them. Whilft they admit a contraband of war, by enumerating its articles, and the effect of a real blockade by defining it, in no inftance do they affirm or imply a right in any fovereign to enforce his claims to the allegiance of his fubjects, on board neutral veffels on the high feas. On the contrary, whenever a belligerent claim against perfons on board a neutral veffel, is referred to in treaties, enemies in military fervice alone are excepted from the general immunity of perfons in that fituation; and this exception confirms the immunity of thofe who are not included in it.

It is not then from the law or the usage of nations, nor from the tenor of treaties, that any fanction can be derived for the practice in question. And furely it will not be pretended that the fovereignty of any nation extends, in any cafe whatever, beyond its own dominions, and its own veffels on the high feas. Such a doctrine would give juft claim to all nations, and more than any thing would countenance the imputation of afpiring to an univerfal empire of the feas. It would be the lefs admiffible too, as it would be applicable to times of peace, as well as to times of war, and to property as well as to perfons. If the law of allegiance, which is a municipal law, be in force at all on the high feas, on board foreign vessels, it must be so at all times there, as it is within its acknowledged fphere. If the reafon alleged for it be good in time of war, namely, that the fovereign has then a right to the fervice of all his fubjects, it must be good at all times, becaufe at all times, he has the fame right to their fervice. War is not the only occafion for which he may want their fervices, nor is external danger the only danger against which their fervices may be required for his fecurity. Again; if the authority of a municipal law can operate on perfons in foreign veffels on the high feas, because within the dominion of their fovereign, they would be fubject to that law, and are violating that law by being in that fituation, how reject the inference that the authority of a municipal law may equally be enforced, on board foreign veffels, on the high feas, against articles of property exported in violation of fuch a law, or belonging to the country from which it was exported? And thus every commercial regulation, in time of peace too, as well as of war, would be made obligatory on foreigners and their veffels, not only whilst within the dominion of the fovereign making the regulation, but in every fea, and at every distance where an armed veffel might meet with them. Another inference deferves attention. If the fubjects of one fovereigu may be taken by force from the vessels of another, on the high feas, the right of taking them when found, implies the right of fearching for them; a vexation of commerce, especially in time of peace, which has not yet been attempted, and which for that as well as other reafons, may be regarded as contradicting the principle from which it would flow.

Taking reafon and justice for the tefts of this practice, it is peculiarly indefenfible; because it deprives the dearest rights of perfons of a regular trial, to which the moft inconfiderable article of property captured on the high feas is entitled ; and leaves their destiny to the will of an officer, fometimes cruel, often ignorant, and generally interested by his want of mariners, in his own decisions. Whenever property found in a neutral veffel is fuppofed to be liable on any grounds to capture and condemnation, the rule in all cafes is that the queftion fhall not be decided by the captor, but be carried before a legal tribunal, where a regular trial may be had, and where the captor himself is liable to damages, for an abuse of his power. Can it be reasonable then, or juft, that a belligerent commander who is thus reftricted, and thus responsible in a cafe of mere property of trivial amount, should be permitted, without recurring to any tribunal whatever, to examine the crew of a neutral veffel, to decide the important queftion of their respective allegiances, and to carry that decifion into inftant execution, by forcing every individual he may chofe, into a fervice abhorrent to his feelings, cutting him off from his most tender connections, exposing his mind and his perfon to the most humiliating difcipline, and his life itfelf to the greatest dangers ? Reason,

juftice, and humanity unite in protesting against so extravagant a proceeding. And what is the pretext for it? It is that the fimilarity of language and of features between American citizens and British fubjects, are fuch as not easily to be distinguished; and that without this arbitrary and fummary authority to make the distinction, British subjects would escape, under the name of American citizens, from the duty which they owe to their fovereign. 1s then the difficulty of distinguishing a mariner of one country from the mariner of the other, and the importance of his fervices, a good plea for referring the queftion whether be belongs to the one or to the other, to an arbitrary decifion on the the spot, by an interested and unresponsible officer? In all other cafes, the difficulty and the importance of quefiions are confidered as reafons for requiring greater care and formality in inveftigating them, and greater fecurity for a right decifion of them. To fay that precautions of this fort are incompatible with the object, is to admit that the object is unjustifiable ; fince the only means by which it can be purfued are fuch as cannot be juftified.

The evil takes a deeper die, when viewed in its practice as well as its principles. Were it allowable that British subjects fhould be taken out of American veffels on the high feas, it might at leaft be required that the proof of their allegiance fhould lie on the British fide. This obvious and juft rule is, however, reversed; and every feaman on board, though going from an American port, and failing under the American flag, and fometimes even speaking an idiom proving him not to be a British subject, is prefumed to be fuch, unless fhewn to be an American citizen. It may fafely be affirmed that this is an outrage and an indignity which has no precedent, and which Great Britain would be among the laft nations in the world to fuffer, if offered to her own fubjects, and her own flag. Nor is it always against the right prefumption alone which is in favour of the citizenship correfponding with the flag, that the violence is committed. Not unfrequently it takes place in defiance of the most pofitive proof, certified in due form by an American officer. / Let it not be faid, that, in granting to American feamen this protection for their rights as fuch, the point is yielded, that the proof lies on the American fide, and that the want of it in the prefcribed form juftifics the inference that the feamen is not of American allegiance. It is diftinctly to be understood, that the certificate, ufually called a protection to American feamen, is not meant to protect them under their own, or even any other neutral flag on the high feas. We can never admit, that in fuch a fituation, any other protection is required for them, than the neutral flag itself on the high feas. The docu ment is given to prove their real character, in fituations to which neither the law of nations, nor the law of their own country, are applicable; in other words, to protect them within the jurifdiction of the British laws, and to fecure to them, within every other jurifdiction the rights and immunities due to them. If, in the courfe of their navigation even on the high feas, the document fhould have the effect of repelling wrongs of any fort, it is an incidental advantage only, of which they avail themselves, and is by no means to be mifconftrued into a right to exact fuch a proof, or to make any disadvantageous inference from the want of it.

Were it even admitted that certificates for protection might be juftly required in time of war from American feamen, they could only be required in cafes where the lapfe of time from its commencement had given an oppor tunity for the American feamen to provide themselves with fuch a document. Yet it is certain, that, in a variety of inftances, feamen have been impreffed from American veffels, on the plea that they had not this proof of citizenhip, when the dates and places of the impreffiments demonstrated the impoflibility of their knowing, in time to provide the proof, that a state of war had rendered it neceffary.

Whether, therefore, we confult the law of nations, the tenor of treaties, or the dictates of reafon and justice, no warrant, no pretext can be found for the

British practice of making impreffments from American veffels on the high feas. Great-Britain has the lefs to fay in excufe for this practice, as it is in direc contradiction to the principles on which the proceeds in other cafes. Whilft fhe claims and feizes on the high feas, her own fubjects, voluntarily ferving in American veffels, fhe has conftantly given, when he could give, as a reason for not discharging from her fervice American citizens, that they had voluntarily engaged in it. Nay, more, whilft fhe impreffes her own fubjects from the American fervice, although they may have been fettled and married, and even naturalifed in the United States, fhe conftantly refufes to release from her's, American citizens impreffed into it, whenever the can give for a reafon, that they were either fettled or married within her dominions. Thus, when the voluntary confent of the individual favours her pretensions, the pleads the validity of that confent. When the voluntary confent of the individual stands in the way of her pretenfions, it goes for nothing! When marriage or refidence can be pleaded in her favour, she avails herself of the plea. When marriage and refidence, and even naturalization are against her, no refpect whatever is paid to either! She takes by force her own subjects, voluntarily ferving in our veffels; fhe keeps by force American citizens, involuntarily ferving in hers. More flagrant inconfiftencies cannot be imagined.

Notwithstanding the powerful motives which ought to be felt by the British government to relinquish a practice which expofes it to fo many reproaches, it is forefcen that objections of different forts will be preffed on you. You will be told first, of the great number of British feamen in the American trade, and of the neceffity for their fervices in time of war and danger. Secondly, of the right and the prejudice of the British nation, with respect to what are called the British or narrow feas, where its domain would be abandoned by the general ftipulation required. Thirdly, of the ufe which would be made of fuch a fanctuary as that of American veffels, for defertions, and traitorous communications to her enemies, especially across the channel to France.

Ift. With refpect to the British feamen ferving in our trade, it may be remarked, firft, that the number, though confiderable, is probably less than may be fuppofed. Secondly, that what is wrong in itself cannot be made right by confiderations of expediency or advantage. Thirdly, that it is proved by the fact, that the number of real British fubjects gained by the practice in queftion, is of inconfiderable importance, even in the fcale of advantage. The annexed report to congrefs on the fubject of impreffments, with the addition of fuch cafes as may be in the hands of Mr. Erving, will verify the remark in its application to the prefent war. The statement made by his predeceffor during the laft war, and which is also annexed, is in the fame view ftill more conclufive. The statement comprehends not only all the applications made by him in the first inftance, for the liberation of impreffed feamen, between the month of June, 1797, and September, 1801, but many alfo which had been made previous to this agency by Mr. Pinckney and Mr. King, and which it was neceffary for him to renew. These applications therefore may fairly be confidered as embracing the greater part of the period of the war; and as applications are known to be pretty indifcriminately made, they may further be confidered as embracing, if not the whole, the far greater part of the impreffments, thofe of Britif fubjects as well as others. Yet the refult exhibits 2.059 cafes only, and of this number 102 feamen only, detained as being British fubjects, which is lefs than 1-20th of the number impreffed, and 1,142 discharged or ordered to be fo, as not being British fubjects, which is more than half of the whole number, leaving 805 for further proof, with the ftrongest prefumption that the greater part, if not the whole, were Americans or other aliens, whofe proof of citizenship had been loft or destroyed, or whofe fituation would account for the difficulties and delays in producing it. So that it is certain, that for all the British seamen gained by this violent proceeding, more than an equal number who were not fo were the victims; it is highly probable that for every British feaman fo gained, a number of oth

ers, less than ro for one, muft have been the victims, and it is even poffible that this number may have exceeded the proportion of 20 to one.

It cannot therefore be doubted, that the acquifition of British feamen by thefe impreffments, whatever may be its advantage, is loft in the wrong done to Americans ignorantly or wilfully mistaken for British subjects, in the jeal oufy and ill-will excited among all maritime nations by an adherence to fuch a practice, and in the particular provocation to measures of redress on the part of the United States, not lefs disagreeable to them, than embarrassing to Great-Britain, and which may threaten the good understanding which ought to be faithfully cultivated by both. The copy of a bill brought into Congrefs under the influence of violations committed on our flag, gives force to this latter confideration. Whether it will pafs into a law, and at the prefent feffion, is more than can yet be faid. As there is every reason to believe that it has been propofed with reluctance, it will probably not be pursued into effect, if any hope can be fupported of a remedy, by an amicable arrangement between the two nations.

There is a further confideration which out to have weight in this question. Although the British scamen employed in carrying on American commerce, be in fome refpects loft to their own nation, yet fuch is the intimate and extenfive connection of this commerce, direct and circuitous, with the commerce, the manufactures, the revenue and the general resources of the British nation, that in other refpects its mariners, on board American vessels, may truly be faid to be rendering it the most valuable fervices. It would not be extravagant to make it a queftion, whether Great Britain would not fuffer more by withdrawing her feamen from the merchant veffels of the United States, than her enemies would suffer from the addition of them to the crews of her fhips of war and cruifers.

Should any difficulty be started concerning seamen born within the British dominions, and naturalized by the United States fince the treaty of 1783, you may remove it by observing: Firft, that very few, if any, fuch naturaliza tions can take place, the law here requiring a preparatory refidence of five years, with notice of the intention to become a citizen entered of record two years before the last necessary formality, besides a regular proof of good mor al character, conditions little likely to be complied with by ordinary fea-faring perfons. Secondly, that a difcontinuance of impreffments on the high feas will preclude an actual collision between the interfering claims. Within the jurisdiction of each nation, and in their respective veffels on the high feas, each will enforce the allegiance which it claims. In other fituations the individuals doubly claimed, will be within a jurisdiction independent of both nations.

Secondly. The British pretenfions to domain over the narrow seas are fo obfolete, and fo indefenfible, that they never would have occurred as a probable objection in this cafe, if they had not actually fruftrated an arrangement fettled by Mr. King with the British miniftry on the subject of impreffinents from American veffels on the high seas. At the moment when the articles were expected to be figned, an exception of the "narrow feas" was urged and infifted on by lord St. Vincent; and being utterly inadmisible on our part, the negociation was abandoned.

The objection in itself has certainly not the flightest foundation. The time has been, indeed, when England not only claimed, but exercifed pretenfions fcarcely inferiour to full fovereignty over the feas furrounding the British ifies, and even as far as Cape Finisterre to the south, and Van Staten, in Norway, to the north. It was a time, however, when reafon had little thare in determining the law, and the intercourse of nations; when power alone decided questions of right, and, when the ignorance and want of concert among other maritime countries facilitated fuch an ufurpation. The progrefs of civilization and information has produced a change in all those respects, and no principle in the code of publick law, is at prefent better cftablished, than

the common freedom of the feas beyond a very limited distance from the territories washed by them. This distance is not, indeed, fixed with abfolute precision. It is varied in a small degree by written authorities, and perhaps it may be reasonably varied in fome degree by local peculiarities. But the greateft diftance which would now be liftened to any where, would make a Imall proportion of the narrowest part of the narroweft feas in question.

What are, in fact, the prerogatives claimed and exercised by Great Britain over these feas? If they were really a part of her domain, her authority would be the fame there as within her other domain. Foreign vessels would be fubject to all the laws and regulations framed for them, as much as if they were within the harbours or rivers of the country. Nothing of this fort is pretended. Nothing of this fort would be tolerated. The only inftances in which these feas are distinguished from other feas, or in which Great Britain enjoys within them, any diftinétion over other nations, are, firft, the compliment paid by other flags to her's. Secondly, the extenfion of her territorial jurifdiction in certain cafes to the distance of four leagues from the coaft. The firft is a relick of ancient ufurpation, which has thus long escaped the correction, which modern and more enlightened times have applied to other ufurpations. The prerogative has been often contested, however, even at the expenfe of bloody wars, and is ftill borne with ill will and impatience by her neighbours. At the laft treaty of peace at Amiens, the abolition of it was repeatedly and ftrongly preffed by France; and it is not improbable, that at no remote day it will follow the fate of the title of "King of France," fo Jong worn by the British monarchs, and at length fo properly facrificed to the leffons of a magnanimous wisdom. As far as this homage to the British flag has any foundation at prefent, it refts merely on long ufage and long acquiefcence, which are conftrued, as in a few other cafes of maritime claims, into the effect of a general though tacit convention. The fecond inftance is the extension of the territorial jurifdiction to four leagues from the fhore. This too, as far as the diftance may exceed that which is generally allowed, refts on a like foundation, ftrengthened, perhaps, by the local facility of fmuggling, and the peculiar intereft which Great Britain has in preventing a practice affecting fo deeply her whole fyftem of revenue, commerce, and manufactures whilft the limitation itself to four leagues, neceffarily implies, that beyond that distance no territorial jurifdiction is affumed.

But whatever may be the origin or the value of these prerogatives over foreign flags in one cafe, and within a limited portion of these feas in another, it is obvious that neither of them will be violated by the exemption of American vessels from impreffments, which are no wise connected with either; having never been made on the pretext either of withholding the wonted homage to the British flag, or of fmuggling in defiance of British laws.

This extenfion of the British law to four leagues from the fhore, is inferred from an act of parliament paffed in the year 1736 (9 G. 2 c. 35) the terms of which comprehend all veffels foreign as well as British. It is poffible however, that the former are conftructively excepted. Should your inquiries afcertain this to be the cafe, you will find yourself on better ground, than the conceffion here made.

With refpect to the compliment paid to the British flag, it is alfo poffible that more is here conceded than you may find to be neceffary. After the peace of 1783 this compliment was peremptorily withheld by France, in fpite of the remonstrances of Great Britain; and it remains for your inquiry, whether it did not continue to be refused, notwithstanding the failure at Amiens to obtain from Great Britain a formal renunciation of the claim.

From every view of the subject, it is reasonable to expect that the exception of the narrow feas, from the ftipulation against impressments, will not be inflexibly maintained. Should it be fo, your negotiation will be at an end. The truth is, that fo great a proportion of our trade, direct and circuitous, paffes through those channels, and fuch is its peculiar expofure in them to the