Obrázky na stránke
PDF
ePub

CHAPTER XXI.

AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.

WHEN a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim O the great philosopher. Who are they by whom you wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say, that they are mad? Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen?

CHAPTER XXII.

ON PRAECOGNITIONS.1

PRAECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and praecognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And

Praccognitions (wpoλúveis) is translated Praccognita by John Smith, Select Discourses, p. 4. Cicero nys (Topica, 7): “Notionem appello quod Greci tumn ἔννοιαν, tum πρόληψιν dicunt. En est insita et aute percepta cujusque formae cognitio, enodationis indigens.' In the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: "Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quan. dam deorum, quam appellat póλny Epicurus? id est, antcceptam nuimo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest." Epicurus, as Cicero says in the following chapter (17), was the first who used póλns in this sense, which Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innato cognitions of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be universal; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See i. c. 2; Tuscul. i. 24; De Fin. iii. 6, and wpóλmyɩs in iv. 8. 6.

who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction ariso? It arises in the adaptation of the praccognitions to tho particular cases. When one man says, He has done well: he is a brave man, and another says, "Not so; but ho has acted foolishly;" then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles ;3 for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? Certainly. Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? I do most certainly. Adapt your praccognitions then to the present matter. Hero the disputo begins. Agamemnon says, I ought not to givo up Chryseis to her father. Achilles says, You ought. It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praccognition of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, Then if I ought to restoro Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you. Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" Yes, her whom you love. Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize? Thus the dispute begins.*

What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not: in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of

The word is örtov, which is very difficult to translate. We may take an instance from ourselves. There is a general agreement about integrity, and about the worship of the supreme being, but a wondrous difference about certain acts or doings in trading, whether they aro consistent with integrity or not; and a still more wondrous difference in forms of worship, whether they are conformable to religion or not. Horace, Epp. i. 2.

Iliad, i. The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up Chryseis to her father.

the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and generally, all with whom we live in society. In what then should we place the good? To what kind of things (otoia) shall we adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny

this?

Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things. Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? It is not possible. And can he maintain towards society a proper behaviour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath." This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he cannot help me; and further, what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.

This is the inquiry of the
Now I do not see

What should we do then? true philosopher who is in labour."

The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had tho opportunity of carrying off a bather's clothes. From men's desires to have what they have not, and do not choose to labour for, spring the disorders of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. 1, to which Mrs. Carter refers.

• See i. 19. 6, note 2.

Upton refers to a passage in the Theaetetus (p. 150, Steph.), where Socrates professes that it is his art to discover whether a young man's mind is giving birth to an idol (an unreality) and a falsity, or to something productive and true: and he says (p. 151) that those who associate with him are jike women in child-birth, for they are in labour and full of trouble nights and days much more thau women, and his

what the Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad? Yes. But suppose that I place the good somewhere among the things which depend on the will: all will laugh at me. There will come some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and he will shake his head and say, Hear, my child. It is right that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some brains also: all this that you aro doing is silly. You learn the syllogism from philosophers; but you know how to act better than philosophers do.-Man, why then do you blame me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: Excuse me, aз you would excuse lovers: I am not my own master: I am mad.

CHAPTER XXIII.

AGAINST EPICURUS.

EVEN Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social, but having once placed our good in the husk he is no longer able to say anything else. For on the other hand he strongly maintains this, that we ought not to admire nor to accept any thing which is detached from the nature of good; and he is right in maintaining this. How then are we [suspicious], if we have no natural affection to our children? Why do you advise the wise man not to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may thus fall into

2

art has the power of stirring up and putting to rest this labour of child-birth.

The conclusion in the chapter is not clear. The student is supposed to be addressed by some rich old man, who really does not know what to say; and the best way of getting rid of him and his idle talk is by dismissing him with a joke. Sec Schweighacuser's note.

That is in the body; see i. 20, 17. Compare ii. 20, at the beginning of the chapter.

The word wovoNTiKoi is not intelligible. Schweighaeuser suggests that it ought to be rрovonтixoi, “how have we any care for others ?" Epicurus taught that we should not marry nor beget children nor engage in public affairs, because these things disturb our tranquillity.

trouble? For docs he fall into trouble on account of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamentation to him? But Epicurus knows that if once a child is born, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who has any sense also does not engage in political matters; for he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you? But Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own offspring, nor yet a wolf; and shall a man desert his child? What do you mean? that we should be as silly as sheep? but not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well, who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping after falling on the ground? For my part I think that even if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle, that you would say what you have said, they would not have cast you away.

CHAPTER XXIV.

HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES.

Ir is circumstances (difficulties) which show what men
arc.1 Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you, re-
member that God, liko a trainer of wrestlers, has matched
you with a rough young man. For what purpose? you
may say. Why that you may become an Olympic con-
queror; but it is not accomplished without sweat.
my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficulty
than you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an
athlete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now

So Ovid says, Trist. iv. 3, 79:

"Quae latet inque bonis cessat non cognita rebus,

Apparet virtus arguiturque malis."

In

t

« PredošláPokračovať »