hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter. I feel as if the British was the only efficient force in Spain. Your Lordship will consider with what view it was originally sent; whether in aid of an enthusiastic brave people, capable of fighting their own battles, or to contend alone with France, and retrieve the affairs of a beaten disorganized nation. We have had now some proof of the efforts of which Spain is capable; and we can judge by the resistance they have made, whether they have fought with that spirit and obstinacy of a people ardent for the independence of their country. It is certainly right for your Lordship to consider well these matters, that you may be able to estimate justly the aid which is to be expected in this struggle from the Spanish nation, and decide to what amount the British Army should be reinforced, or, if not reinforced, what measures it should follow. The French force in Spain may fairly be set down at 80,000 men*, besides what is in Catalonia; the British at 27 or 28,000, including the regiments coming from Portugal. The French expect considerable reinforcements. The armies which the Spaniards had formed have been beater and dispersed, and are again collecting. This, my Lord, is, I believe, the true statement; and I leave your Lordship to throw into the scale what portion of enthusiasm, resolution, and ability, you think we have a right to expect from the specimen already given."

On the 14th, the head quarters were at Alaejos, and on the 15th at Toro. On the 20th, Sir J. M. reached Majorga, and was joined by Sir David Baird.

The British army were now united ; and, independent of some small detachments left to keep up the communications, it amounted to 23,000 infantry, and 2000 two or three hundred cavalry. The Head Quarters were at Majorga, but the cavalry and horse-artillery were advanced to Monastero Melgar Abaxo, within three leagues of Sahagun; where it was understood that near 700 of the Enemy's cavalry were posted.'

The Head quarters were established at Sahagun on the 21st. All information, on which reliance could be placed, still displayed the conduct of the Spanish Juntas, and the situation of their troops, in the most discouraging light: but Sir John now determined on making an attack on the enemy, under Marshal Soult, at Saldana, and concerted measures with the Marquis Romana for that purpose. Writing to Mr. Frere on the 23d, he concludes by observing, .

"The movement I am making is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication intercepted with the Galicias. Í

Sir J. Moore's intelligence, particularly that obtained through the Spanish Government, was often imperfect. Instead of 80,000, he should have said 150,000.'

wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause; and that we do not abandon it, until long after the Spaniards had abandoned us."

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In the course of this day, however, messenger after messenger brought unpleasant reports; information was received that the enemy was advancing from Madrid; and Sir John Moore perceived that his movement and design were discovered by Bonaparte, who was now marching a superior force against him. This was what he had all along expected, and was prepared for.-The forward march of the troops was instantly countermanded.' The General also directly wrote to Romana, and thus states his intentions:

"Your Excellency knows my object, in marching in this direction, was to endeavour to free you from a troublesome neighbour, and to strike a blow at a corps of the rnemy, whilst it was still imagined that the British troops had retreated into Portugal I was aware of the risk I ran, if i should be discovered, and the Enemy push on a corps between me and my communication

"My movement has, in some degree, answered its object, as it has drawn the Enemy from other projects, and will give the South more time to prepare With such a force as mine, can pretend to do no more I would only be losing this army to Spain and to England, to persevere in my march on Soult; who, if posted strongly might wait, or, if not, would retire and draw me on until the corps from Madrid got behind me: in short, single-handed, I caunot pretend to contend with the superior numbers the French can bring against me.

"I received your Excellency's letter at six, and the troops were to have marched from this to Carrion at eight this evening. I countermanded them, and shall take immediate measures for retiring on Astorga. There I shall stand; as my retreat thence, if necessary, will be secure. I shall be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which I expect from England. At the worst, I can maintain my self, and, with your Excellency's aid, defend the Galicias and give time for the formation of the armies of the South, and that which you command to be prepared, when joint effort may be made, which can alone be efficacious. It is playing the Enemy's game to draw him to attack our armies in rotation."

Here the Editor interposes some additional remarks and information:

It is now requisite to point out the plan which was adopted by Buonaparte. The particulars were disclosed by his movements; but exact information has also been obtained through Major Napier of the 50th regiment. This Officer at the battle of Corunna was stabbed in the body by a bayonet, and wounded in the head by a sword, yet he defended his life till quarter was promised him. When a prisoner he was treated most handsomely by the Duke of

Dalmatia.

Dalmatia (Soult). He dined with Marshal Ney frequently, who as well as General La Borde, the Chief of l'Etat Major, and other officers of rank, frankly told him the design and sentiments of the Emperor. When Buonaparte received intelligence that the British were moving to the Duero, he said, "Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me, I shall advance against him in person."

'Orders were then sent to the Duke of Dalamatia to give way, if attacked, and to decoy the British to Burgos, or as far Eastward as possible; and at the same time to push on a corps towards Leon, on their left flank. And should they attempt to retreat, he was ordered to impede this by every means in his power. The corps on the road to Badajos was stopt, and ordered to proceed towards Salamanca; while he himself moved rapidly with all the disposable force at Madrid, and the Escurial, directly to Benavente. Neither Buonaparte nor any of his Generals had the least doubt of surrounding the British with between 60 and 70,000 men before they could reach Galicia.

'Sir John Moore, as appears both by his letters and his conduct, saw clearly the whole of this plan: he had prepared for the danger; calculated the time; and has acquired the glory of being the first General who has frustrated Buonaparte.'

Here is the material point in the history of this unfortunate campaign. The General now seriously determined on withdrawing, and commenced measures for effecting that retreat which ended in the embarkation at Corunna; which has been praised by some as conducted with the most eminent skill, firmness, and perseverance; and which has been censured by others as injudicious and unwarrantably severe in its rapidity. On the melancholy effects of it, as sustained by the troops while on march, we shall not dwell in our abstracted narrative: but it is essential to state the principle on which it was directed, and the position of the enemy by which it was induced. The Editor represents that

The Duke of Dalmatia received strong reinforcements from the 22nd to the 24th; so that his army alone was much superior to the British. It was posted behind the river Carrion, between Carrion and Saldana.

The Duke of Abrantes had advanced from Burgos to Palentia, and threatened the right flank of the British.

Buonaparte pushed on the corps at the Escurial, and marched from Madrid on the 18th in person, with an army consisting of 12,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry. The advanced guard of this cavalry passed through Tordesillas on the 24th; the same day the van of the British left Sahagun; and both moved to the same point - Benavente.

"There was another corps on the road to Badajos commanded by the Duke of Dantzic; this had advanced to Talavera de la Reina ; and had pushed on as far as Arzo-Bispo, in pursuit of the Spanish General Galuzo. This was likewise counter-matched, and was diREV. SEPT. 1809.

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rected

rected towards Salamanca. Even the division under the Duke of Trevise. which was proceeding to Saragossa, was stopt; and the long, meditated vengeance against that heroic city was deferred.

In fine, the whole disposable force of the French army, forming an irregular crescent, was marching in radii with rapid steps to environ the British. To accomplish this favourite object, Buonaparte stopt his victorious career to the South, where there was nothing capable of resisting him'

Sir John Moore's first object was to pass the river Elsar without interruption. There are three routes across this river: the first is by Mansilla, where there is a good bridge; the second is by Valencia where there was only à ferry; and the third is by Castro Gonsalo, where there is also a bridge; this last road leads to Benavente. It was impossible to go by Mansilla, as the Marquis of Romana's troops were there, and the country was completely exhausted by them. There were great objections to the whole army attempting the passage by the ferry at Valencia: for the intelligence received was, that the river was rapidly increasing, so that the ford would probably be too deep, and the boats were few. These circumstances would render the passage of the whole army very tedious at this point. And besides, an adequate supply of food could not be found; nor could covering, which was necessary at this season, be had for the whole army on one route.

It was, however, quite requisite to secure Valencia to stop the Enemy. Sir David Baird was, therefore, directed to take that route; and it was resolved that the rest of the army should proceed by Castro Gonsalo.

By this division of the army also the magazines and stores, which were deposited at Benavente and Zamora, were effectually covered.'

These movements were effected according to the General's orders, and on the 27th. his head quarters were established at Benavente. On the 29th, the British dragoons had a skirmish with some French cavalry under General Lefebvre, who was taken; and from the prisoners it was learnt that Bonaparte slept the preceding night at Villalpando, only four leagues from Benavente To prevent being turned by the enemy, and on account of the scarcity of provisions, the Commander detached General Craufurd with gooo light troops to Orense, on the road to Vigo; and the rest of the army proceeded to Astorga, where Sir D. Baird's column was again united to it,

It is known (says the Editor) that Buonaparte had fully expected to have reached Benavente as soon as, or before, the British; and the Duke of Dalmatia hoped, that they would be so much retarded by Buonaparte's attacks, that he might, by forced marches through Leon, precede them at Astorga, The little resistance made by the Spaniards at Mansilla, and the immediate submission of Leon, facilitated this plan. Had either been in time, the British would have been surrounded. But Buonaparte was anticipated in

both

both his projects; and, while a part of his cavalry was repulsed by Lord Paget, the van of the British Army, under General Fraser, entered and secured Astorga.'.

A dispatch of the 31st to Lord Castlereagh thus representǝ affairs:

"With respect to me, my Lord, and the British troops, it has come to that point which I have long foreseen. Abandoned from the beginning by every thing Spanish, we were equal to nothing by ourselves. From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion it has answered completely; but, as there is nothing to take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the army for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. I found no provision here: the little which has been collected had been consumed by Sir David's corps in their passage; and there is not two days' bread to carry the army to Villa-franca. I have been forced to push on the troops by divisions, without stopping 'There is no means of carriage: the people run away, the villages are deserted; and I have been obliged to destroy great part of the ammunition and military stores. For the same reason I am obliged to leave the sick. In short, my sole object is to save the army. We must all make forced marches to the coast, from the scarcity of provisions, and to be before the enemy; who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us."

The troops now proceeded to Villa Franca, the French ca valry constantly hanging on their rear, and frequent skirmishes occurring.

When Buonaparte reached Astorga he was joined by the Duke of Dalmatia. The whole army that was assembled there amounted to near 70,000 men, independently of other corps, which were countermanded from their former destination, though not yet come up. It is natural to imagine that a man so accustomed to succeed in all his plans must have been bitterly disappointed to find that, notwithstanding his exertions, the British were beyond his reach. He here reviewed this immense force; and perceiving, by the masterly arrangements of his enemy, that it was no longer possible to intercept him, he halted to watch the event. Three Marshals of France, with as many divisions, were commanded to follow the British elosely, and to destroy them, either before or during their emharkation. And some other corps followed those divisions, to support them.'

At Lugo, Sir John Moore determined to offer battle to the French, the ground being favourable, and he conceiving it to be desirable to fight the enemy there, rather than suffer his troops to be continually harassed on their march: but Marshal Soult seemed not to relish the dispositions which he found made by Sir J. M., and nothing more than skirmishes took place. The retreat of the British was therefore continued to

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Corunna;