Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub

stood; and therefore Dr. Reid's argument does not in the least invalidate the doctrine of the Nominalists, that without the use of language (under which term I comprehend every species of signs) we should never have been able to extend our speculations beyond individuals.

That in many cases we may safely employ in our reasonings, general terms, the meaning of which we are not even able to interpret in this way, and consequently, which are to us wholly insignificant, I had occasion already to demonstrate in a former part of this section.

SECT. IV. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT. INFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF LANGUAGE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THOUGHT, AND THE ERRORS IN REASONING TO WHICH IT OCCASIONALLY GIVES RISE.*

*

In the last section I mentioned Dr. Campbell as an ingenious defender of the system of the Nominalists, and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reasonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Philosophy of Rhetoric, in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens," that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader." The title is somewhat ludicrous in a grave philosophical work, but the disquisition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound remarks on the nature and power of signs, both as a medium of communication, and as an instrument of thought.

Dr. Campbell's speculations with respect to language as an instrument of thought, seem to have been suggested by the following passage in Mr. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature: -"I believe every one who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and complete ideas to every term we make use of; and that in talking of Government, Church, Negotiation, Conquest, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas of which * [Compare Elements, vol. ii. chap. ii. sect. 2, subsect. 2.-Ed.]

VOL. II.

N

these complex ones are composed. It is, however, observable, that notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a full comprehension of them. Thus if, instead of saying, that in war the weaker have always recourse to negotiation, we should say, that they have always recourse to conquest; the custom which we have acquired, of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition."

In the remarks which Dr. Campbell has made on this passage, he has endeavoured to explain in what manner our habits of thinking and speaking, gradually establish in the mind such relations among the words we employ, as enable us to carry on processes of reasoning by means of them, without attending in every instance to their particular signification. With most of his remarks on this subject I perfectly agree; but the illustrations he gives of them, are of too great extent to be introduced here, and I would not wish to run the risk of impairing their perspicuity, by attempting to abridge them. I must therefore refer such of my readers as wish to prosecute the speculation, to his very ingenious and philosophical treatise.

"In consequence of these circumstances," says Dr. Campbell, “it happens that, in matters which are perfectly familiar to us, we are able to reason by means of words, without examining, in every instance, their signification. Almost all the possible applications of the terms (in other words, all the acquired relations of the signs) have become customary to us. The consequence is, that an unusual application of any term is instantly detected; this detection breeds doubt, and this doubt occasions an immediate recourse to ideas. The recourse of the mind, when in any degree puzzled with the signs, to the knowledge it has of the things signified, is natural, and on such subjects perfectly easy. And of this recourse the discovery of the meaning, or of the unmeaningness of what is said, is the immediate effect. But in matters that are by no means familiar, or are treated in an uncommon manner, and in such

as are of an abstruse and intricate nature, the case is widely different." The instances in which we are chiefly liable to be imposed on by words without meaning, are (according to Dr. Campbell) the three following:

First, Where there is an exuberance of metaphor.

Secondly, When the terms most frequently occurring, denote things which are of a complicated nature, and to which the mind is not sufficiently familiarized. Such are the words-Government, Church, State, Constitution, Polity, Power, Commerce, Legislature, Jurisdiction, Proportion, Symmetry, Elegance.

Thirdly, When the terms employed are very abstract, and consequently of very extensive signification.1 For an illustration of these remarks, I must refer the reader to the ingenious work which I just now quoted.

To the observations of these eminent writers, I shall take the liberty of adding, that we are doubly liable to the mistakes they mention, when we make use of a language which is not perfectly familiar to us. Nothing, indeed, I apprehend, can shew more clearly the use we make of words in reasoning than this, that an observation which, when expressed in our own language, seems trite or frivolous, often acquires the appearance of depth and originality, by being translated into another. For my own part, at least, I am conscious of having been frequently led, in this way, to form an exaggerated idea of the merits of ancient and of foreign authors; and it has happened to me more than once, that a sentence which seemed at first to contain something highly ingenious and profound, when translated into words familiar to me, appeared obviously to be a trite or a nugatory proposition.

1 "The more general any word is in its signification, it is the more liable to be abused by an improper or unmeaning application. A very general term is applicable alike to a multitude of different individuals, a particular term is applicable but to a few. When the rightful applications of a word are extremely numerous, they cannot all be so strongly fixed by habit, but that, for greater se

curity, we must perpetually recur in our minds from the sign to the notion we have of the thing signified; and for the reason aforementioned, it is in such instances difficult precisely to ascertain this notion. Thus the latitude of a word, though different from its ambiguity, hath often a similar effect."Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. ii. p. 122.

The effect produced by an artificial and inverted style in our own language, is similar to what we experience when we read a composition in a foreign one. The eye is too much dazzled to see distinctly. "Aliud styli genus," says Bacon, "totum in eo est, ut verba sint aculeata, sententiæ concise, oratio denique potius versa quam fusa, quo fit, ut omnia, per hujusmodi artificium, magis ingeniosa videantur quam re vera sint. Tale invenitur in Seneca effusius, in Tacito et Plinio secundo moderatius."

The deranged collocation of the words in Latin composition, aids powerfully the imposition we have now been considering, and renders that language an inconvenient medium of philosophical communication, as well as an inconvenient instrument of accurate thought. Indeed, in all languages in which this latitude in the arrangement of words is admitted, the associations among words must be looser than where one invariable order is followed, and of consequence, on the principles of Hume and Campbell, the mistakes which are committed in reasonings expressed in such languages will not be so readily detected.

The errors in reasoning, to which we are exposed in consequence of the use of words as an instrument of thought, will appear the less surprising, when we consider that all the languages which have hitherto existed in the world, have derived their origin from popular use, and that their application to philosophical purposes was altogether out of the view of those men who first employed them. Whether it might not be possible to invent a language, which would at once facilitate philosophical communication, and form a more convenient instrument of reasoning and of invention, than those we possess at present, is a question of very difficult discussion, and upon which I shall not presume to offer an opinion. The failure of Wilkins' very ingenious attempt towards a real character and a philosophical language, is not perhaps decisive against such a project; for, not to mention some radical defects in his plan, the views of that very eminent philosopher do not seem to have extended much farther than to promote and extend the literary

intercourse among different nations. Leibnitz, so far as I know, is the only author who has hitherto conceived the possibility of aiding the powers of invention and of reasoning, by the use of a more convenient instrument of thought, but he has nowhere explained his ideas on this very interesting subject. It is only from a conversation of his with Mr. Boyle and Mr. Oldenburg, when he was in England in 1673, and from some imperfect hints in different parts of his works,1 that we find it had engaged his attention. In the course of this conversation he observed, that Wilkins had mistaken the true end of a real character, which was not merely to enable different nations to correspond easily together, but to assist the reason, the invention, and the memory. In his writings, too, he somewhere speaks of an alphabet of human thoughts, which he had been employed in forming, and which, probably, (as Fontenelle has remarked,) had some relation to his universal language.2

The new nomenclature which has been introduced into chemistry, seems to me to furnish a striking illustration of the effect of appropriated and well-defined expressions in aiding the intellectual powers, and the period is probably not far distant, when similar innovations will be attempted in some of the other sciences.

1 See Note L.

• “M. Leibnitz avoit conçu le projet d'une langue philosophique et universelle. Wilkins Evêque de Chester, et Dalgarno y avoient travaillé; mais dès le tems qu'il étoit en Angleterre, il avoit dit à Méssieurs Boyle et d'Oldenbourg qu'il ne croyoit pas que ces grands hommes eussent encore frappé an but. Ils pouvoient bien faire que des nations qui ne s'entendoient pas eussent aisément commerce, mais ils n'avoient pas attrappé les véritables caractères réels, qui étoient l'instrument le plus fin dont T'esprit humain se pût servir, et qui

devoient extrêmement faciliter et le raisonnement, et la mémoire, et l'invention des choses. Ils devoient ressembler, autant qu'il étoit possible, aux caractères d'algèbre, qui en effet sont très simples, et très expressifs, qui n'ont jamais ni superfluité, ni équivoque, et dont toutes les variétés sont raisonnées. Il a parlé en quelque endroit, d'un alphabet des pensées humaines, qu'il méditoit. Selon toutes les apparences, cet alphabet avoit rapport à sa langue universelle."-Eloge de M. Leibnitz, par M. de Fontenelle.

« PredošláPokračovať »