an hypothesis in science, after a long course of patient and critical investigation has evinced it false and inconclusive. But when the subject of the experiment is changed to a great and populous nation, when the whole nervous system of the political body is laid bare to the cold and unflinching hand of an ignorant operator, when every touch of the lancet draws forth the groans and convulsions of the suffering victim; what words can express our sensations when the surgeon declares, in spite of his ill-success, that he must probe yet deeper into the wound? Must we not believe him capable, through enmity and disappointment, of plunging his instrument into the heart of the patient, and stifle in the grave both the throes of despair and the remembrance of the assassination. Mr. Giles admits that cries of distress resound from one end of the continent to the other; he confesses the inefficacy of the experiment in determining the truth of the hypothesis; but declares his intention of persevering in the errour, though the nation should rise in rebellion, and the constitutional building be shaken to its foundation. One principal topick in his vindication of the Embargo measure, has for its foundation the circumstance of its failure. How then can he favour its continuance, when its execution at home becomes every day more impracVol. 1.

E

ticable and unpopular, and its operations abroad become every day less injurious. Having admitted its ill-success, &c. of what consequence is it to enquire how success has been frustrated? Suppose our party dissensions, suppose the revolution in Spain to have been the causes, (which we by no means admit,) the argument is directly in the teeth of administration; for the difficulties resulting from the Spanish revolutions and our domestick discontents, are evidently increasing, and if they have been sufficient reasons for the present failure, are much stronger against the further continuance of the policy. It is always thus with tyrannical and oppressive measures; their advocate must confound himself in contradiction or conceal himself in subtlety, when the errour is open and palpable to the plainest principles of moral honesty and common sense.

The Embargo it was easy to foresee would be ineffectual in its coercion of the belligerent powers (even if it had not been manifestly intended to favour the French nation, and if the result had not determined its futility) which will be evident if we consider the state of our commercial negociations at the time of its adoption, the difficulties which conspired to impede them, and the little probable injury Great-Britain would sustain in consequence of its operation. The sentiments of the new British ministry relating to neutral commerce had been promulgated in various shapes; but particularly in the decisions of the admiralty courts, under Sir William Scott, and in the pamphlet of "War in Disguise," published before that ministry came into power. We know the sentiments of that work to be those of Mr. Canning, for they have since then been adopted in their utmost latitude. The President's rejection of the treaty obtained by Messrs. Munroe and Pinckney, and the news of the Chesapeak disaster, were received in England nearly upon the heels of each other; and the temper of the English government towards us was proved, by its complete acquiescence in that rejection, though the treaty was negotiated under circumstances more favourable to the interests of the United States, than ever before existed. But the principles insisted on by our government, were so far strained, that Lords Holland and Aukland, at the present moment in the opposition, declared in relation to our proposition, with respect to seamen in merchant ships, that the British " government could not adopt it without taking on itself a responsibility, which no ministry would be willing to meet, however pressing the emergency might be ;* and this language was used by the very ministry who had before welcomed our commissioners, in these terms, an attention which it will always be the pride of the foreign office to shew to the ministers of the United States, our half countrymen." It was clear,

66

* Page 110, 111 of documents published by order of our government, March 22, 1808. † Page 77, ibid.

therefore, that our administration could never calculate upon further concessions in our favour, than the former British ministry had granted; and that the favourite principle of Mr. Madison, which is the complete protection of every person sailing under the American flag in merchant vessels, could never be acceded to by the new administration.

Our claims in respect to the prosecution of commerce, were equally repugnant to the present ministry. The idea of its granting the principle either of “ free ships, free goods," or a further relaxation of the rule of war of 1756, must have been imaginary and delusive to all but very theoretic and speculative men. And though the West-India merchants and planters made the concessions granted to us in the rejected treaty, the occasion of great clamour against Mr. Fox and his friends, and indeed preferred them as charges for the removal of that ministry from power; yet Mr. Madison now contends for them, with as much confidence and pertinacity, as if the views of the United States alone, were to be consulted, and as if the English nation had no other right or interest, but to clear away the obstacles which intercept them. The opposition made to our commercial claims, was sufficiently notorious in England and in this country, insomuch that the English merchants concerned in West-Indian affairs, had become formidable enough to render the ministry exceeding jealous of all plans proposed by our minister at the Court of St. James, which could be viewed in any light repugnant to the feelings of so powerful a party.

Under such a state of publick sentiment in Great-Britain, the kind of probability existing, that the Embargo could produce a concession of the principles which it was its apparent intention to inforce, could be found only in such brains as those of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. For under any emergence, this sentiment would still continue in its fullest force; and the calculation was, that the distresses which we vainly flattered ourselves would be produced, were not likely to arrive.

Though the West-Indian colonies would probably be driven to a great strait, by a scarcity of flour and provisions; yet the idea of starving them, was always considered futile and ridiculous. Every principle of commerce was in direct repugnance to the notion; not only because the colonists would probably turn their attention to the culture of grain, and additional quantities of yams, and other vegetables; but because it was foreseen that there would be frequent evasions of the Embargo laws in this country. That the prices of every description of provisions, with which we were in the habit of supplying the West-Indies, would be greatly enhanced, was certainly evident; but at the same time, it was equally apparent, that the English colonists could well afford to pay much more than usual for such supplies, because the evident effect of the measure in Europe, was to increase very considerably the demand for their own West-India productions. This will be rendered apparent, if the state of the colonies be considered at

the period when the Embargo was established; in which we shall discover the causes of the opposition to American commerce, just now referred to, as presenting formidable obstacles to the settlement of any definitive principles, on which our colonial trade might be prosecuted.

From a variety of causes, in the front of which, the interfering commerce of this country was arrayed as the principal, the British WestIndian concerns, were, in the years 1806 and 1807, involved in extraordinary calamity. The excessive cultivation of sugar all over the islands, produced a glut in the great market of the world; and the Americans supplied nearly the whole of continental Europe, with that article. The English on the other hand, were obliged to confine themselves to their home markets. It was apparent that we should supply the continental market with no more sugar than we could realize a profit upon, which of consequence threw back the whole surplus sugar of the world, upon the English merchants and planters. The result of all this was, that there arose a gradual accumulation of upwards of 100,000 hogsheads of sugar, which lay as a drug in the English market; being so much over and above the actual demand. This surplusage had reduced the average price of sugar from 654 per cwt. which was the estimate in the year 1800, to 33/6 per cwt. which was the mean price, for the first six months of 1807.* ** It seems also, that the actual cost of cultivation in the West-Indies, together with freight and insurance, amounted to 36/10 the same year; hence it follows that an absolute loss accrued to the planter, from the cultivation of his estate. All this difficulty was charged to the effects of American commerce, and of course the whole West-Indian interest was decidedly opposed to our government. The policy which they urged on Great Britain to adopt with respect to us, was to enforce the rule of war of 1756; and our Embargo has seconded their views more effectually than any other conceivable measure of their own ministry could possibly have done. By depriving the continent of the advantages of our supply of sugar (we confine ourselves to this single article for the sake of perspicuity) the Embargo created such a demand for the article, that the English found a vent for a great part of their surplusage; and of course it has considerably raised the price in Great Britain.

I

The quantity of sugar exported to the mother country, by all the English colonies, amounted to 2,810,915 cwt. in 1805, and in 1806 to 280,000 hogsheads, of 13 cwt. each, making a total of 3,640,000 cwt. An enhancement of 1 dollar per cwt. on this quantity, would produce 3,640,000 dollars. The quantity of flour exported to the English West-Indies from the United States, amounts, on an average, annually, to 431,504 barrels. During the Embargo they can receive no other

Edinburgh Review, No. 21, p. 153,