CHAPTER II.

THE EPICUREANS.

§ I. EPICURUS.

THE Epicureans are condemned in their names. We before noticed how the meaning attached to the name of Sophist inadvertently gives a bias to every judgment of the Sophist School, and renders it extremely difficult to conceive the members of that School otherwise than as shameless rogues. Equally difficult is it to shake off the influence of association with respect to the Epicureans; although historians are now pretty well agreed in believing Epicurus to have been a man of pure and virtuous life, and one whose doctrines were moderate and really inculcating abstemiousness.

Epicurus was born Ol. 109 (B. c. 342), at Samos, according to some; at Gargettus, in the vicinity of Athens, according to others. His parents were poor, his father a teacher of grammar. At a very early age, he tells us, his philosophical career began: so early as his thirteenth year. But we must not misunderstand this statement. He dates his career from those first questionings which occupy and perplex most young minds, especially those of any superior capacity. He doubtless refers to that period when, boy-like, he puzzled his teacher with a question beyond that teacher's power. Hearing the verse of Hesiod wherein all things are said to arise from Chaos, Epicurus asked, “And whence came Chaos ?"

"Whence came Chaos?" Is not this the sort of question to occupy the active mind of a boy? Is it not by such questions that we are all led into philosophy? To philosophy he was re

ferred for an explanation. The writings of Democritus fell in his way, and were eagerly studied; the writings of others followed; and, his vocation being fixed, he sought instruction from many masters. But from all these masters he could gain no solid convictions. They gave him hints; they could not give him Truth; and working upon the materials they furnished, he produced a system of his own, by which we presume he justified his claim to being self-taught.

His early years were agitated and unsettled. He visited Athens at eighteen, but remained there only one year. He then passed to Colophon, Mitylene, and Lampsacus. He returned to Athens in his six-and-thirtieth year, and there opened a school, over which he presided till his death, Ol. 127 (B. c. 272).

The place he chose for his school was the famous Garden, a spot pleasantly typical of his doctrine. The Platonists had their Academic Grove; the Aristotelians walked along the Lyceum; the Cynics growled in the Cynosarges; the Stoics occupied the Porch; and the Epicureans had their Garden.

Here, in the tranquil Garden, in the society of his friends, he passed a peaceful life of speculation and enjoyment. The friendship which existed amongst them is well known. In a time of general scarcity and famine they contributed to each other's support, showing that the Pythagorean notion of community of goods was unnecessary amongst friends, who could confide in each other. At the entrance of the Garden they placed this inscription: "The hospitable keeper of this mansion, where you will find pleasure the highest good, will present you liberally with barley-cakes and water fresh from the spring. The gardens will not provoke your appetite by artificial dainties, but satisfy it with natural supplies. Will you not be well entertained ?”

The Garden has often been called a sty; and the name of Epicurean has become the designation of a sensualist. But, in spite of his numerous assailants, the character of Epicurus has been rescued from contempt, both by ancient and by modern critics. Diogenes Laertius, who gives some of the accusations

in detail, easily refutes them by an appeal to facts; and the modern writers have been at no loss to discover the motive of the ancient calumnies, which mostly proceeded from the Stoics. A doctrine like that of Epicurus would, at all times, lend itself to gross misrepresentation; but in an epoch like that in which it appeared, and contrasted with a doctrine so fiercely opposed to it as the doctrine of the Stoics, we cannot wonder if the bitterness of opposition translated itself into bitter calumny. It is one of the commonest results of speculative differences to make us attribute to our opponent's opinions the consequences which we deduce from them, as if they were indubitably the consequences he deduces for himself. Our opinions are conducive to sound morality; of that we are convinced; and being so convinced, it is natural for us to believe that contrary opinions must be immoral. Our opponent holds contrary, ergo immoral opinions; and we proclaim his immorality as an unquestionable fact. In this, however, there is a slight forgetfulness, namely, that our opponent occupies exactly similar ground, and what we think of him, he thinks of us.

The Stoics had an ineffable contempt for the weakness and effeminacy of the Epicureans. The Epicureans had an ineffable contempt for the spasmodic rigidity and unnatural exaggeration of the Stoics. They libelled each other; but the libels against the Epicureans have met with more general credit than those against the Stoics, from the more imposing character of the lat ter, both in their actions and doctrines.

Epicurus is said to have been the most voluminous of all Greek Philosophers, except Chrysippus; and although none of these works are extant, yet so many fragments are preserved here and there, and there is such ample testimony as to his opinions, that there are few writers of whose doctrine we can speak with greater certainty; the more so as it does not in itself present any difficulties of comprehension.

Nothing can be more unlike Plato and Aristotle than Epicurus; and this difference may be characterized at the outset by

their fundamental difference in the conception of Philosophy, which Epicurus regarded as the Art of Life, and not the Art of Truth. Philosophy, he said, was the power (svépyɛα) by which Reason conducted man to happiness. The investigations of Philosophy he despised: they were not only uncertain, but contributed nothing towards happiness; and of course Logic, the instrument of Philosophy, found no favor in his sight. His system was, therefore, only another form of Skepticism, consequent on his dissatisfaction with previous systems. Socrates had taught men to regard their own nature as the great object of investigation; but man does not interrogate his own nature out of simple curiosity, or for simple erudition: he studies his nature in order that he may improve it; he learns the extent of his capacities in order that he may properly direct them. The aim, therefore, of all such inquiries must be Happiness. And what constitutes Happiness? Upon this point systems differ: all profess to teach the road to Happiness, and all point out divergent roads. There can be little dispute as to what is Happiness, but infinite disputes as to the way of securing it.* In the Cyrenaic and Cynic Schools we saw this question leading to very opposite results; and the battle we are now to see renewed on similar ground between the Epicureans and the Stoics.

Epicurus, like Aristippus, declared that Pleasure constituted Happiness; all animals instinctively pursue it, and as instinctively avoid Pain. Man should do deliberately that which animals do instinctively. Every Pleasure is in itself good; but, in comparison with another, it may become an evil. The Philosopher differs from the common man in this: That while they both seek Pleasure, the former knows how to forego certain enjoyments which will cause pain and vexation hereafter; whereas, the common man seeks only the immediate enjoyment. The

* At a meeting of Socialists in London, to discuss in a friendly way the means of reforming the world, M. Pierre Leroux rose and addressed his brethren thus: "Nous voulons arriver au Paradis, n'est-ce pas ? n'est-ce pas? Eh bien! il ne s'agit que d'y arriver ! Voilà!"

Philosopher's art enables him to foresee what will be the result of his acts; and, so foreseeing, he will not only avoid those enjoyments which occasion grief, but know how to endure those pains from which surpassing pleasure will result.

True happiness, then, is not the enjoyment of the moment, but the enjoyment of the whole life. We must not seek to intensify, but to equalize; not debauchery to-day and satiety tomorrow, but equable enjoyment all the year round. No life can be pleasant except a virtuous life; and the pleasures of the body, although not to be despised, are insignificant when compared with those of the soul. The former are but momentary; the latter embrace both the past and future. Hence the golden rule of Temperance. Epicurus not only insisted on the necessity of moderation for continued enjoyment, he also slighted, and somewhat scorned, all exquisite indulgences. He fed moderately and plainly. Without interdicting luxuries, he saw that Pleasure was purer and more enduring if luxuries were dispensed with. This is the ground upon which Cynics and Stoics built their own exaggerated systems. They also saw that simplicity was preferable to luxury; but they pushed their notion too far. Contentedness with a little, Epicurus regarded as a great good; and he said, wealth consisted not in having great possessions, but in having small wants. He did not limit man to the fewest possible enjoyments: on the contrary, he wished him in all ways to multiply them; but he wished him to be able to live upon little, both as a preventive against ill fortune, and as an enhancement of rare enjoyments. The man who lives plainly has no fear of poverty, and is better able to enjoy exquisite pleasures.

Virtue rests upon Free Will and Reason, which are inseparable: since, without Free Will our Reason would be passive, and without Reason our Free Will would be blind. Every thing, therefore, in human actions which is virtuous or vicious depends on man's knowing and willing. Philosophical education consists in accustoming the Mind to judge accuratety, and the Will to choose manfully.