consequence of secret information, procured in advance of our neighbor, are dishonest. If property rise in value by the providence of God, while in my neighbor's possession, that rise of value is as much his, as the property itself; and I may as honestly deprive him of the one, without an equivalent, as of the other.

The ordinary pleas, by which men excuse themselves for violation of the moral law of property, are weak and wicked. Thus, when men sell articles of a different quality from that which their name imports-as when wines or liquors are diluted or compounded; when the ordinary weight or measure is curtailed; or where employers defraud ignorant persons of their wages, as I am told is sometimes the case with those who employ certain classes of laborers—it is common to hear it remarked, "The competition is so great, that we could sell nothing, unless we adopted these methods;" or else, "The practice is universal, and if we did not do thus, other persons would, and so the evil would not be diminished." To all this, it is sufficient to reply: The law of God is explicit on this subject. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" and God allows of no excuses for the violation of his commands; "He hath shewed it unto them; therefore they are without excuse." These pleas are either true or false. If false, they ought to be abandoned. If true, then the traffic itself must be given up; for no man has any right to be engaged in any pursuit, in violation of the laws of God.

A bargain is concluded, when both parties have signified to each other, their will to make the transfer; that is, that each chooses to part with his own property, and to receive the property of the other in exchange. Henceforth, all the risk of loss, and all the chances of gain, are, of course, mutually transferred; although the articles themselves remain precisely as they were before. If a merchant buy a cargo of tea; after the sale, no matter where the tea is, the chances of loss or gain are his, and they are as much his in one place as in another.

So, if the article, after the sale, have become injured, before I take actual possession of it, I bear the loss; because, the right of ownership being vested in me, I could

have removed it if I chose, and no one had a right, without my direction, to remove it.

The only exception to this, exists in the case where, by custom or contract, the obligation to deliver, is one of the conditions of the sale. Here the seller, of course, charges more for assuming the responsibility to deliver, and he is to bear the risk, for which he is fairly paid. It is frequently a question, When is the act of delivery completed? This must be settled by precedent; and can rarely be known in any country, until a decision is had in the courts of law. As soon as such a case is adjudicated, the respective parties govern themselves accordingly.

SECONDLY, when the transfer of property is temporary. In this case, the borrower pays a stipulated equivalent for the use of it.

That he should do so is manifestly just, because the property in the hands of the owner is capable of producing an increase, and the owner, if he held it, would derive the benefit of that increase. If he part with this benefit for the advantage of another, it is just that the other should allow him a fair remuneration. If the borrower could not, after paying this remuneration, grow richer than he would be without the use of his neighbor's capital, he would not borrow. But, inasmuch as he, by the use of it, can be benefited, after paying for the use, no reason can be conceived why he should not pay for it.

The remuneration paid for the use of capital, in the form of money, is called interest; when in the form of land or houses, it is called rent.

The principles on which the rate of this remuneration is justly fixed, are these: The borrower pays, first, for the use; and, secondly, for the risk.

1. For the use.

Capital is more useful, that is, it is capable of producing a greater remuneration at some times than at others. Thus, a flour-mill, in some seasons, is more productive than in others. Land, in some places, is capable of yielding a greater harvest than in others. And thus, at different times, the same property may be capable of bringing in a very different income. And, in general, where the amount of

capital to be loaned is great, and the number of those who want to borrow, small, the interest will be low; and where the number of borrowers is great, and the amount of capital small, the rate of interest will be high. The reasons of all this are too obvious to need illustration.

2. For the risk.

When an owner parts with his property, it is put under the control of the borrower, and passes, of course, beyond the control of the owner. Here, there arises a risk over which he has no control. It varies with the character of the borrower for prudence and skill, and with the kind of business in which he is engaged. Property in ships is exposed to greater risk than property in land. A man would consider the chance of having his property returned much better, if employed in the building of dwelling-houses, than in the manufacture of gun-powder. Now, as all these circumstances of risk may enter more or less into every loan, it is evident that they must, in justice, vary the rate at which a loan may be procured.

Hence, I think that the rate of interest, of every sort, being liable to so many circumstances of variation, should not, in any case, be fixed by law; but should be left, in all cases, to the discretion of the parties concerned.

This remark applies as well to loans of money as to loans of other property, because the reasons apply just as much to these as to any other. If it be said, men may charge exorbitant interest, I reply, so they may charge exorbitant rent for houses, and exorbitant hire for horses. And, I ask, how is this evil of exorbitant charges in other cases remedied? The answer is plain. We allow a perfectly free competition, and then the man who will not loan his property, unless at an exorbitant price, is underbidden, and his own rapacity defeats and punishes itself.

And, on the contrary, by fixing a legal rate of interest, we throw the whole community into the power of those who are willing to violate the law. For, as soon as the actual value of money is more than the legal value, those who consider themselves under obligation to obey the laws of the land, will not loan; for they can employ their property to better advantage. Hence, if all were obedient

to the law, as soon as property arrived at this point of value, loans would instantly and universally cease. But as some persons are willing to evade the law, they will loan at illegal interest; and, as the capital of those who are conscientious, is withdrawn from the market, and an artificial scarcity is thus produced, those who are not conscientious have it in their power to charge whatever they choose. Again, when we pay for money loaned, we pay, first, for the use, and, second, for the risk; that is, we pay literally a premium of insurance. As both of these vary with difference of time, and with different individuals, there is a double reason for variation in the rate of interest. When we have a house insured, we pay only for the risk; and, hence, there is here only a single cause of variation. But while all governments have fixed the rate of interest by law, they have never fixed the rate of insurance; which, being less variable, is more properly subject to a fixed rule. This is surely inconsistent; is it not also unjust?

Nevertheless, for the sake of avoiding disputes, and errors of ignorance, it might be wise for society to enact, by law, what shall be the rate of interest, in cases where no rate is otherwise specified. This is the extent of its proper jurisdiction; and doing any thing further is, I think, not only injurious to the interests of the community, but also a violation of the right of property. While, however, I hold this to be true, I by no means hold that, the laws remaining as they are, any individual is justified in taking or giving more than the legal rate of interest. When conscience does not forbid, it is the business of a good citizen to obey the laws; and the faithful obedience to an unwise law, is generally the surest way of working its overthrow.

We shall now proceed to consider the laws which govern this mode of transfer of property.

The loan of money.

1. The lender is bound to demand no more than a fair remuneration for the use of his capital, and for the risk to which it is exposed.

2. He is bound to make use of no unlawful means to influence the decision of the borrower. The principles here are the same as those which should govern the per

manent exchange of property. All rumors and false alarms, and all combinations of capitalists to raise by a monopoly the price of money, are manifestly dishonest; nor are they the less so, because many persons may enter into them, or because they have the skill or the power to evade the laws of the land.

3. The borrower is bound to pay a just equivalent, as I have stated above; and he is equally forbidden to use any dishonest motives to influence the decision of the lender.

4. Inasmuch as the risk of the property is one part of the consideration for which the owner receives remuneration, and as this is in every case supposed to be a specified quantity, the borrower has no right to expose the property of another to any risk not contemplated in the contract. Hence, he has no right to invest it in a more hazardous trade, or to employ it in a more hazardous speculation, than that for which he borrowed it; and if he do, he is using it in a manner for which he has paid no equivalent. He is also under obligation to take all the care to avoid losses which he would take if the property were his own; and to use the same skill to conduct his affairs successfully.

5. He is also bound to repay the loan exactly according to the terms specified in the contract. This requires that he pay the full sum promised, and that he pay it precisely at the time promised. A failure, in either case, is a breach of the contract.

The question is often asked, whether a debtor is morally liberated by an act of insolvency. I think not, if he ever afterwards have the means of repayment. It may be said, this is oppressive to debtors; but, we ask, is not the contrary principle oppressive to creditors; and are not the rights of one party just as valuable, and just as much rights, as those of the other? It may also be remarked, that, were this principle acted upon, there would be fewer debtors, and vastly fewer insolvents. The amount of money actually lost by insolvency, is absolutely enormous; and it is generally lost by causeless, reckless speculation, by childish and inexcusable extravagance, or by gambling and profligacy, which are all stimulated into activity by