forth death." Licentiousness in outward conduct never appears, until the mind has become defiled by impure imaginations. When, however, the mind has become thus defiled, nothing is wanted but suitable opportunity to complete the moral catastrophe. Hence, the necessity of the most intense vigilance in the government of our thoughts, and in the avoiding of all books, and all pictures, and all society, and all conduct and actions of which the tendency is to imbue our imaginations with any thing at variance with the purest chastity. Whatever, in other respects, may be the fascinations of a book, if it be impure or lascivious, let it be eschewed. Whatever be the accomplishments of an acquaintance, if he or she be licentious in conversation or action, let him or her be shunned. No man can take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned. We cannot mingle with the vile, let that vileness be dressed in ever so tasteful a garb, without becoming defiled. The only rule of safety is, to avoid the appearance of evil; for thus alone shall we be able to avoid the reality. Hence it is, that a licentious theatre (and the tendency of all theatres is to licentiousness), immodest dancing, and all amusements and actions which tend to inflame the passions, are horribly pernicious to morals. It would be interesting to learn on what principle of morals a virtuous woman would justify her attendance upon an amusement, in which she beholds before her a once lovely female uttering covert obscenity in the presence of thousands, and where she is surrounded by hundreds of women, also once lovely, but now abandoned, whose ruin has been consummated by this very means, and who assemble in this place, with the more certain assurance of thus being able, most successfully, to effect the ruin of others. 305 CHAPTER SECOND. THE LAW OF MARRIAGE. It has been already remarked, in the preceding section, that the law of chastity forbids all sexual intercourse between persons who have not been exclusively united for life. In the act of marriage, two persons, under the most solemn circumstances, are thus united; and they enter into a mutual contract thus to live in respect to each other. This relation having been established by God, the contract thus entered into has all the solemnity of an oath. Hence he who violates it is guilty of a two-fold crime: first, the violation of the law of chastity; and, secondly, of the law of veracity,―a veracity pledged under the most solemn circumstances. But this is by no means all that is intended by the institution of marriage. By the contract thus entered into, a society is formed, of a most interesting and important character, which is the origin of all civil society; and in which, children are prepared to become members of that great community. As our principal knowledge of the nature and obligations of this institution is derived from the sacred Scriptures, I shall endeavor briefly to explain the manner in which they treat of it, without adding any thing to what I have already said, in regard to the teaching of natural religion. I shall consider, first, the nature of this contract, and, secondly, the duties which it enjoins, and the crimes which it forbids. First. The nature of the contract. 1. The contract is for life, and is dissoluble for one cause only, the cause of whoredom : Matthew xix, 3-6, 9. "Then came some of the Pharisees to him, and, tempting him, asked, Can a man, upon every pretence, divorce his wife? He answered, Have ye not read, that at the beginning, when the Creator made man, he formed a male and female; and said, for this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and adhere to his wife; and they two shall be one flesh. Wherefore, they are no longer two, but one flesh. What then God hath conjoined, let not man separate. Wherefore, I say unto you, whosoever divorceth his wife, except for whoredom, and marrieth another, committeth adultery." I use here the translation of Dr. Campbell, which, I think, conveys more exactly than the common version the meaning of the original. 2. We are here taught that marriage, being an institution of God, is subject to his laws alone, and not to the laws of man. Hence the civil law is binding upon the conscience only in so far as it corresponds to the law of God. 3. This contract is essentially mutual. By entering into it, the members form a society, that is, they have something in common. Whatever is thus in common, belongs equally to both. And, on the contrary, what is not thus surrendered, remains as before in the power of the individual. 4. The basis of this union is affection. Individuals thus contract themselves to each other, on the ground not merely of mutual regard, but also of a regard stronger than that which they entertain for any other persons else. If such be not the condition of the parties, they cannot be united with any fair prospect of happiness. Now, such is the nature of the human affections, that we derive a higher and a purer pleasure from rendering happy those whom we love than from self-gratification. Thus, a parent prefers selfdenial, for the sake of a child, to self-indulgence. The same principle is illustrated in every case of pure and disinterested benevolence. This is the essential element, on which depends the happiness of the married state. To be in the highest degree happy, we must each prefer the happiness of another to our own. 5. I have mentioned above, that, this being a voluntary compact, and forming a peculiar society, there are some things which, by this compact, each surrenders to the other, and also other things which are not surrendered. It is important that these be distinguished from each other. I remark, then,— a. Neither party surrenders to the other any control over any thing appertaining to the conscience. From the nature of our moral constitution, nothing of this sort can be surrendered to any created being. For either party to interfere with the discharge of those duties, which the other party really supposes itself to owe to God, is therefore wicked and oppressive. b. Neither party surrenders to the other any thing which would violate prior and lawful obligations. Thus, a husband does not promise to subject his professional pursuits to the will of his wife. He has chosen his profession, and, if he pursue it lawfully, it does not interfere with the contract. So, also, his duties as a citizen, are of prior obligation; and, if they really interfere with any others, those subsequently formed must be construed in subjection to them. Thus, also, the filial duties of both parties remain, some respects, unchanged after marriage, and the marriage contract should not be so interpreted as to violate them. If it can c. On the other hand, I suppose that the marriage contract binds each party, whenever individual gratification is concerned, to prefer the happiness of the other party to its own. If pleasure can be enjoyed by both, the happiness of both is increased by enjoying it in common. be enjoyed but by one, each should prefer that it be enjoyed by the other. And if there be sorrow to be endured, or inconvenience to be suffered, each should desire, if possible, to bear the infliction for the sake of shielding the other from pain. d. And, as I have remarked before, the disposition to do this arises from the very nature of the principles on which the compact is formed, from unreserved affection. This is the very manner in which affection always displays itself. This is the very means by which affection is created. "She loved me for the dangers I had seen, and I loved her that she did pity them."-SHAKSPEARE. And this is the only course of conduct by which affection can be retained. And the manifestation of this temper is, under all circumstances, obligatory upon both parties. 6. As, however, in all societies, there may be differences of opinion, even where the harmony of feeling remains unimpaired, so there may be differences here. Where such differences of opinion exist, there must be some ultimate appeal. In ordinary societies, such questions are settled by a numerical majority. But as, in this case, such a decision is impossible, some other principle must be adopted. The right of deciding must rest with either the one or the other. As the husband is the individual who is responsible to civil society, as his intercourse with the world is of necessity greater, the voice of nature and of revelation unite in conferring the right of ultimate authority upon him. By this arrangement the happiness of the wife is increased no less than that of the husband. Her power is always greatest in concession. She is graceful and attractive while meek and gentle; but when angered and turbulent, she loses the fascination of her own sex, without attaining to the dignity of the other. "A woman moved is like a fountain troubled, SHAKS. Secondly. I come now to speak of the duties imposed by the marriage relation. I. The marriage relation imposes upon both parties, equally, the duty of chastity. 1. Hence it forbids adultery, or intercourse with any other person than that one to whom the individual is united in marriage. 2. And, hence, it forbids all conduct in married persons, or with married persons, of which the tendency would be to diminish their affection for those to whom they are united in marriage, or of which the tendency would be to give pain to the other party. This is evident from what we have before said. For, if the contract itself proceed upon the principle of entire and exclusive affection, any thing must be a violation of it, which destroys or lessens that affection; and that which causes this affection to be doubted, |