mœomeria of Anaxagoras, and declared Atoms, invisible and intangible, to be the primary elements; and that all things were but modes of one of the triple arrangements, namely, configuration, combination, and position. The atom, being indivisible, is necessarily one; and, being one, is necessarily self-existent. By this hypothesis, therefore, Democritus satisfied the demands of those who declared that the self-existent must be One; and of those who declared that there were many things existing, and that the One could never be more than the One, never become the Many. He amalgamated the Ionian and Eleatic schools in his speculation, correcting both. He, doubtless, derived this idea from the homœomeria of Anaxagoras; or, as those who place Anaxagoras later than Democritus would say, originated this idea. It becomes a question, therefore, which of these speculations bears the impress of greater maturity. On this question we cannot hesitate to pronounce. The idea of homœomeria betrays its more primitive nature in this-it attributes positive qualities to atoms, which qualities are not changed or affected by combination or arrangement. The idea of the atom divested of all quality, and only assuming that quality as phenomenal when in combination with other atoms, and changing its quality with every change of combination, is indubitably a far more scientific speculation; it is also obviously later in point of development.

From the axiom that only "like can act upon like,” Anaxagoras formed his homœomeria. Democritus accepted the axiom, but gave it a wider application. If only like can act upon like, said he, then must all things be alike in esse; and the only differences are those of phenomena, i. e. of manifestation; these depend on combination and arrangement.

Atomism is homœomerianism stripped of qualities. It is therefore the system of Anaxagoras greatly improved.

The Atomism of Democritus has not been sufficiently appreciated as a speculation. It is one of the profoundest yet reached by human subtlety. Leibnitz, many centuries afterwards, was

led to a doctrine essentially similar; his celebrated “Monadologie" is but Atomism, with a new terminology. Leibnitz called his Monad a force, which to him was the prima materia. So also Democritus denied that atoms had any weight; they had only force, and it was the impulsion given by superior force which constituted weight. It is worthy of remark that not only did these thinkers concur in their doctrine of atomism, but also, as we have seen, in their doctrine of the origin of knowledge: a coincidence which gives weight to the supposition that in both minds one doctrine was dependent on the other.

From what has already been said, the reader may estimate Ritter's assertion, that it would be in vain to seek for any profounder view in the theory of Democritus than that common to all mechanical physicists who sought to reduce every thing to mathematical conceptions: an assertion as preposterous as that which follows it, namely, that Democritus arrived at his atomic theory in the same way as modern physicists,—from a bias for the mechanical consideration of Nature. Ritter here contradicts himself. Having first declared that there was nothing in the Democritian. theory but what the Ionians had previously discovered, he next declares that this theory is the same as that of the modern atomic theory. We are puzzled to which decision we shall award the palm of historical misconception. The modern atomic theory is the law of definite proportions; the ancient theory is merely the affirmation of indefinite combinations. Between these two conceptions there is precisely the difference between Positive Science and Philosophy. Instead of being similar conceptions, they were neither arrived at in the same way, nor have they the same signification.

Attempts have been made, from certain expressions attributed to Democritus, to deduce an Intelligence, somewhat similar to that in the Anaxagorean doctrine, as the Formative Principle. But the evidence is so small and so questionable, that we refrain from pronouncing on it. Certain it is that he attributed the

formation of things to Destiny; but whether that Destiny was intelligent or not is uncertain.

In conclusion, we may observe that his system was an advance on that of his predecessors. In the two great points of psychology and physics, which we have considered at length, it is impossible to mistake a very decided progress, as well as the opening of a new line in each department.

THIRD EPOCH.

INTELLECTUAL CRISIS. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF ALL ATTEMPTS TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE, AS WELL AS THAT OF KNOWLEDGE, PRODUCES THE SOPHISTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE SOPHISTS.

§ I. WHAT WERE THEY?

That they should

THE Sophists are a much calumniated race. have been so formerly is not surprising; that they should be so still, is an evidence that historical criticism is yet in its infancy. In raising our voices to defend them we are aware of the paradox; but looked at nearly, the paradox is greater on the side of those who credit and repeat the traditional account. In truth, we know of few charges so unanimous, yet so paradoxical, as that brought against the Sophists.* It is as if mankind had consented to judge of Socrates by the representation of him in The Clouds. The caricature of Socrates by Aristophanes is quite as near the

* It is proper to state that the novel view of the position and character of the Sophists advanced in this Chapter was published five years before the admirable Chapter of Mr. Grote's History of Greece, wherein that erudite and thoughtful writer brings his learning and sagacity to the most thorough elucidation of the question it has yet received. In claiming priority in this point of historical criticism, it is right for me to acknowledge that Mr. Grote substantiates his view with overwhelming force of argument and citation; and in revising the present Chapter, I have been much indebted to his criticisms and citations.

truth as the caricature of the Sophists by Plato ;* with this difference, that in the one case it was inspired by political, in the other by speculative antipathy.

On the Sophists we have only the testimony of antagonists; and the history of mankind clearly proves that the enmities which arise from difference of race and country are feeble compared with the enmities which arise from difference of creed : the former may be lessened by contact and intercourse; the latter are only aggravated. Plato had every reason to dislike the Sophists and their opinions; he therefore lost no occasion of ridiculing the one and misrepresenting the other. And it is worthy of especial remembrance that this hostility was peculiarly Platonic, and not Socratic; for, as Mr. Grote reminds us, there is no such marked antithesis between Socrates and the Sophists in the biographical work of Xenophon. Plato, however, and those who followed Plato, misrepresented the Sophists, as in all ages. antagonists have misrepresented each other.

The Sophists were wealthy; the Sophists were powerful; the Sophists were dazzling, rhetorical, and not profound. Interrogate human nature-above all, the nature of philosophers--and ask what will be the sentiment entertained respecting these Sophists. by their rivals. Ask the solitary thinker what is his opinion of the showy, powerful, but shallow rhetorician who usurps the attention of the world. The man of convictions has at all times a superb contempt for the man of mere oratorical or dialectical display. The thinker knows that the world is ruled by Thought; yet he sees Expression gaining the world's attention. He knows, perhaps, that he has within him thoughts pregnant with human welfare; yet he sees the giddy multitude intoxicated with the enthusiasm excited by some plausible fallacy, clothed in enchanting language. He sees through the fallacy, but cannot make others as clear-sighted. His warning is unheeded; his wisdon is spurned; his ambition is frustrated: the popular Idol is carried

* See in particular that amusing dialogue, the Euthydemus, which is quite as exaggerated as Aristophanes.