asserting (against Locke) the existence of native and necessary truths they deny (as against Kant and Mansel) that these primarily appear on the theatre of consciousness as forms of thought or abstract principles. Logomachy is avoided, and much confusion cleared up, by a simple, yet most important, distinction drawn between intuitions, as regulative principles, as spontaneous concrete convictions, and as general maxims elaborated out of the individual cases; whilst, to prevent an indiscriminate appeal to first principles, we are furnished with the tests of self-evidence, necessity, and catholicity; in all cases the paramount authority of consciousness is recognised.

The aim and method of this inquiry are manifest;-to discover, and present in scientific form, the primary data of our intelligence by the inductive method: the truths are reached, not proved, by experience, which enters into the process, but does not modify the result; the laws exist and are valid a priori, but can only be discovered a posteriori.

After an elaborate and very acute "critical review of the opinions of philosophers" on the points already specified, we have (Part ii.) a "particular examination of the intuitions," which are conveniently classified as Cognitions, Beliefs, Judgments, and Moral Convictions.

Dr M'Cosh declines the theory common to Locke and his critics, Cousin and Hamilton, that the unit of consciousness is a judgment. "We first know things, and then are able to compare them;" consciousness is knowledge, perception is knowledge, not merely the inlet of knowledge.

Professor Bain rejects the Realistic creed, as "irrelevant" and "unphilo sophical.” "Belief in external reality is the anticipation of a given effect (a sensation) to a given antecedent (a movement);" i.e. my idea of the external reality of a lump of ice is simply an anticipation that my grasp will be followed by certain sensations of resistance, weight, and temperature. In opposition to this physico-sensational idealism, we assert an intuitive knowledge of an external, independent, and really existing universe contained in, and occupying space. The object perceived is not object mecum nor object + subjective forms, nor objective-phenomena + subjective elements, nor relation-of-object-to-subject; we know the thing truly (we do not say perfectly); our knowledge, though partial, is "pure."

On our author's able defence of his thorough-going natural realism, and on his views of the genesis and nature of such ideas as substance, extension, personality, and power, we may not linger. "Qualities, as qualities distinct from substance, are as much unknown as substances distinct from qualities, ... we know both in one concrete act." By subsequent abstraction we separate substance and quality; but in nature, and in our primitive cognition, both exist together; we perceive something extended and coloured; we are not conscious of sensation, thought, volition, but of something that thinks and wills. This is excellent; it is an advance on the Scottish school. If we admit that phenomena apart from substance can be perceived by the senses, we shall not easily find sufficient justification for postulating substance as a datum of reason.

Here arises the question, "How are our intuitions related to the faculties?" They are involved in the operations of the faculties. Sir William Hamilton, though only under protest as it were, constituted these fundamental laws of intelligence into his "Regulative Faculty." Misled also by the Kantian doctrine of forms, he admitted not merely a cognition of space as a necessary form of thought, but also an empirical perception of extension as an element of existence. Grasping at this admission, Mr Bain rejects space as an intuition of the mind, and ascribes the idea of extension simply to the muscular feelings. We think a knowledge of space enters into every perception, just as a knowledge of the ego, the personal self, is involved in all conscious ac

tion. We believe, not merely that at each conscious moment we know our organism as extra-mental and extended, a knowledge which may result from the concurrent action of several senses, but that each perception or sensation is known to be external to the mind, and is vaguely localized, is felt to be somewhere, we have thus a cognition of space, space as a point : two distinct sensations by their "reciprocal outness," give the idea of extension (partes extra partes), somewhere + otherwhere, a line in space; whilst sight and the muscular sense furnish an immediate knowledge of superficial figure, defined space. In like manner time is known in each conscious act; "the now is involved and faintly perceived in the concrete, but the present quickly becomes the past, "the then" appears in our recollection hence the idea of duration, continuous time.

Book II. treats of our "primitive beliefs," and of space, time, and the infinite. Space and time have an objective reality. Of their precise nature, however, and of their relations, especially to the Deity, Dr M'Cosh speaks with pardonable hesitancy. The infinite is neither represented as the absolute of transcendental philosophy, nor as a purely negative idea, the creature of human impotency; nor is it viewed in an exclusively quantitative aspect -a misconception which involved many British thinkers in hopeless contradictions, from which "faith" cannot deliver. The relation of faith to knowledge is substantially, though not precisely, that of the representative knowledge of Hamilton to the presentative. Our native cognitions and our native beliefs are intelligent and trustworthy; there is no antithesis of faith and reason, simply a distinction between belief and knowledge.

Our "primitive judgments" are conveniently classified. The most important section considers the relation of cause and effect, expressing the law in a precise formula, establishing its subjective and objective validity, and justifying and accounting for it on philosophic principles.

Book IV., "on our moral convictions," furnishes a good provisional inventory of the springs of human action, asserts the veracity of conscience, opposes the refined utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, and points out some dark phenomena (sin and guilt) generally overlooked by academic moralists.

On the vexed question of free-will, two propositions are laid down. The will is free; this is attested by consciousness and conscience. Causes act upon the will; this is a legitimate deduction from the law of causality, and is confirmed by statistical science. We cannot positively reconcile these truths, but they are not contradictory: we trace the difficulty (no longer an antinomy) to the mysterious nature of causal action in the will; here a prudent speculation will rest.

Throughout this "examination" we have been struck with its sound positive philosophy, its firm belief in the data of consciousness. Once admit that we know not things in themselves, but merely things as they appear to us, modified and coloured by the subjective medium; that our faith in the infinite is a blind trust in an unknown and altogether unknowable x ; that our causal judgment is merely a law of thought, having no application to things; that moral truth as known by man is relative, not absolute truth, at all events not known as such,—the foundation of all certainty is shaken. We vainly appeal to the "practical reason," we are compelled to retire upon blind faith or unreflecting feeling; and not even thus can we escape such nihilism as that of Fichte: "All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream, into a dream made up only of a dream of itself." We have no longer a philosophy, but the despair of all philosophy-the apotheosis of doubt and error; "and naught is everything and everything is naught."

Part III. is chiefly critical and constructive. Metaphysics is defined as "The science which inquires into the original convictions of the mind with the view of generalizing and expressing them, and also of determining what

are the objects revealed by them," thus comprising Gnosiology and Ontology. Here such questions as the origin and extent of knowledge and beliefs, the relation of intuition to experience, idealism, scepticism, the views of Locke, J. S. Mill, Hamilton, and Herbert Spencer, are very ably discussed.

Metaphysics having been defined in itself, is further explained as in relation and contrast to other sciences, particularly mathematics, psychology, and theology. We have interesting sections on the theistic argument, the immortality of the soul, and pantheism in its various forms. We regret that we cannot lay before our readers some of the author's important strictures on recent phases of religious thought;-these ethical and theological discussions cannot fail to prove as interesting as they are intrinsically valuable.

The present work is most seasonable. The march of physical science, the agitation of the question, "Is a philosophy of history possible?" the rapid development of statistical and economic science, the felt impossibility of believing that to be theologically true which is philosophically false, the growing desire to "brush with extreme skirt the circle of the sciences;" theso causes, amongst others, are directing public attention to the subjects here treated.

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We regret that the author has not shewn how his view, that substance and quality are known together, can apply to the finite or infinite nature of space and time, or to the data of conscience, which certainly seems to be a qualitative faculty. His analysis of substance presents the idea of permanence, a product of faith or judgment rather than of knowledge. His " ticular examinations of the intuitions" proceeds on a classification, of which the principle is, we think, psychological rather than metaphysical, and hence arises a seeming incompleteness. Under the "Primitive Judgments,' the question of modality might have been considered. The test of self-evidence, especially with reference to cognitions and beliefs, is somewhat imperfectly explained; and we are not sure that he has given due prominence to the quantitative character of the infinite, especially as an attribute of space and time.

But we most cordially invite attention to this volume. Its chief scientific merits we conceive to be its discrimination between the intuitions, considered as regulative principles, as concrete facts, and as abstract general laws, and its correct appreciation of the relative position of these a priori elements and our faculties. To these we might add its definite conception of the sphere of metaphysical inquiry, its logical arrangement, its clear and succinct historical notices of systems, and its acute and searching, though not unfriendly, criticisms of current opinions.

Some will regret that the deductive and constructive methods are so sparingly employed, trains of thought are seldom pursued to any length; but the aim of the writer is to discover first truths merely, the alphabet of knowledge, and not the totum scibile. The mathematician constructs; the metaphysician may not disdain the humbler offices "of digging for a foundation, of removing rubbish, and carrying materials;" he must induct; and proceeding in this safe method, a few faulty links do not vitiate the entire chain. Dr M'Cosh has thus widened the sphere of human knowledge, placed metaphysics on a well defined and well secured basis, and been more successful than if he had aimed at a more showy, but less solid "reasoned philosophy."

A manly and intelligent tone pervades this work. It is indeed devoid of the thoughtful and somewhat dreamy, but graceful and attractive, sentimentalism, that gilds the pages of Schelling or Schleiermacher; it requires to be "chewed and digested," "to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention." We can safely assure our readers that it will repay such a careful perusal.

W. P.

Inspiration: the Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures. By JAMES BANNERMAN, D.D., Professor of Theology New College, Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

This volume contains incomparably the most systematic and complete discussion of the great question of the inspiration of Holy Scripture which has yet been presented to the Christian church. It makes a very large contribution indeed towards that satisfactory settlement of the question which the unsettled state of modern opinion has been for some time loudly calling for. We have very specially to commend the logical orderliness and disposition of the topics handled; and we think no intelligent and logical mind can read the table of contents without deriving from it both instruction and gratification. The method or scheme there sketched is such as to include, and that in their right relations to each other, all the great leading trains of thought which a fair and full investigation of the subject must embrace in order to be treated in a manner suitable to its own intrinsic importance, and with reference to the history and specialities of modern, or rather current discussion. The treatise has a beginning, a middle, and an end. In the earlier chapters, the author treats of the preliminary truths to be admitted, the preliminary objections to be discussed, the importance of the question, and the history of opinion in reference to it. The central department of the work is occupied with discussion of the state of the question, and the kind of evidence proper to it; adduces the actual proof from both Testaments, and then deals with the very interesting topic of the relation between the divine and human in Scripture. The concluding portion is devoted to the consideration of what the author very happily calls the psychological objections to inspiration, then the critical objections, and finally, the relation between inspiration and interpretation of Scripture. All these topics are treated in a very worthy manner, and most of them with a fulness, accuracy, and satisfactoriness which leaves little to be desired, and goes far towards raising this volume to the honourable position of a standard work on the question, or even the standard work demanded by the present state of things in the theological world. We wish we could have unhesitatingly assigned this position to it without drawback or qualification. We read it with the desire of being able so to pronounce upon it; and we have the firm belief that, after the discussion which it is sure to undergo at the hands alike of friends and foes, it is capable, by the author's generous use of their probable criticisms, of taking this position in the future editions of it, which are sure to be called for.

We regret that we cannot enter at any length, here and now, on the subject of inspiration, this Review having very lately discussed it somewhat fully. But should the great leading positions of Dr Bannerman's book be seriously assailed from any respectable quarter, we are prepared very earnestly to defend them. In doing so, we would with all freedom respectfully point out what we think would be improvements in the treatise. For instance, in the first place, we think the author identifies too directly and immediately what is meant by the word "inspiration" with what is meant by the phrase "infallible truth and divine authority." No doubt, with explanation, this is quite defensible. But it is liable to be mistaken, and needs to be defended. The identification, as to immediate effect, between "divine inspiration" and "divine authorship" is far preferable, and is liable to no such misapprehension. We can easily conceive God to have been the author of a book, not one substantive statement of which should have claimed to be infallible truth, or have asserted with divine authority a single duty. He might have given by inspiration a volume devoted, from beginning to end, to a record and exposure of the lies and devices of the devil. Of course it would have been an infallibly true record, and we would have been under obligation, by divine authority, to believe it to be

Critical Notices.

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80. In that sense, and in that sense only, the inspiration of the Bible is to be identified immediately and directly with its infallible truth and divine authority; but that is far better expressed by the phrase "divine authorship," leaving it to the book itself to say what of its own substantive statements claim to be in themselves infallibly true, and what of them are designed to assert and enforce duty by its author's authority. Then again, secondly, we would call for a somewhat more exact and scientific discussion of the direct scriptural proof of the doctrine. Some of the passages adduced to prove inspiration, seem to us to go no farther than proving revelation. A more accurate presentation of the scriptural evidence would be more effective though it turned out to be less bulky. What could be more effective, for instance, than the evidence afforded by a comparison of the 5th and 6th verses of the 1st chapter of Hebrews? In the first of these verses an expression is attributed to God, of which we find from the second psalm, that he was the direct speaker or allocutor: "Said he; Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." In the second of these verses, an expression is attributed to God by the same formula: "Saith he," of which we find by the 97th Psalm, from which it is quoted, that God was not the allocutor; yet it is his as truly as the former. What inference can we draw, but that the verse from the 97th Psalm is as much the divine word as God's direct address to Emmanuel. He is the author of that verse in written words, as truly as He was the allocutor in spoken words of the utterance in the other psalm. And there is nothing to appropriate that verse in written words to God as author, more than the psalm as a whole; and if so, then the whole psalm is divine word; and if so, then equally the book of Psalms; and if so, then equally the Law, the Psalms, and the Prophets-the entire holy Scripture. But thirdly, and more seriously, we would earnestly suggest the complete withdrawal of the position which Dr Bannerman labours very hard to make good, viz. that "Revelation is co-extensive with Scripture," and of course the co-relative position that "Inspiration is limited to Revelation." This conjoined position we believe to be indefensible,—unnecessary to the reality and demonstration of the entire divine authorship of Scripture, and an unfortunate burden laid on the discussion of the orthodox doctrine on the subject. Is it at all necessary to contend that Moses, in writing the fourth chapter of the book of Numbers, with such materials and means of information as he certainly possessed, must have had it revealed to him from heaven that the labourers in the services of the tabernacle from among the Kohathites, numbered 2750; the Gershonites, 2630; the Merarites, 3200; and also that revelation was needed to tell him that these amounted to a total of 8580 souls? If he wrote under the guidance of the Spirit of inspiration, was it not enough? Or when Luke had to engross by inspiration the letter of Claudius Lysias, could not the ordinary providence of God have placed a correct copy of it, or the original, at his disposal, without miraculously making him acquainted with its contents? And if under divine guidance he transcribed it accurately into its right place in his inspired narrative, was it not enough? These questions may be multiplied indefinitely. They will assuredly be put by earnest, liberal-minded, honest inquiring minds, such as it is extremely important to gain over to the cause of truth; and it is most desirable that no unnecessary obstacle should be left in the way of their accepting, out and out, the divine authorship of the Bible. We are persuaded that this position of Dr Bannerman's is an unfortunate one, and fitted to constitute an obstacle to the reception of views which he advocates with such intelligence, large-mindedness, and ability. That inspiration is co-extensive with Scripture, Scripture itself asserts. It affirms that all Scripture is theopneustic, no where that all Scripture is apocalyptic.

But we must not omit to reiterate that this volume makes a contribution