T

HE Russian army in point of size is colossal. By a recent Act of the Duma its strength, on a peace footing, has been fixed at 2,200,000 men, and in time of war this number is increased to 5,500,000. The strength of an army, however, is not necessarily commensurate with its size. Ten years ago, on the fields of Manchuria, our army was shot to pieces, and after a series of ignominious defeats was forced to surrender all along the line. As a result, Russia was compelled to sign the Treaty of Portsmouth, which amounted to a full confession of complete failure. Much has since been written about that war, and the reasons for our failure are now well known. We had wonderful soldiers-patient and hardened-who fought and died bravely; but our officers were good for nothing. The generals in command were uneducated, incompetent, and cowardly, while their subordinates, as a rule, were lacking in enthusiasm, understanding, and a sense of duty.

Since that time ten years have elapsed. Many things have changed in Russia, and among them the army; but has there been any improvement in the character and qualifications of the officers? In Manchuria the Commander-in-Chief was General Kuropatkin, who had won high honors in the RussoTurkish war, who had been at one time War Minister, and who was generally popular among both officers and men. In the present struggle the Commander-in-Chief is the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch, who, outside of the army circle in Petrograd where he once held command, is little known and has no popularity. Between him and the army that he directs there are as yet no ties. The appointment of a member of the Royal family to supreme command is not enough, in itself, to weld the army into a compact and enthusiastic whole. The time has passed when the magic word "Czar" or Grand Duke " was enough to incite the masses to heroic deeds.

As for the lesser generals, they are entirely incompetent. They lost the war with Japan through their blunders, and on the basis of my military experience I am bold enough to say that in the ten years which have since elapsed they have hardly improved. We no

longer have such brilliant and talented generals as Suvorov, Kutuzoff, and Skobeleff— leaders who could weld the army into a strong and obedient machine, and at the same time love, understand, and respect the soldier. They are gone, and their places have not been filled.

As for the subordinate ranks the commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies they are little better. In such a war as that which is now raging the lower grades of officers necessarily play great rôles. Moments are not infrequent when the whole army falls apart, and when problems common to it as a whole are resolved into thousands of smaller ones, which must be dealt with by separate companies or battalions. The line of battle extends for many miles, and at every point of it larger or smaller groups are carrying on obstinate, incessant, and more or less independent fights. In such circumstances the soldiers naturally look to their company and regimental officers for understanding and direction; but the latter very often are ignorant of geography, cannot read maps, and do not even know where they are. In maneuvers in which I participated near Moscow in 1913 the disorder and disorganization of the whole army were perfectly apparent. The officers did not even know the lay of the land over which they led their troops. For example:

We met the "Twelfth " marching through the woods.

"Where are the enemy, Captain Neduziroff?" asked our commander.

"The devil only knows!"

Perhaps so. To hell with these maps! I never could understand them, even at school."

This was the way in which our companies solved their problems. It is not hard to imagine how our military commanders wandered around in Manchuria if, only twenty miles from Moscow, they could not make their way about, even with the aid of maps.

In

After the Japanese War a law was enacted which enlarged the corps of officers and raised the standard of practical and theoretical training. Under this law, which took effect only last year, candidates for admission to the corps of officers must have studied not less than six years in a gymnasium. Formerly those who had had four years of gymnasium work were accepted. They are now obliged to serve two years instead of one year as heretofore, and to pass an examination at the end of the first year, before attaining the lowest commissioned rank. Formerly a candidate had to serve only six weeks before receiving a commission. Theoretically, this law was expected not only to increase the numerical strength of the corps of officers but to raise its intellectual level. In practice, however, it has not so worked out, partly for the reason that the examinations are generally perfunctory and in many cases farcical. order to pass the first examination (for the rank of soldier) the candidate is supposed to know the contents of an elementary booklet of seventy pages. On his second examination (for the rank of non-commissioned officer) he is expected to be familiar with a book of one hundred and fifty pages; and finally, on his third examination (for the rank of captain or praporshchik), he must have mastered a text-book of two hundred and fifty pages. The last of these examinations, which is conducted by the officers of a different regiment, is the only one that is at all rigid, and even that, for various reasons, is far from exacting. Men are often given commissions when they are totally ignorant of military science. Of the soldiers who served with me, seventy or eighty were made captains (praporshchiks), but ninety per cent of them were not fit to be intrusted with the command of one hundred men in battle. It should be noted, however, in fairness, that officers appointed from the ranks are often quite as capable as those

who have completed their education in special military corps or schools. Ignorance of fundamental problems of tactics and strategy, unfamiliarity with geography and military history, and inability to read maps-all these are deficiencies that are common even among our older officers.

As for our soldiers, eighty per cent of them are absolutely illiterate; and in this respect the army, of course, merely reflects the state of public education in Russia generally. In the Manchurian campaign the illiterate Russian soldier was opposed by a Japanese who was comparatively well educated and intelligent, and who could read, without aid, the map with which he was furnished. In modern warfare moments often occur when even the private soldier must have some acquaintance with the problems that come, or may come, to his regiment for solution. One after another his officers are killed or wounded; and in the Manchurian campaign it frequently happened that all the Russian officers in a company or a battalion were put out of action, and the command devolved upon the common soldiers. While the Japanese private, with a perfect knowledge of the problems involved, could lead his comrades in battle if necessary, the Russian soldiers, deprived of their officers, became disorderly mobs, sowing with their dead bodies the line of their retreat.

If it be said that the German public school teacher, and not the German soldiers alone, won the Franco-Prussian War, it may also be said, with equal truth, that it was the lack of public school teachers, and not lack of courage in the Russian soldiers, that brought about the defeat in Manchuria. The Russian Government, in 1904-5, was in the habit of describing the war between Russia and Japan as a conflict between "cultured" Europe and "semi-barbarous Asia. This legend was widely circulated and believed; but, as a matter of fact, the "semi-barbarous Asiatics were literate and educated, and had a parliament, while education and popular representation had been withheld from the "cultured " Europeans by a despotic Gov

ernment.

In their time, Russians were. wonderful soldiers; but that was when military tactics were not as complicated as they are to-day, and when the soldiers trusted their officers. Now things are changed. During my period of service I witnessed two very important military innovations: first, the equipment of the