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think the Commander-in-Chief has power to decide it." Another Scotchman, on the opposite page, says, "I am not agreeable to soldier under her Majesty, as I was not sworn in for it; that's my reason." An Irishman, next on the list, says, "I've nothing more to say, sir, than that I enlisted for the Honourable East India Company, for ten or twelve years, so long as they required my services; and now they are done away with, I think I'm entitled to my discharge. I only want my discharge, and don't want to re-enlist. I enlisted for the Company only, and not for any corps in her Majesty's service.' An Englishman, whose answer appears on the same page, says, "I enlisted for the Honourable Company for ten years, provided they so long required my services. I understand the Company is now no more, and I consider myself a free man. I wish for my discharge, and to give up soldiering. I swore to serve the East India Company, and to be true to her Majesty, her heirs, and successors, as a civil subject"-the distinction, doubtless, of an intelligent man, who understood the oath he had taken, and who could not readily be persuaded that because he had sworn to be true to the Queen, he had sworn to serve her as a soldier.*

serve the East India Company for twelve or fourteen years, provided the East India Company should so long require my services. Now, the East India Company, so far as regards me, has ceased to exist; and as there is now no Company, they cannot require my services any longer; therefore, legally, my contract is void, and I am a free man. 2. Some have brought forward my oath of allegiance as argument against me. Now, it is well known that that oath is supposed to be taken by every one of her Majesty's subjects, and that no man can obtain a situation under Government without doing so. 3. If the oath of allegiance has power to keep me in my present situation, why does it not form part of my attestation? but it is only mentioned in the deposition made by the magistrate; consequently, as it does not form part of my attestation, it does not bind me in any way further than serving her Majesty loyally, being one of her subjects." We hardly think, however, that this more formal and methodical statement of the case is any improvement upon the simple unpremeditated logic quoted above.

These are fair specimens of the plain, unsophisticated logic of gunners and privates of the old Company's army. But their protests, as we have said, were sometimes put forth in a more lawyer-like shape. Many artillerymen, for example, represented the case according to the following formula:-"I distinctly understood, when I agreed to serve the East India Company, that when that Company should cease to hold power in India (as it has done by an Act of Parliament passed in 1858), its claim upon me also ceased, and therefore I beg to submit the following arguments in my behalf: 1. In my attestation I agreed to

But whether premeditated or unpremeditated, there is nothing disre spectful in all this. The majority of the men did not mean to be disrespectful, and were not at all disaffected. They simply stood out, not merely for what they conceived to be their rights, but what actually were their rights. There appears, however, in some cases, to have been a vague idea of playing at mutineers on a larger scale. There are always some foolish, ill-conditioned men in a regiment, ready to avail themselves of any opportunity that may arise for a row, and not overburdened with any scruples of loyalty or conscience. It would have been marvellous indeed, if, at such a time, there had not been some treasonable correspondence, for the period which succeeds one of active and exciting

See also a demi-official letter, at page 749 of the printed papers, from Lieut.General Beresford to Sir Patrick Grant, in which the former officer narrates a conversation which he held with a man of the Madras Fusiliers- a Scotchman, of better family than soldiers generally are, and well educated"—who appears, at some length, to have enunciated the same view, and supported it with a good deal of argumentative dexterity.

service is always a dangerous crisis in the discipline of an army. A few foolish letters were written about combination, and some senseless, perhaps drunken fellows, scribbled here and there upon the walls some nonsense about marching "to Delhi." But we do not believe that there were half-a-dozen men among the so-called "mutineers" who had any sober, serious intention of doing any thing of the kind. They all, however, declared, very soberly and seriously, that they had no desire to serve the Queen.

Now, it would be almost as absurd to declare that these men had any especial feelings of loyalty and veneration towards the Company, as it was to predict at the time of the transfer that every man, woman, and child, under that great corporation, would shout themselves hoarse with delight at the thought of a more immediate connection with the Crown. The majority, we believe, simply resented the abstract notion of an enforced transfer from one authority to another. Some had an obscure idea that they were condemned by this transfer to the forfeiture of certain acquired rights; and others, doubtless, regarded what might be the practical inconveniences of the change. They had enlisted for service in India, and they apprehended that, once transferred to her Majesty's service, they might be compelled "to soldier" in England, an important consideration, especially to those who had enlisted for the express purpose of leaving the country, and hiding themselves in a foreign land. All these things would have been perfectly clear and intelligible without the aid of three great Blue-books to demonstrate it on the authority of the soldiers themselves. But the authorities in India do not appear, until too late, to have understood the situation. A little timely explanation-a trifling concession at the outset, and the old soldiers of the Company would have become the loyal servants of the Queen. But too much heed was given to the councils of high functionaries, who knew more about laws than about men, and who consulted AdvocatesGeneral instead of their own hearts. This is a mistake which statesmen

are too apt to make. They forget that large bodies of men are only so many individuals, with like passions and appetences and reasoning powers as themselves, and treat them in the concrete as though they were vast machines. A well-judged, assuring speech on parade-a good dinner— a few fireworks-and the promise of a year or two's service to count towards their time of pension-would have made everything run smoothly, and every troop and company in the service would have given three lusty cheers for the Queen.

We have dwelt upon this story of the great strike of the Company's European army at greater length than we had intended, or than its intrinsic importance would warrant, because it has been put forward as the proximate cause of the contemplated abolition of the local service. The argument, we believe, is, that a local army is not likely to be as loyal and as well-disciplined as a line army, and that this fact has been clearly demonstrated by the recent revolt. There are some who have thought it necessary, in support of this argument, to descant upon the general deficiencies of the old Company's European force. It has been said that the local army of India has shown itself to be so wanting in discipline, that it may be fairly pronounced to have signed its own deathwarrant. "Give a dog a bad name -and hang him." The dog is to be hanged; so a bad name must be found for him. But it was not found that he was so very bad a dog when he was flying at the throat of the Bengal tiger-when Neill was crying havoc, and letting him slip at the enemy, gorged with European blood. The magnificent achievements of the Indian artillery, for a century past, are sufficient to make the reputation of any service in the world. When the Bengal artillery and the Royal artillery worked together, in generous emulation, under Lord Clyde, did the great Indian hero, who has just returned to sun his laurels amongst us, draw any distinctions unfavourable to the former? Did Napier and Hardinge, who had served with both, draw any such distinctions? No: they were delighted to declare, on every possible occasion, that the Ben

gal artillery was unsurpassed by any in the world. This complaint of want of discipline has never been alleged before. It has been trumped up now for the occasion. Some, we believe, have endeavoured to fix its paternity on Lord Clyde. But that eminent soldier, in his farewell address to the Indian army, dwelt emphatically upon the good discipline of both services--the line and the local armyand we have too high an opinion of him to believe that he keeps a vocabulary of praise only for such public occasions.

But however ill-founded the charge against it may be, it is certain that the doom of the local army is sealed. As we write, a bill is before Parliament for the suspension of enlistments for such service. As with well-nigh all Indian measures, public discussion is not invited until the session is nearly at an end, and then legislation is hurried through in a most unseemly manner. Every member of Parliament cares for his holidays, but every member of Parliament does not care for the Indian army. We would have wished, therefore, that the subject had been discussed at an earlier period. It may be fairly doubted, indeed, whether, in its present poverty of information, Parliament is in a fit state for the discussion of so important a question. Some think that before the question is decided, we ought to know the terms and conditions under which the amalgamation is to take place. Others are of opinion that, until the relative powers of the Secretary of State for India and his Council are determined, the discussion ought not to proceed. These are, doubtless, important considerations, against which are to be arrayed the extreme disadvantages of that continued incertitude, which already is sapping the morale of the Indian army. This evil is so certain and so great, that it is hardly to be balanced by any problematical benefit that may arise from a more leisurely consideration of the question. It is perfectly plain that the decision of that question is not to be determined by mere force of argument. If it were, the published minutes of Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Colonel Durand, Mr Willoughby, Mr Prinsep,

Captain Eastwick, and other great Indian authorities, would have already decided it. But, as it is, we cannot hope that they will affect the eventual result any more than the last new song or the last bon-mot in Punch.

But we believe that, if they were only read, they would extensively influence public opinion. Mr Willoughby's elaborate dissent may, indeed, almost be said to exhaust the subject. We cannot hope, and therefore we shall not attempt to give, in the limited space at our disposal, a satisfactory account of the long array of arguments which it contains. We may state, however, that it satisfactorily demonstrates that the proposed system will be more costly and less effective than the old; that India, whilst it pays for the maintenance of large bodies of Imperial troops, will only have a partial control over their services, and that when at any time those services are required in Europe, Imperial interests are sure to be regarded, to the entire exclusion of all considerations connected with the welfare of India; that an efficient European army in India is less likely to be maintained by a system of reliefs than by the permanent residence in the country of local forces, because the sanitary condition of seasoned troops is always superior to that of new-comers; that the destruction of the local European establishment will lower the character and affect the morale of the native army; that the transfer of the controlling authority to the Horse-Guards will lower the influence and the prestige of the governments of India, will remove nearly all the existing checks on the abuse of patronage, and fatally affect the general military administration of India, which demands more undivided attention and more local experience than the Commander-inChief or the Secretary-at-War can bestow upon it; and, above all, that neither the officers nor the men of a line army are likely to have the same knowledge of, or the same kindly feelings towards, the natives of the country, as those who look to India as their home, instead of regarding themselves as mere birds of passage.

These and other considerations are emphatically urged by Mr Wil

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loughby, and supported with a wealth of argument and illustration which leaves little new to be said upon the subject. We have always thought that the objection which we have placed last in the above list, is the most vital of all, because it affects not only the military service of India, but the entire administration of the country, and our general relations with the people. Every one knows that hitherto many of the most important administrative and diplomatic offices have been held by soldiers nurtured and trained in the bosom of the Company's army; who have looked upon India as the home of their adoption, and had no thought of distinction on any other theatre of action. This system of employing a large number of military officers on extra- regimental duties may have had some concomitant evils; but we incline to think that they have been greatly overrated. Mr T. G. Baring, Under-Secretary of State for India, put the case in a clever and telling manner, when he said, in the course of the debate on the second reading of Sir Charles Wood's Bill-"Let honourable members for a moment imagine a regiment of British infantry quartered at Portsmouth, its major being governor of the Isle of Man, its senior captain master of Westminster School, another of its officers at the head of the Irish Constabulary, a fourth negotiating the commercial treaty in Paris, a fifth a major of militia, a sixth employed in the construction of the Caledonian Canal, and a seventh engaged in superintending the construction of a harbour in Galway, and they would have some idea of the way in which European officers were employed in India previous to the mutiny." Perhaps, considering the multifarious duties in which officers of the Indian army are employed, the analogy is not much overstrained. But it might have been replied, that if the establishment of officers nominally attached to a regiment is calculated upon a numerical scale intended to admit of

We

the absence of a certain number of officers at a time, and if that number is not exceeded, no great harm is done after all. The regimental training is decidedly advantageous; and it appears now to be the opinion of some highly competent authorities that many European officers are not wanted with native regiments, and that the Irregular system is the best. When a regiment is on service, more officers may be required; but then the rules of the service, no less than practice and inclination, provide that officers on Staff employ should rejoin their respective corps. have seen, to our astonishment, some statements to the contrary; and it has even been said that when in England we hear so much, on the sudden breaking-out of war, of officers rushing back to join their regiment, the movement only indicates that a certain number of officers are rushing back to join lucrative appointments on the Staff. But this is not, and, we may add, never has been the case. During the Indian mutiny, we believe that every officer was at the post where his services were most required. It was so sudden, and so disastrous in its suddenness, that officers could not rejoin their regiments before they heard that their comrades had been shot down, and their sepoys marched off for Delhi. And assuredly they were of more service to their country at the court of a native prince, keeping him true to his allegiance, or preserving by their influence and authority a whole district in peace and tranquillity, than by going to their regiments to be shot like dogs. But this crisis of the Indian mutiny was altogether of an exceptional character. Who, with any knowledge and experience, doubts that when the war in Affghanistan commencedwe cannot say "broke out," for it was deliberately undertaken-officers threw up their Staff appointments and rushed back eagerly to their corps?* Who doubts that they did the same when war with

"There was not an officer in the army who did not long to join the invading force; and many from the distant presidency, or from remote provincial stations, leaving the quiet Staff appointments, which had lapped them so long in ease and luxury, rushed upwards to join their regiments."-KAYE'S History of the War in Afghanistan.

China was declared, and when the Sikhs invaded our borders? We can conceive, indeed, nothing more unjust than an imputation of this kind levelled against the officers of the Company's army, who have since the days of Clive, like that great hero, been "immoderately addicted to fighting," and have never shrunk from it when they have had a chance.

But if this system has some inherent defects, surely they are not to be remedied in the manner proposed. The real question to be determined is, how we are to improve the existing military system without injury to the general administration of the country. What we want to do is to keep India without fighting for it; but if any large number of civil and political appointments are placed in the hands of men of slight Oriental training, and with no Oriental sympathies, we may be sure that ere long we shall be fighting for India instead of governing in peace. Nothing struck Mr Wilson more, on his first arrival in India, than the difference between the line and the local officers in respect of their treatment of the natives of the country. Newcomers are almost always haughty, insolent, and even cruel, towards the natives, and the officers of line regiments have, hitherto, rarely become more considerate towards them throughout the whole period of their residence in India. Looking upon themselves as mere birds of passage, they take little interest in the people, and are seldom at the pains to study and to understand their character and feelings. Any enlarged sympathy with Blackey" is held to be a disreputable weakness. But men who feel that their lot is cast in Indiathat Indian administration is in some shape or other the profession of their lives, who have no hankering after the clubs of St James's and the salons of Belgravia, deem it no weakness to sympathise with the feelings of the natives, and to study their languages, their customs, and their institutions. The Indian army has never yet been wanting in firstrate administrators and diplomatists. But we do not feel quite so sure that, when appointments of this kind are

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scrambled for by line officers, the same number of Malcolms, Munros, and Lawrences will come to the front.

Are we to believe that anything but the feeling that India is their legitimate sphere of action, can keep men up to this high mark? Are mere strangers and pilgrims, who vote India a bore, and are eager to abridge their period of exile as much as possible, likely to run the risks and to incur the sacrifices by which alone we are enabled to do great things? Mr Baring, whose speech we have already quoted, pointed out the fine field of action which lies open to the enterprise of Great Britain, and spoke of the independent achievements of young men like Eldred Pottinger, Herbert Edwardes, and Willoughby Osborne. But all that he said on this subject sounded to us like an eloquent protest against the abolition of that local service, which has given us these young heroes. It was the old system that made these men-that made a succession of such men-and why should we seek to change it? They went out to India with no interestwith no recommendations beyond their own personal character. They made their way to the front rank by their own heroic exertions, fostered by a system which throws no cold shade over the manly efforts of the middle classes. Will men appointed to line regiments in England, taking their tour of duty in India, ever have the same generous ambition to distinguish themselves in wild scenes of Indian adventure? An Indian career may be regarded by them as a chapter in varied life; but it will not fill the book of their lives; it will not be a whole, but a part; and as such, will never develop the same energies or incite to the same persistent action. This may be said to be mere conjecture, but it is conjecture based upon experience.

This is the Indian view of the question; but it is probable that there are many of our readers who will be more inclined to take an English view of it, and to consider the immense power which all this increase of patronage will confer upon the Government of the day. If it be intended, as we conclude,

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