that there is no religion of nature, and that we have no knowledge of the attributes of God, or even of his existence, independently of revelation. The assertion is, I think, mischievous, because I believe it untrue: and by truth only can a God of truth be honoured, and the cause of true religion be served." "The single-minded writers of the New Testament, having their souls filled with other truths, thought little of the laws of nature but they tell us of the immutable perfections of our heavenly Father, and describe him as a being in whom is no variableness or shadow of turning. The religion of nature and the religion of the Bible are therefore in beautiful accordance; and the indications of the Godhead, offered by the one, are well fitted to give us a livelier belief in the promises of the other." (Pp. 15, 16, 18, 19.)

It is moreover a favourite doctrine with a large class of phrenologists, that man cannot advance in the improvement of his nature, except by studying his own constitution and that of external objects, and acting in conformity with the laws which the Creator has impressed on both; and that this is natural religion. The same view is eloquently enforced by Mr Sedgwick. "As all parts of matter," says he, " are bound together by fixed and immutable laws; so all parts of organic nature are bound to the rest of the universe, by the relations of their organs to the world without them. If the beautiful structure of organic bodies prove design, still more impressive is the proof, when we mark the adaptation of their organs to the condition of the material world. By this adaptation, we link together all nature, animate and inanimate, and prove it to be one harmonious whole, produced by one dominant intelligence." (P. 24.)

"Under no form of government is man to be maintained in a condition of personal happiness and social dignity, without the sanction of religion. As all material laws, and all material organs, throughout animated nature, are wisely fitted together, so that nothing, of which we comprehend the use, is created in vain; and as the moral and intellectual powers of man, working together according to the laws of his being, make him what he is-teach him to comprehend the past and almost to realize the future-and rule over his social destiny; we may surely conclude, as a fair induction of natural reason, that this religious nature (so essential to his social happiness) was not given to him only to deceive him; but was wisely implanted in him, to guide him in the way of truth, and to direct his soul to the highest objects of his creation. And thus we reach (though by steps somewhat different), the same end to which I endeavoured to point the way in the former division of this discourse." (P. 45.)

Under the second head, Mr Sedgwick makes the following observations regarding the study of classical literature. "I think it incontestably true, that for the last fifty years our clas

sical studies (with much to demand our undivided praise), have been too critical and formal; and that we have sometimes been taught, while straining after an accuracy beyond our reach, to value the husk more than the fruit of ancient learning and if of late years our younger members have sometimes written prose Greek almost with the purity of Xenophon, or composed Iambics in the finished diction of the Attic poets, we may well doubt whether time suffices for such perfection-whether the imagination and the taste might not be more wisely cultivated than by a long sacrifice to what, after all, ends but in verbal imitations-in short, whether such acquisitions, however beautiful in themselves, are not gained at the expense of something better." (P. 37.) These are precisely the views which we have for a considerable time been urging on the public, and it is gratifying to see them propounded by a Professor of distinguished reputation in such a stronghold of antiquated customs as the University of Cambridge.

Under the third branch of studies-those relating to human nature, he informs us, that "Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding," and "Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," have long formed such prominent subjects of instruction in the University of Cambridge, that he confines his remarks almost to these two works. His criticisms on both authors are bold, just, and discriminative. Locke's Essay he considers to be defective in may important particulars, especially in its omission of the faculties of moral judgment. He bestows the highest commendation on Locke's love of truth, vigour of intellect, and generosity of sentiment; but maintains that his system of psychology is extremely defective from the omission alluded to. Mr Sedgwick contends eloquently for the innate existence of moral faculties in man. "The greatest fault in Locke's system," says he, "is the contracted view he takes of the capacities of man, allowing him, indeed, the faculty of reflecting and following out trains of thought according to the rules of abstract reasoning; but depriving him both of his powers of imagination and of his moral sense. Hence it produced, I think, a chilling effect on the philosophic writings of the last century." "It is to the entire domination his Essay' had once established in our University, that we may perhaps attribute all that is faulty in the Moral Philosophy of Paley."

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Ample commendation is bestowed on Paley also: "His homely strength and clearness of style," says Mr Sedgwick, " and his unrivalled skill in stating and following out his argument, must ever make his writings popular;" but "he commences by denying the sanction and authority of the moral sense." "Amidst all the ruin that is within us," continues Mr S., "there are still the elements of what is good; and were there left in the natural heart no kindly affections and moral senti

ments, man would be no longer responsible for his sins; and every instance of persuasion against the impulse of bad passion, and of conversion from evil unto good, would be nothing less than a moral miracle. On such a view of human nature, the Apostles of our religion might as well have wasted their breath on the stones of the wilderness as on the hearts of their fellow men in the cities of the heathen.” (P. 59.)

These views have often appeared in the pages of this Journal, and in the standard phrenological works; and we are much gratified to find them so ably expounded and advocated by Mr Sedgwick. Yet he never even alludes to Phrenology. Being so much disposed to commend, we are loath to be under the necessity of condemning any part of Mr Sedgwick's conduct; but the great interests of truth compel us to speak our mind. Has Mr Sedgwick heard of Phrenology or has he not? We know positively that he is not ignorant of its existence; but he appears not to have esteemed it worthy of his consideration. He has a profound perception of the power and wisdom of God displayed in the works of creation; and it is our duty to tell him, that, in despising Phrenology, he is deliberately shutting his eyes against one of the most wonderful and important revelations of divine power and wisdom that has ever been made to the human understanding. It is perverse to assume that Phrenology is the invention of Drs Gall and Spurzheim, in the absence of all evidence to this effect, and in opposition to the most positive asseverations of themselves and their followers that it is a mere announcement of natural institutions. The founders of Phrenology have no more created the functions of the brain and the relations of these to external objects, than Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton, created the planetary system. Mr Sedgwick laments the grave errors of Locke and Paley in omitting the faculties of imagination and the moral sense, in their schemes of the philosophy of man; but we desire to ask him by what means the existence of these and other faculties omitted by the metaphysical and moral philosophers, can be proved with half the force of evidence that is afforded by Phrenology? Mr Combe, in his System of Phrenology, enumerates the discordant opinions concerning the moral sense, entertained by ten philosophers of the highest reputation, and adds: "I have introduced this sketch of conflicting theories, to convey some idea of the boon which Phrenology would confer upon moral science, if it could fix, on a firm basis, this single point in the philosophy of mind, That a power or faculty exists, the object of which is to produce the sentiment of justice or the feeling of moral duty and obligation, independently of selfishness, hope of reward, fear of punishment, or any extrinsic motive; a faculty, in short, the natural language of which is Fiat justitia, ruat colum.' Phrenology does this by a demonstration founded on numerous ob

servations, that those persons who have the organ of Conscientiousness large, experience powerfully the sentiment of justice, while those who have that part small are little alive to this emotion. This evidence is the same in kind as that adduced in support of the conclusions of physical science." (P. 291.)

The phrenologists do not leave the fact here asserted to rest on their own observations merely, but present the means of verifying its truth to every one who chooses to qualify himself and to take the necessary trouble to do so. The following figures are given in Mr Combe's work as representing the organ of Conscientiousness in different degrees of development.

These figures, we affirm, represent Nature, not a casual appearance, but forms which are found constantly in combination with the qualities here named and we inquire why Nature, when she speaks to the geologist or the chemist, should be listened to with profound attention, and her revelations treasured for human improvement.-but scouted and despised when she speaks to and is interpreted by phrenologists? It is God who speaks from Nature in all her departments; and the brain is as assuredly his workmanship as the Milky Way itself, with all its myriads of

History presents us with numerous examples of the rejection, by men calling themselves philosophers, of the best authenticated natural truths, which had subsequently been universally received. We are the witnesses of a repetition of the same conduct in the case of Phrenology; but we appeal to Mr Sedgwick, and to every man possessing his reach of thought and elevated sentiments, whether the individuals who have thus acted have secured to themselves a permanent reputation for wisdom, or afforded any reason for gratitude towards them on the part of their fellow men. The neglect, by inferior minds, of the doctrine of the functions of the brain, and its consequences, gives us no uneasiness; but we cannot behold this neglect on the part of men who have within them a profound and reverential respect

for the philosophy of nature, and a capacity to perceive the invaluable consequences that flow from obedience to the natural laws, without feeling regret that ignorance, indifference, or the fear of losing a little temporary reputation, should lead them to shut their eyes against such an important discovery.

Mr Sedgwick might have expounded many other deficiencies in the philosophy of Locke and Paley, which it will be impossible to supply without the aid of Phrenology. "The external world," he observes, "proves to us the being of a God, in two ways; by addressing the imagination, and by informing the reason. It speaks to our imaginative and poetic feelings, and they are as much a part of ourselves as our limbs and our organs of sense. Music has no charms for the deaf, nor has painting for the blind; and all the touching sentiments and splendid imagery borrowed by the poet from the world without, would lose their magic power, and might as well be presented to a cold statue as to a man, were there no preordained harmony between his mind and the material beings around him. It is certain that the glories of the external world are so fitted to our imaginative powers as to give them a perception of the Godhead and a glimpse of his attributes; and this adaptation is a proof of the existence of God, of the same kind (but of greater or less power, according to the constitution of our individual minds) with that we derive from the adaptation of our senses to the constitution of the material world." (Pp. 20, 21.)

The concluding part of this sentence might be made the subject of a whole chapter on the philosophy of mind. The proof of the existence of God afforded by the external world, is of "greater or less power, according to the constitution of our individual minds." Is it of no importance, then, to possess the means of expounding to every man what the constitution of his individual mind is; to be able to point out to those who profess to see no evidence in external Nature of the existence of a God, that they are deficient in the organs of certain highly important moral and intellectual faculties; to shew to the men who deny the existence of natural conscience, that their scepticism on this point arises from a palpable deficiency of an organ in their own brains; and to be able to prove to those who deny disinterested goodness in the human race, that this cold-hearted distrust owes its origin also to the imperfect development of a cerebral part? Phrenology does this, and no other philosophy of mind even pretends to accomplish as much.

"Amidst all the ruin that is within us," says Mr Sedgwick, "there are still the elements of what is good." As Mr Sedgwick is a philosophical and precise thinker, we regret that he has not favoured us, in some detail, with his notions of "the ruin that is within us." Correct conceptions on this point necessarily lie at the foundation of all sound natural theology and moral