mind is naturally indifferent to the objects, that are presented to it, and to the discovery of truth and that its progress in knowledge is naturally unattended with satisfaction; a state of things, which could not be expected, and is not warranted by facts. In what school of philosophy was it ever taught, that the human mind, with this unbounded mental and material universe around it, adorned throughout and brilliant with truth, has no natural desire to possess and enjoy this beauty and radiance of knowledge, but is equally well contented with the glooms of ignorance!

We see the operation of this principle every where. When any thing unexpected and strange takes place, the attention of all persons is immediately directed towards it; it is not a matter of indifference, but all are anxious to ascertain the cause. Without the aids of this strong desire, how few persons would be found, who would be willing to explore the intricacies of science, or search the labyrinths of history' And what an accession would there be to the multitude of volumes, that remain unopened and untouched on the shelves, where they are deposited!

There is at least one class of writers, whose prospects of being read depend, in a great measure, on the workings of this principle; we refer to novelists and writers of romance. However commonplace may be their conceptions, and however uninteresting their style, if they lay the plan of their novel or romance with so much skill as strongly to excite the curiosity, they can command readers. And this undoubtedly is the whole secret of success in a multitude of cases.

§. 115. Further illustrations of the principle of curiosity.

In further proof of the existence of this propensity as a natural or implanted one, it may be proper to refer to the whole class of the Deaf and Dumb, and to those unfortunate individuals, who are blind, as well as deaf and dumb. These persons almost uniformly give the most striking indications of a desire to learn; it seems to glow in their countenance, to inspire their gestures, and to urge them on, with a sort of violence, in their inquiries. Certainly if the principle of curiosity were not implanted, and did not exist in great strength, they would be entirely overcome by the multi

tude of discouragements, with which they are encompassed. Take, as an illustration, the case of James Mitchell, of whom Mr. Stewart has given a minute and interesting account. Although this unfortunate boy was afflicted with the three-fold deprivation of being deaf, sightless, and without the use of speech, he exhibited a considerable degree of mental activity. The principle of Curiosity, in particular, existed in great strength. He showed a strong desire to examine, and to obtain a knowledge of all objects, that came within his reach. We find him exploring the ground inch by inch; we see him creeping on his hands and knees, on bridges and the tops of houses; examining not only men, but dogs, horses, carriages, furniture, and musical instruments; standing by the side of shoemakers, tailors, and bricklayers, and intently curious to know the mode and the result of their labors. Inspired by the desire of extending his acquaintance with things, he would rush forth, (blind and deaf and dumb as he was,) and rapidly travel miles in the neighboring country; so that it was necessary to employ a lad to follow him, that he might be kept from the numerous dangers, to which he was exposed in these excursions.

"Solitary as Mitchell is, (says Mr. Stewart,) in the midst of society, and confined in his intercourse with the material world within the narrowest conceivable limits, what a contrast does he exhibit to the most sagacious of the lower animals, though surrounded with all the arts of civilized man, and in the fullest possession of all the powers of external perception. Even in his childish occupations and pastimes, we may discern the rudiments of a rational and improvable nature; more particularly in that stock of knowledge, scanty as it is, which he has been led to acquire by the impulse of his own spontaneous and eager curiosity."

But it is unnecessary to dwell upon these general considerations, or to refer to extraordinary instances, when we constantly witness in all infants and children the most ample proofs, that the principle of curiosity is deeply implanted in the human mind. It seems to be their life; it keeps them constantly in motion; from morn till night it furnishes new excitements to activity, and new sources of enjoyment. The poets, many of whom are entitled to the credit of an exact ob

servance of human nature, have made this trait in infants and children the foundation of many striking passages, as in the following:

"In the pleased infant see its power expand,
"When first the coral fills his little hand;
"Throned in his mother's lap, it dries each tear,
"As her sweet legend falls upon his ear;
"Next it assails him in his top's strange hum,
"Breathes in his whistle, echoes in his drum;
"Each gilded toy, that doting love bestows,
"He longs to break and every spring expose.

§. 116. Of the two-fold operation and the morality of the principle of curiosity.

The innate principle or propensity of curiosity, like that of self-preservation, has its two-fold action INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY.—An action, which is purely instinctive, is always directed towards its object as an ultimate end; it looks at the object itself without regard to the good or evil, which may be involved in it; it chooses and pursues it for its own sake. It is in this way, that the principle of curiosity operates in the first instance. This is its instinctive operation. And so far as it thus operates, it is neither selfish nor benevolent; neither morally good nor evil; but simply innocent and useful.

It possesses also a VOLUNTARY action; founded upon a view of consequences, and implying the exercise of reflection. We may direct it to proper objects; we may stimulate its exercise by considerations of interest or of duty; we may restrain it when it becomes irregular and inordinate. And its action, so far as it exists under such circumstances, may, with entire propriety, be denominated voluntary. And so far as it is of this character, morality is predicable of it; it may be either virtuous or vicious. If it be stimulated to action for good ends, and with a suitable regard to all other moral claims, its exercise is virtuous. If it have bad ends in view, or be put forth with such intensity as to violate other moral obligations, its exercise is vicious. It is in accordance with these views, that Mr. Stewart remarks upon and disapproves the conduct of a certain ancient astronomer. pears, that on a certain occasion the astronomer was accused

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of indifference in respect to public transactions. He replied to the charge by the remark, that his country was in the heavens; distinctly implying, that he had deliberately merged the duties of the citizen in those of the astronomer, and that love to his country was essentially annulled by the higher love, which he cherished for his chosen science. We obviously have here an instance of the inordinate exercise of the principle under consideration. It was not duly subordinated. It became so intense as to conflict, in the view of an enlightened conscience, with the proper exercise of other feelings and with the discharge of other duties.

§. 117. Imitativeness or the propensity to imitation.

Another of the original propensities of the human mind is the principle of Imitation or the desire of doing as we see others do. We find the evidence of the existence of such a principle every where around us.

I,-If this propensity be not natural, it will be difficult to account for what every one must have noticed in infancy and childhood, And we take this occasion to remark, that, on this whole subject, we shall refer particularly to the early periods of life. That is a time, when human nature will be likely to show itself in its true features. And in respect to the principle now before us, it is certain, that children are early found to observe with care what others do,and to attempt doing the like. They are greatly aided by this propensity in learning to utter articulate sounds. It is not without long continued efforts, in which they are evidently sustained by the mere pleasure of imitation, that they acquire the use of oral language.

At a little later period of life, after having learnt to articulate and having become old enough to take part in juvenile sports, we find the same propensity at work. With the animation and formidable airs of jockeys, they bestride a stick for a horse, and try equestrian experiments; they conduct their small and frail carriages through courts and streets, and journey with their rude sledges from one hill-top to another. Ever busily engaged, they frame houses, build fortifications, erect water works, and lay out gardens in miniature. They shoulder a cane for a musket; practice a

measured step and fierce look; and become soldiers, as well as gardeners and architects, before they are men.

II,-But the operation of this propensity is not limited to children; men also do as their fathers have done before them; it often requires no small degree of moral courage to deviate from the line of precedents. Whether right or wrong, we feel a degree of safety, so long as we tread in the path of others.

This is shown in the most solemn transactions, particularly in judicial decisions. Seldom does the judge appeal to original principles of right, and build his decisions on the immutable will of the Supreme Being, as it is revealed in the moral sentiments of mankind, if he must do it in the violation of a precedent. It is highly probable, that the idea of a system of law, built upon precedent and essentially supported by the mere fact of antecedent authority, was suggested, at least indirectly, by the principle before us. So prone were men to follow in the steps of their fathers, that even in cases of right and wrong they were not willing to deviate from the beaten track; and although we are willing to admit, that the decisions of the Common Law have ever been supported by various considerations of their safety and wisdom, it is nevertheless true, that they derive a large portion of their stability from that effective trait in man's nature, which impels him, as if by a sort of enchantment, to walk in the path, which his progenitors have trodden. If we could expel from the human bosom the principle of imitation, there would be far less efficacy attached to many of the opinions and decrees and doings of our ancestors, than there is at present. But undoubtedly for sufficient reasons, it is wisely ordered, that such an expulsion is impossible.

§. 118. Practical results of the principle of imitation.

It may perhaps be supposed by some, whatever evidence may exist in favor of regarding the principle under consideration as an original one, that it has but a slight connection with the advancement and the happiness of mankind. But it is a remark not unfrequently to be made in respect to the principles of the mind, that often results of great magnitude are found to connect themselves with elements in human