troops through the Transvaal territory in case not only of war, but even of danger of war. And then there followed last but not least, the control of the Vassal-state's external relations. That then, the reserve made in the preamble, viewed in the light of those subsequent stipulations, was to be understood in a very material, a really concrete sense, no one, endowed with sound brains, will be tempted to deny. But what further? What other prerogatives could the concept of suzerainty even then contain over and above those, which the articles expressly summed up? Perhaps, upon a brief review of the endeavours students of international law have made to specify the contents of the concept now under consideration, we might discover a single ever-present and comparatively well defined element. It is however a duty of the suzerain, not a right: the duty to protect the Vassal-state, if needs be. As to the suzerain's right, it, most frequently, though not always, centres in this point, that he shall in some way control his Vassal's dealings with foreign powers. Yet if among the men of science we should inquire as to the proper limits of that right of control, all of them would agree that these are too multiform and varying to admit of a universally valid definition. They therefore must depend in every given case upon the particular provisions made. And so your own government, at that time, explained the term when in a despatch of your colonial secretary's most wise and discreet predecessor, the Earl of Kimberley, it stated in explicit terms this: "Entire freedom of action will be accorded to the

"Transvaal-Government, so far as is not inconsistent with "the rights expressly reserved to the Suzerain Power. The "term "suzerainty" has been chosen as most conveniently "describing superiority over a State possessing independent "rights of Government, subject to reservations with reference "to certain specified matters."

Hitherto this much, we presume, has been made clear. Even under the Pretoria-settlement with its carefully constructed preamble, presenting the independence of the Transvaal as a gracious boon, the object and outcome of a one-sided royal declaration, and expressly reserving to Her Majesty the suzerain right, even then the said reservation conferred upon the imperial government no other prerogative, no, not a single one, except those specially provided for in the subsequent articles. And now, what shall we have to think of the position of affairs created by the London-treaty, which in 1884 took the place of the arrangement we have already analysed?

Let us first look at the circumstances under which the birth of that new agreement took place. In 1883 a Transvaaldeputation went from South Africa to London in order to settle anew with the British government the relations between Great Britain and the inhabitants of the Transvaalterritory. The first document deserving attention in the correspondence between the delegates and the colonial secretary, the Earl of Derby, is a memoir drawn up by the South-African triumvirate and dated November 14. There the three patriots undertook to expound freely the grievances

of their countrymen, and they began with the sincere avowal that they not only objected to some decisions of the former settlement but to that settlement in its entirety. Then, first of all among the things which have made the Pretoria convention odious to them as a whole, we find mentioned this point, that the said convention has not been the outcome of free negotiations between both parties, but a one-sided document, made up by a Royal commission, wherein, notwithstanding their urgent request, the Boers were not represented. After having enumerated still other objections to the existing state of things, and especially a series of practical difficulties to which it has given rise, the deputies wind up by asking his Lordship that the old Sand-river-convention of 1852, which originally sanctioned the country's independence, may be taken as the basis for all further negotiations.

Lord DERBY did not fall in with that proposal. He thought it impossible, so runs his answer, dated November 20, that the Sand-river-convention could still be kept alive, or that, if revived, it could meet actual demands. And his chief argument for supporting the latter assertion was that the SO called Sand-river-convention had been, exactly like the Pretoria arrangement, not a treaty between two contracting powers, but only a declaration by the Queen, assented to by some persons then her subjects, concerning the conditions upon which Her Majesty was willing to grant them autonomy. As for the rest - thus wrote the minister - Her Majesty did not decline the idea of framing a new convention

as preferable to a revision of the existing one; in short he thought it most desirable that, if the convention of 1881 were to be abolished, a new document should supersede the old one.

Now, after taking due notice of that correspondence, please read again the historical part of your colonial secretary's argument, and chiefly his suggestion that the South African Republic still owes to this day its independence to the gracious benevolence of Queen VICTORIA, since even the London-negotiations have not resulted in the removal of the former instrument as a whole, but only in the substitution of a new series of articles for the old one. Compare that theory with the categorical utterances of both the negotiating parties. Verily, if your present secretary's statement should prove to be supported by the text, both Lord DERBY and KRÜGER must have been most unlucky in their choice of the final redaction. For this much at least does not bear gainsaying: they were unanimous in this twofold aim: first that the settlement to come should be a bilateral compact; and secondly, that it should not only amend its forerunner, but totally supersede it. We go on and inquire into what has been written about the all-important question from your minister's standpoint — the question concerning the term "suzerainty". Should it be maintained or should it be left out?

Foremost but one among the final proposals, the triumvirate in its above cited letter made to the man at the wheel in Downing street, ranked this, that by the new compact every tie between Transvaal and England should not be broken,

but that instead of the condition of political dependence, in which the country had hitherts stood to the British crown, it should henceforth become a freely contracting power. Since then, there has been much friction, much spending of ink and paper over and over again. His Lordship asked the other party to hand over a scheme. When it was made, it did not please him. Nor could he thoroughly understand what ties the South Africans meant should subsist between their country and Great Britain. After due investigation of that point and after long and tedious squabbling regarding the frontier- and the nativeproblem, the noble Lord himself on February 15, 1884 at last produced what he entitled as "a draft of the new convention which Her Majesty's Government propose in substitution for the convention of Pretoria." The first page of that draft was headed by a note, which ran as follows: "The words and paragraphs bracketed or printed in italics are proposed to be inserted, those within a black line are proposed to be omitted.” Immediately below there followed the preamble of '81, containing the ominous word "suzerainty"; and, lo, it stood within a black line, and was, in consequence, according to the noble author's intention, to be omitted. The new preamble, which on the evidence of its brackets should take the old one's place, contained the weighty term no more. Could the colonial secretary of '84 have manifested his real meaning on this point more categorically than he did?

Again, grasp of these well proved facts, and then remember your minister's statement that the instrument of '84