were granted, it is absolutely necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted, and from accepting what does not follow from the words in which our concessions were made. For the inference is now not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted. We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and such change and variation of them (from one meaning to another), by which in the course of questioning or answering, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other such way, the premises undergo variations, and give occasion to the foolish to Le confounded, if they do not see what conclusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to examino? In order that we may not in this matter be employed in an improper manner nor in a confused way.

And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments; for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is proposed, or not allow every one? And if not every one, which should we allow? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis, must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must be sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man says, If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will draw you to an impossibility. With such a person shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a contest, and avoid discussion and conversation with him? But what other man than the man of senso can use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and answering, and B, every B is also A, he might answer that it is. But if you put the conversion in this material form: "Every goose is an animal," ho immediately perceives that he cannot say, “Every animal is a goose." What does this show? It shows that the man's comprehension of the proposition, every A is B, was not truc, and that ho took it to mean something different from what the person intended who put tho question. He understood that A and B were coextensive. Whether we call this reasoning or something else, makes no matter. A man whose understanding is sound cannot in the nature of things reason wrong; but his understanding of the matter on which he reasons may be wrong sonicwhere, and he may not be able to discover where. A man who has been trained in the logical art may show him that his conclusion is just according to his understanding of the terms and the propositions employed, but yet it is not true.

incapable of being cheated and deceived by false reasoning? And shall he enter into the contest, and yet not take caro whether he shall engage in argument not rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how can he be such a man as we conceive him to be? But without some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a continuous and consistent argument? Let them show this; and all these speculations (Oewpnuara) become superfluous, and are absurd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious man.

Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father? Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could kill him? What then have you done? The only fault that was possible hero is the fault which you have committed. This is the very remark which I mado to Rufus' when he blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted in a certain syllogism: I suppose, I said, that I have burnt the Capitol. Slave, he replied, was the thing omitted here the Capitol? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Capitol and to kill your father? But for a man to use the appearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and carelessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration, nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and answering what is consistent with that which we have granted or is not consistent; is there no error in this?

Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. 1). To kill a father and to burn the Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp. Horace, Epode, iii.; Cicero, De Amicit. c. 11; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus, c. 20.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE FACULTIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED.

2

In as many ways as we can change things which are equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we can change the forms of arguments (mixeрnμara) and enthymemes (èvovμýpara) in argumentation. This is an instance: if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe me the money you havo not borrowed and you have not repaid; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skilfully is suitablo to no man more than to the philosopher; for if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be equally expert in the imporfect also.

Why then do wo not exercise ourselves and one another in this manner? Because, I reply, at present, though we are not exercised in these things and not distracted from the study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an occupation which would withdraw us from moro necessary things, but would also bo a canso of self-conceit and arroganco, and no small cause. For great is the power of arguing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it should be much exercised, and also receive additional ornament from banguage: and so universally, every faculty acquired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the danger of those persons being clated

The faculties, as Wolf says, are the faculties of speaking and arguing, which, as he also says, mako men arrogant and careless who have no solid knowledge, according to Bion's maxim, à yàp olnois ¿YKORN TAS TроKowns dσri, “arrogance (self-conceit) is a hindrance to improvement." Seo viii. 8..

Things mean "propositions" and "terms." Sco Aristot. Annlyt. Prior. i. 33), δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, &c. Επιχειρήματα aro argu ments of any kind with which wo attack (wixeipeiv) an adversary.

• The Enthymeme is defined by Aristotle: ἐνθύμημα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων ἢ σημείων (Anal. Prior. ii. c. 27). He has explained, in the first part of this chapter, what he means by eixos aud σημεῖον. Soo also De Morgan's Formal Logic, p. 237; and P. C. Organon, p. 6, note.

and inflated by it. For by what means could one persuado a young man who excels in these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage to them, but to make them an appendage to himself? Does he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he has turned aside?

What then was not Plato a philosopher? I reply, and was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippocrates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speak thus in respect of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which have been accidentally united in the same men? And if, Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men become philosophers, and what things belong to them in other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you also to be made lame? What then? Do I take away these faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask mo what is the good of man, I cannot mention to you anything else than that it is a cortain disposition of the will with respect to appearances.7

A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of speaking, his chief excellence. Ho should use it to set off something which is superior.

Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician. Epictetus was lame.

In i. 20, 15, Epictetus defines the being (ovola) or nature of good to be a proper use of appearances; and he also says, i. 29, 1, that the nature of the good is a kind of will (poalpeσis woid), and the nature of evil is a kind of will. But Schweighaeuser cannot understand how the "good of man" can be "a certain will with regard to appearances;" aud he suggests that Arrian may have written, "a certain will which makes uso of appearances."

CHAPTER IX.

HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN

MAY PROCEED TO THE CONSEQUENCES.

If the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man, what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world (xóoμos). For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensivo community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings-for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with him 2-why

Cicero, Tuscul. v. 37, has the same: "Socrates cum rogaretur, enjatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. Totius euim muudi se incolum et civem arbitrabatur." (Upton.)

It is the possession of reason, he says, by which man has communion with Gol; it is not by any external means, or religious ceremonial. A modern expositor of Epictetus says, "Through reason our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the deity as though they were part of him" (Epictet. i. 14, G; ii. 8, 11. 17, 33). In tho Epistle named from l'eter (ii. 1, 4) it is written: "Whereby are given tous exceeding great anl precious promises that by these (see v. 8) ye might be partakers of the divino nature (yévnobe belas Kouwvol pureus), having escaped the corruption that is in the world through Just." Mrs. Carter, Introduction, § 31, has some remarks on this Stoic doctrine, which are not a true explanation of the principles of Epic

tetus and Antoninus.