on the subject, when my hearers (ev) are well acquainted with it;" cf. Id. III. 53: πρòs eidóτas πávтa λeλéžetai, “those, to whom the speech will have been addressed (πpós), know all about it." Plat. Resp. p. 515 Ε: εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἕλκοι βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβά σεως καὶ ἀνάντους οὔσης, “ if any one were to drag him up when the ascent (dua), by which he has to mount, is so rugged and steep;” Id. Protag. p. 332 E : πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; ναί. ἐναντίως; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων; ναί. ἐναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνης. “ The one is done by discretion, the other by folly, is it not? Yes. Contrariwise? Of course. Accordingly, the things, by which they are done (vπó), are opposites. Yes. Therefore folly is the opposite of discretion." Thucyd. 1. 69, § 2: oi yàp Spŵvtes Beßovλevμévoi πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται, “ for those, who act after deliberation, advance at once and without delay, while those, whom they attack (πpós), have not yet come to a decision." Obs. This form of the tertiary predicate is particularly observable when the participle represents a local predicate (above, 442, (b)). Thus we have in Herod. v. 29: év áveσtykvíŋ tŷ xwpy, “in the country where it extends upwards from the coast.' The κατέβησαν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, which follows, shows that this is the meaning intended. 496 The use of the tertiary predicate with a preposition is not limited to participles, though they are best adapted for this construction. The adjective sometimes appears in the same kind of construction. Thus Dem. in Lacrit. 930, 1. 13: èkeîvov tòv veavíσκον τὸν δανείσαντα ἐξηπάτησαν ὡς ἐπ ̓ ἐλευθέροις τοῖς χρήμασι Savellóμevoi, "they deceived that young man, who advanced the money, by the pretence that the property, on which they borrowed it (ei), was free from all incumbrance." 497 Sometimes, as might be expected (above, 405, Obs. 2), the tertiary predicate approximates to the illative sentence. This prolepsis implies that the quality denoted by the adjective is conveyed to the object by the verb. As in Pind. Ol. v. 4: Tàv σàv TóλIV σὰν πόλιν αὔξων λαοτρέφον, i. e. ὥστε λαοτρόφον εἶναι, “ increasing thy city so as to make it a nurser of population." Similarly, with a kind of figura etymologica, in Thucyd. IV. 17: Toùs λóyovs panpotépovs παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς οὐ μηκυνοῦμεν, i. e. ὥστε μακροτέρους εἶναι, “πε will not spin out our speech so as to make it more prolix, contrary to our usual practice." This idiom is found even in Latin, which has no article; as in Pers. I. 17: liquido cum plasmate guttur Mobile collueris, i.e. ut mobile fiat; and even in the nominative, as in Juv. 1. 83: paullatimque anima caluerunt mollia saxa, i.e. ita ut mollia fierent. 498 The Greek idiom did not even shrink from a negative use of this prolepsis; thus we have in Soph. Antig. 856: τὸν δ' ἐμὸν πότμον ἀδάκρυτον i.e. σTE où daxρúοvσiv avтóv, "no friend bewails my fate, so that it remains unwept." And the same adjective is similarly used in the Trach. 106: οὔποτ ̓ εὐνάζειν ἀδακρύτων βλεφάρων πόθον, i. e. εὐνάζειν τὸν πόθον τῶν βλεφάρων ὥστε οὐ δακρύουσιν, οι ὥστε γίγνεσθαι avτà àdáκρνтa, "to rest the regret of her eyes, so that they shed no αὐτὰ ἀδάκρυτα, tears." 1 This supplement is made in the margin and interpolated in the text of Plat. Polit. p. 311 c, where after κοινὸν ξυναγαγοῦσα αὐτῶν τὸν βίον, we have ὥστ ̓ εἶναι κοινόν. CHAPTER III. ON THE HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITION, AND ON THE MOODS, AND NEGATIVE PARTICLES. § I. General Principles. 499 WE have thus far discussed at length all that concerns the elements of the simple proposition. It remains that we should examine the doctrine of co-ordinate and subordinate sentences. In passing to this part of our subject, we have to remember that the secondary predication, even when expressed by a single word, and that too a mere particle, may be equivalent to a conditional proposition (above, 436), and as this is really a relative sentence, which under other circumstances might be expressed by a mere epithet (above, 393, (b)), we must see that the due consideration of the hypothetical proposition connects itself immediately with certain elements in the analysis, to which the simple sentence has been submitted, and that, as far as the conditional clause is adverbial or relative, it deserves to be treated by itself, and as a sort of transition to the doctrine of those sentences which have an external appearance of greater distinctness and independence. It has been already remarked (above, 384), that there are two kinds of hypothetical propositions, and that they always contain two sentences. In the conditional hypothetical, these sentences are connected as antecedent and relative. In the disjunctive hypothetical, both sentences are relative. The one kind, therefore, may be referred to the doctrine of adverbial or dependent sentences: the other will fall under the class of co-ordinate sentences. In accordance with the principles, which we have now stated, we confine ourselves at present to the adverbial forms of the hypothetical propositions. § II. Conditional Propositions. 500 In the conditional hypothetical, the conditional or relative sentence is called the protasis (πpóтaois), while the sentence which follows is called the apodosis (àmódoσis). It thus appears, that what is logically consequent, is grammatically antecedent. 501 The protasis of a conditional proposition is most generally and regularly expressed by the relative particle ei, and when it is thought necessary to express an antecedent to this relative, the particle av, or in epic Greek Kév, appears in the apodosis. These particles are shortened forms of the antithetic prepositions ȧvá and Kaтá (above, 481, Obs.). 502 There are four classes of conditional propositions, which imply respectively I. Possibility, without the expression of uncertainty: el Tɩ exel, didwor= "if he has anything, he gives it"= si quid habet, dat. II. Uncertainty, with some small amount of probability: ẻáv Ti ex?, dwσel=“if he shall have anything (which is not improbable), he will give it " = si quid habeat, dabit. III. Mere assumption, without any subordinate idea: e T Lexoi, Sidoín äv=“if he were to have anything (i. e. as often as he had anything), he would give it"= si quid habeat, det. IV. Impossibility, i. e. when we wish to indicate that the thing is not so: (α) εἴ τι εἶχεν, ἐδίδου ἄν = “ if (which is not the case) he had anything, he would give it " = si quid haberet, daret. åv (6) εἴ τι ἔσχεν, ἔδωκεν ἄν = “ if (which was not the case) he had had anything, he would have given it"= si quid habuisset, dedisset. These four classes will be best illustrated by the following examples: (a) The first class includes all conditional propositions, in which the apodosis is expressed by the indicative without av, or by the imperative, and it will be found in all cases that there is a mere expression of possibility, that, in fact, the protasis and apodosis are merely correlative sentences, in which the fact assumed and its consequence are placed on precisely the same footing. Thus we have (aa) The present or perfect in the protasis. Xen. Mem. II. 1, § 28: εἰ τοὺς θεοὺς ἵλεως εἶναί σοι βούλει, θεραπευτέον [ἐστὶ] τοὺς Oeous, "if you wish the gods to be propitious to you, you must θεούς, worship the gods;" Plat. Crit. p. 43 D: Ei TaÚTη TOîs BEOîs [ẻσTì] φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω, " if it is pleasing to the gods in this way, so be it;” Isocr. Paneg. § 28: εἰ μυθωδὴς ὁ λόγος γέγονεν, ὅμως αὐτῷ καὶ vûv ¿ηoñνaι πроońket, "if the story is fabulous, it is nevertheless proper that it should be spoken on this occasion." (bb) The future in the protasis. Xen. Cyr. II. 1, § 8: ei Ti πείσονται Μῆδοι, εἰς Πέρσας τὸ δεινὸν ἥξει, “ if the Medes shall suffer anything, the danger will extend to the Persians;" Id. Anab. ιν. 7, § 3: τῇ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, εἰ μὴ ληψόμεθα τὸ xwpiov, "unless we shall take the place, there are no provisions for the army." (cc) A past tense in the protasis. Thucyd. III. 54: Eï Ti äλλo ἐγένετο ἐπικίνδυνον, πάντων μετέσχομεν, “if any other danger arose, we took our share in all;" Id. Ibid. 55: ei àπоσтîναι ove ἠθελήσαμεν, οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν, “ if we refused to separate ourselves, we did no wrong;” Id. Ibid. 65: εἰ ἐμαχόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐδῃοῦμεν, adiкoûμev, "if we fought and ravaged the land, we are in the wrong.' (B) The second class includes all conditional propositions, in which the protasis is expressed by eáv and the subjunctive, and in which the apodosis is the future indicative or some virtual equivalent. Plat. Euthyd. p. 288 c: τὸ ἑξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι, κ.τ.λ., καὶ αὐτὼ σπουδάσηTOV, "I will endeavour, in such way as I shall be able, to investigate what follows, if in any way (as is probable) I can induce them, &c., and if they will be in earnest." And the subjunctive with ou μn, being equivalent to the future, is also used in the apodosis to éáv (below, 545). But the present and even the perfect may take the place of the future (above, 423, (aa), (2), 425, (c)), and thus we find the following constructions: Xen. Anab. 1. 8, § 12: Kav TOÛTO νικήσωμεν, πάνθ' ἡμῖν πεποίηται, “ and if we shall have conquered in this, everything is (will be) at once effected for us;" Dem. Ol. II. § 12: ἅπας λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, ματαιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ Kevóv, "all speaking, if actions are wanting, appears to be something vain and empty." It will be seen that in the expression of repeated acts (below, 580, (a)), the subjunctive with orav, &c. is the regular protasis to the present or future indicative. |