less added to one-third more of these charges exceeds a half; but admit that it were only a half, is it no object to the owners of this vessel, to save £56. 6s. a year? Suppose the owners to have six vessels of the same size, and at the same rate. The difference on their charges on tonnage and light dues, according to 's shewing, may be made more or less on the same register tonnage by upwards of £200 a year. And is this no object to the owners? I shall pass over 's misstatements and false deductions, till I arrive at the middle of the first paragraph on page 163, and that I may not misrepresent either the letter or spirit of the article, I shall quote it for the purpose of making some observations on it. says, "It seems to be quite forgotten by these writers that the main object in going to sea, is to bring the cargo home safe, (cheaply, to be sure, but still in good order;) that if any damage arises from deficiency in the ship, the ship-owner is liable personally, not the underwriter; that even if the underwriter has to pay the damage, that the ship's character is lost. 66 And with whom is the ship's character lost? Surely not with the merchant whose goods have been protected from loss, and who, consequently, has suffered no loss. Is it with the underwriter, then? The underwriter knows full well, that, were there no losses or damages to ships and goods at sea, there would be no sea insurances; and, moreover, that the more losses and damages there are at sea, as a matter of course, the higher the premiums on ships and goods rise, and that as he is provided with funds from the ship-owners and merchants to pay these damages, and which funds are charged upon the goods, it is to his interest that losses and damages should take place. As to merchants refusing to ship in her what unconscionable fellows these merchants must be, to refuse to ship in a vessel by which they have suffered no loss? She has made an average, the merchants refuse to ship in her; another and a better ship steps in and takes her place." Now, I respectfully submit that the main object is nothing of the kind stated by , and that the main, and only object is, to make money, as Mercator says in the Nautical Magazine of January last. From the same reason it happens that, when a cargo is delivered with damage, the ship-master is accustomed to call an exparte survey for his own exoneration, without the knowledge of the consignee, who, in general, takes no interest whatever in the inquiry, but is satisfied when he learns that a survey has been held by the elders, the uniform result of which renders it unnecessary for him to call for its production. Few instances are known of surveys, so called, in absence of a representative of the injured party, ever finding that the ship is liable. - Remarks on the Averages of Hamburgh. But suppose the survey held in London, and the merchant and underwriter to be personally present at it, can they or say what constitutes a deficiency in the ship, so as to make the ship-owner liable? Is not the underwriter, in general, brought in liable for the damage, and is he not provided with the means of paying it, and a reversion of profit left after paying it, by the premiums which he has received, or is to receive, on that cargo, and other vessels and their cargoes? If he is not able to pay, he must become insolvent, and abandon the trade. In few words, what is sea-worthiness? " Can , or any of your readers, define it? But says, that "another and a better ship steps in, and takes her place." Admitting to mean that a better ship is hauled on the berth and advertised for the voyage, it does not follow that she will take the trade from the vessel which damaged her cargo. The vessel which did so, must either be repaired or not. If she be repaired, she is probably a better ship than she was when she damaged her cargo. If she be not repaired, it is quite right that "another and a better ship should step in and take her place." But I make no doubt that a newer ship would get a preference. Hence all motive or inducement is taken from a ship-owner to get a ship that will last, and be safe at sea. Safety, shape, form, quality, condition, materials, workmanship, every thing, is sacrificed to newness. Hence a ship-owner's whole object is to get the cheapest vessel he can, keep her insured, let her be lost when she is near wearing off the first letter, get the sum she was insured for, buy another new vessel at the cheapest rate with this sum, and again run the same round. I ask if, owing to the fatal system under which merchant ships are classed, this is not the course generally followed by ship-owners? Supposing a carrier's cart of superior construction to have cost £10, and another of inferior construction to have cost only £5, but with which the owner can earn as much money as with the one which cost £10, and that upon each of these carts becoming twelve years, or twelve months old, a proscriptive mark was put on it, rendering it unprofitable to the owner, and for the same reason to anybody else, and nearly valueless in the market, and that this law or practice was general, and applied to all carriers' carts. What would be the consequence? Why, clearly, that there would be no demand for £10 carts, and none would be made. Changing the words "carrier's cart," for "merchant ship," the case exactly represents the practice of the present day. Should this practice continue to be tolerated, whoever may profit by it? again says, that "these gentlemen seem to think that competition is a thing unknown to the ship-owner." Now, it is well known that age is the great standard by which the existing system is professedly regulated. The effect of this, to a very great extent, is, when a ship has outlived her first character, to compel the owner immediately to sell her, from the impossibility, in a large portion of our carrying trade, to employ any ship to the name of which, the talismanic charm of A, 1, is not appended, and the party so forced to get rid of his ship, from the arbitrary system of regulating her character by age only, immediately supplies her place with a NEW one, THUS CREATING, from the operation of this obnoxious system, AN ADDITIONAL SHIP TO THE PREVIOUSLY EXISTING GLUT, because only an A, 1, can be employed for his purpose, the merchants being governed in their shipments by the practice at Lloyd's, of looking to the class, and not to the intrinsic excellence of a ship. Thus the effect is, that two ships exist instead of one, the party purchasing the older vessel, forcing her into employment also. "Whence sprung the wild mania for building, which has had so large a share in producing the state of things under which we are now so seriously suffering? The answer is obvious, that, on an average of about nine years, every ship registered in the United Kingdom lapses, with utter disregard to her actual condition, however anxious the owner may be to prevent it by the fullest and most complete repair, INTO THE SECOND CLASS; and under the present mode, a first class vessel is regarded as indispensable for a very great proportion of our carrying trade. Here then is a practical illustration, that to a system devised and administered by irresponsible persons, possessing a very limited knowledge of the description of property over which they exercise so serious a power, is to be ascribed a considerable portion of the evils against which the ship-owners of this country have to contend." So says Marshall on the Classification of Shipping. Here then is the real competition against which ship-owners have to contend, for the classification, although altered in name, is the same in spirit and effect as when the above able remarks were written by Marshall; and it is clear to any person who will bestow a little reflection on it, that the system is the real cause of there being such a superfluity of unremunerative British tonnage. Yet, incredible as it may appear to the uninitiated, shipowners do not wish the system altered; and justly observes, "Now, when it is known that, though there occur cases when a total loss may be an advantage to an owner, yet that an average or partial damage is invariably (though insured) a loss in a pecuniary view, it follows that ship-owners must contemplate total losses, which generally involve a loss of life." ⚫ also says, "Bad ships, cheap ships, always will exist, but from a cause perfectly distinct from sea insurance; if insurance were unknown, it would still be the same. If I can do the same work with £1,000 as my neighbour with £2,000, I save in capital, in interest, and, above all, I save in premiums of insurance: whether we both risk the whole, or only nine-tenths, I still have the advantage." The first of these statements, I pointedly deny. If sea insurance did not exist, no man would risk his property in such shells, sieves, and wholesale coffins as are now built and sent to sea. If no sea insurance existed, every ship-owner would strive to have the safest ship, to preserve his property from loss. And the next statement I also deny. If can do the same work with £1,000, as his neighbour with £2,000, he can do the same work with £500 as his neighbour with £1,000, with £250 as with £500, with £125 as with £250, and so on; and see where the absurd position leads him to. But, by means of the abuse of sea insurance, and a disregard of safety, he can do the same work with £1000, embarked in a cheap and unsafe ship, as his neighbour can with £2,000, embarked in a good and safe ship of the same size; and here it is, where, at the expense of life and merchandise, he "saves in capital, in interest, and, above all, in premiums of insurance; and this whether he risks the whole, or only nine-tenths." The safe ship, which cost £2000, would be preserved in nine cases out of ten, where the unsafe ship, which cost only £1000, would be lost; and, were it not owing to sea insurance, by means of which, has informed us, that " a total loss may be an advantage to an owner;" and, were 's capital really at stake, he would take good care to have a safe instead of an unsafe ship. This is the true cause of the numerous wrecks and destruction of property In further proof, were any wanting, of the fatal effects of sea insurance in causing shipwrecks, it may be stated, that only three smacks, out of the whole number constantly trading between Dundee and London, (and which vessels were not insured, and consequently it was the owners great object to keep them from being lost,) have been lost in the course of upwards of forty years. Whilst, on the other hand, no less than 250 vessels, most if not all of which were insured, (and consequently it was no great loss to the owners, whether they were lost or not,-in some cases, in all probability they made a gain by it,) have been lost belonging to the Tyne, in the course of the last forty-seven months. at sea. How does account for this fact? and if it be not owing to sea insurance, to what is the safety in the one case and the unsafety in the other to the ascribed? I should like a plain answer to this question, and not assertion without proof, declamation, or tirade. Whilst I make no reflection on ship-owners, as a body, I am at liberty to quote documents, wherever I find them applicable to the case in hand, and the following is a quotation from "The Profits of the Sinking System at Sea," published some years ago. But, again, as respects life, supposing a vessel, of originally faulty construction, with indifferent materials, to have become rickety and battered by age and service, to be put to sea, protected by insurance at twice her worth, does it not immediately become the interest of the owner that she should founder! Will he repel this almost 66 481 self-springing desire, by reflecting upon the loss of life which might, The first cries out for facts; and he shall have them. I shall give is published in the Edinburgh Advertiser, so far back as 11th October, 1825. It is there stated, in reference to the smacks in the trade between Leith and London, in which there were twenty-one vessels then employed, and a capital of £100,000 embarked in them, "That the whole profits, after allowing the usual per centage, paying expenses, and keeping up the stock, by meeting and providing against deterioration, &c., have not averaged £10,000 per annum, of which £8000 would have been required to pay insurance, had the Company not taken their own risks, so that the real profits (after allowing for such insurances, had the Company, or shareholders of the Company, not taken them on themselves) have only been about two per cent per annum." This, I think, shews pretty strongly the profit to the ship-owner of having well-constructed, manned, provided, and equipt vessels, and diminishing the extent of his insurance. Had it not been for the pestiferous influence exercised over the construction of all merchant vessels, whether they were intended to be insured or not, by the abuse of marine insurance, which, it is quite clear, operates to prohibit all improvements in naval construction, and, like the simoom of the desert, blights, blasts, and withers everything within range of its influence, these vessels (the smacks) would have been built much stronger and safer. The cause producing this effect is still, it is to be regretted, in full operation. The second fact is, that in 1833 upwards of 800 British merchant vessels were lost, while not one British ship of war was lost. How is this fact to be accounted for? Simply by the improved construction, or solidity of bottom, inherent in the vessels of war, and which was wanting in the merchant vessels. This fact is further proved, were further proof wanted, from the circumstance of several vessels of war having that year been ashore in storms and tremendous gales of wind, on rocks, rocky shores, and sand-banks exposed to the open sea, (the Goodwin, &c.) and yet all of them preserved. This fact completely deprives the opponents of safety, of the argument of which they wish to avail themselves, of attributing the safety of the vessels of war to the NO. 54.-VOL. v. 3 P |