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Pers. 5, 170: Chaerestratus will attempt to free himself from a disreputable life (see Gildersleeve's translation of lines 161175). Stat. Theb. 3, 241 neu me temptare precando certetis: the speaker will have a request addressed to him (ne pugnate is the usual reading earlier in the verse, and is probably correct). Stat. Silv. 4, 9, 55: a friend, having received some of the speaker's verses, will send some of his own in reply (in a spirit of fun). Mart. 11, 55, 2: Urbicus will have an own child to inherit his property rather than a scheming pretended friend. Pseud.-Quint. 201, 9: the speaker himself indicates the insignificant result of non-compliance, by the following ne videaris,
Vespa 62: the speaker, a cook, will lose a debate on the relative merits of his own calling as compared with that of a baker. Auson. 296, 83: no one will ever so much as know Sen. Troad. 553 (562): whether these prohibitions are complied with or not.
Apul. 7, 5 (146, 3): the speaker will not be recognized as the famous robber he claims to be.
Curt. Ruf. 4, 1, 22 (reading uncertain): the person addressed will forget that he was once poor.
Curt. Ruf. 4, 10, 26: the person addressed will spare the speaker's feelings so far as possible in narrating what has happened. Apul. 2, 10 (30, 6): a mere jest, disregarded (and meant to be disregarded) alike by the speaker and the person addressed (to the ecstatic happiness of both of them).
Auson., p. 301, 1. 190 (Peiper): the speaker will be blamed, but he considers such blame of too little account to cause any change in his manner of living.
It should be remembered that the cases above cited are only those that are, according to Clement, least favorable to my theory. I am passing by unnoticed the much larger number of those that are admitted by Clement himself to support the theory. It will be seen, then, that out of the total of 63 instances of ne (neve) and cave with the present subjunctive, cited by Clement, there remain only 7 in which the result would be disastrous, if the prohibition were not to be heeded. One of these-Baehrens 3, p. 300 (ne referas)-can hardly be regarded as having any weight, as this is a perfectly formal prayer of the cheeriest kind. The assurance of safety and divine favor breathes through the entire prayer. There is therefore nothing to call forth energetic utterance. In the remaining 6 instances (Avian. 9, 23; Dracont. 5, 273; Stat. Theb. 3, 665; 6, 893; Mart. 6, 78, 3; Curt. 7, 8, 28) the acts prohibited are of such a character as naturally to call forth energetic utterance. But two of these are instances of cave, and can therefore hardly have as much weight as similar instances in Plautus, as the perfect with cave had, generally speaking, long
since gone out of use (see above). Our examination of the present tense has, then, resulted in showing that over 90 per cent. (93 per cent.?) of the instances (57 (59?) out of a total of 63) are in perfect accord with my theory. Of the 6 (4?) exceptions it is enough to say that, when a man is alarmed at a threatening danger he does not always use the most energetic expression that a language affords.
On p. 165 Clement takes "at random" numerous examples of the present tense and states what the disastrous results would be in case of a failure to comply with the prohibition. An examination of the passages referred to (one has to search for them, as citations are omitted) will disclose the fact (a surprising one, no doubt, to Clement) that only 3 of them belong to the phenomena under discussion (i. e. are introduced by ne (neve) or cave; and of these 3 instances, one (Stat. Theb. 3, 241) assumes as correct an uncertain reading (ne pugnare) that is rejected by nearly all editors, and in another (Curt. Ruf. 4, 10, 26 cave auribus parcas) a failure to comply would be quite the opposite of disastrous. In other words, he cites against me only one instance (Mart. 6, 78, 3 bibas caveto) out of a total of 63 instances, and this is with cave, which, as seen above, had before the time of Martial come to be used only with the present tense. And still Clement apparently thinks that he is making out a strong case against my theory!
It is, I hope, clear from the above discussion that the distinction I drew for classical times between ne feceris and ne facias still holds perfectly good (with rare exceptions) in Silver Latin. Whether a similar distinction will hold good for the genuine prohibitions with neque (nec), nihil, numquam, nullus, minime, etc., I can not say. Whether it will or not, is immaterial to the justification of my claim, and I have not therefore examined this part of Clement's collection with this point in view. If it should break down when applied to these instances, this would be a very remarkable fact, and suggestions of the reason for such a state of things would then be in order. The conditions of the problem in this period are very different from those confronting us in the Golden Age. It is beyond all dispute that neque (nec), for instance, had in Silver Latin come to be regarded often as an exact equivalent of neve (neu) and could be used for it at any time and in any sort of clause. But while it is true that the types nec feceris and nec facias are freely used in Silver Latin as prohibitions, it is also true, and quite as undeniably true, that they are in Silver Latin, just as in earlier times, not infrequently used as expressions of mere contingent futurity. As instances of this latter use may be cited Tac. Germ. 14, 5 nec tam facile persuaseris quam, etc. ('nor would you so easily persuade,' etc.); ib. 18, I severa illic matrimonia, nec ullam morum partem magis laudaveris. In such cases nec with the perfect would yield no sense whatever, if treated as a prohibition; such expressions are in modal force exactly like nec crediderim (Tibull. III 4, 83), nec
facile dixerim (Cic. Brut. 41, 151), neque reprehenderim (Cic. orat. 47, 157), etc. Numerous instances might be cited also of nec with the present tense where the only interpretation that makes sense is the one that regards the subjunctive as one of contingent futurity, e. g. Mart. 4, 20, 3 ferre nec hanc possis, Colline; Stat. Silv. 10, 70, 11 nec possis; Tac. Ann. 6, 8 nec adsequare; Liv. 35, 16 nihil aliud profecto dicatis; and often (see Part II of my 'Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses'). It follows from these facts that, even in Silver Latin, wherever it makes as satisfactory sense to interpret such expressions as nec putaveris and nec dicas as meaning 'nor would you think,' 'nor would you say,' as it does to interpret them as prohibitions, no one can properly criticise such an interpretation as impossible. I can not see how any one has a right to say that every instance that makes good sense when interpreted as a prohibition must be so interpreted, and only those that can not be made to yield good sense when interpreted as prohibitions may be regarded as expressions of contingent futurity. Where either one of these interpretations makes as good sense as the other, it is in Silver Latin difficult to decide how the expressions were felt by the Romans themselves. Possibly the two sorts of expressions had by this time become somewhat confused in the Roman consciousness. Such a supposition would, at any rate, account for the remarkable extension in the use of both non and nec in Silver Latin and the inroads they are admitted to have made upon the territory of ne and neve.
In one or two details, the use of ne with the perfect in Silver Latin is shown by Clement to differ from that of earlier times, but my own casual observation had convinced me that such differences exist, and I called attention to them in The Latin Prohibitive (p. 326 (49)), a fact, by the way, which Clement forgets to mention. In early times it was never used in deferential address. In Silver Latin, on the other hand, it is used once in addressing the patres conscripti and in a few other instances where deferential address would, under ordinary circumstances, be expected. It will be noticed, however, that every such case, without exception (see Clement's own classification), is one in which failure to comply will entail a disastrous result. Even in Tac. Ann. 6, 8 (the only instance not so classified by Clement), failure to comply with the prohibition will result in the speaker's condemnation and death. When a man's life depends upon the non-performance of the act prohibited, as it does here, he can hardly be expected to retain perfect composure and observe all the forms of politeness.
It is true that the proportion of verbs of mental activity among prohibitions expressed by ne (neve) and the perfect is somewhat larger in Silver Latin than in earlier times. But this fact is not in the least unfavorable to my theory, if only these particular prohibitions are of such a sort that failure to comply with them will lead to disastrous results. And we have already seen that they are, as admitted in nearly all cases by Clement himself.
One other point should be briefly touched upon. On p. 165 Clement refers to passages in which he says the present and perfect tenses occur side by side in a way to show that no difference was felt between the tenses. Even if ne with the present and ne with the perfect did occur in these passages side by side, I can not see that it would necessarily tend to prove my theory to be false. Why is it necessary to suppose that a man can not prohibit one act with unusual energy, without using the same energy in every other prohibition uttered at about the same time? I should expect that the manner of utterance in each case would ordinarily depend upon the character of the act prohibited, as it appeared to the speaker. However, there is no such instance of the two tenses with ne in prohibitions in any of the passages cited by Clement. In Curt. Ruf. 9, 2, 28 and 29 the first ne-clause is subordinate (oro quaesoque ne deseratis). In Tac. Ann. 6, 8, Clement thinks that nec adsequare is an emotional prohibition, and ne cogitaveritis, "the reverse." As a matter of fact, nec adsequare is not a prohibition at all (see above). On the other hand, ne cogitaveritis, as has been shown, is a prohibition of an act which, if performed, would involve as great a disaster as could well be conceived of. None of the other passages cited contains any instance of ne or cave except Curt. Ruf. 7, 8, 28 f., where ne credideris and cave credas occur in two neighboring sentences. Attention has already been called to the virtual disappearance of the perfect tense with cave.
H. C. ELMER.
ELMER'S TREATMENT OF THE PROHIBITIVE-A REJOINDER.
The editor of the Journal has asked me to reply to Professor Elmer's criticism of my paper, ending the discussion of the prohibitive in these pages. The manner in which Elmer has treated my article makes it possible to discuss his original paper more incisively than the scope of my original investigation permitted.
In his original article (A. J. P. XV 326; 491), Elmer said: "My examination of these (i. e. certain Silver Latin) authors leads me to think it probable that the principles I have laid down for classical times will, in the main, hold also for Silver Latin." This inspired my investigation. I made no attempt to prove the incorrectness of Elmer's distinction for the use of the tenses in prohibitions in the period before Livy, but only its incorrectness for the period I was considering. As Elmer (A. J. P. XX 80, note) commended my "careful examination" of the period when I had spent only a few weeks upon it, instead of the year and a half
1 The first number gives the page of the original article, the second the same page in the reprint.
For the usage in Terence, see my paper in C. R. XV 157–159 (April, 1901).
devoted to the final paper, and as he encouraged me to continue, I can not believe that he is entirely serious in his present criticism of my method of treatment.
One of his first complaints (I shall treat them as they appear in his reply) is that I have brought other things into my discussion, beside "independent prohibitions introduced by ne (neve) and cave"-for example, clauses introduced by vide ne. Here, at the start, we have a lack of exactness in his terminology. He uses the unmodified word "prohibitions," when he ought constantly and consistently to say "independent prohibitions, together with one class of dependent prohibitions, namely those with cave" (for of the dependence of the subjunctive in the latter class there can be no question). Why does Elmer choose to confine himself to the dependent prohibitions introduced by cave? He is bound to state why the phenomena with vide ne are not the same as with cave. It will not do, as a scientific matter, to say that he chooses to confine himself to the construction with cave. If he can make out the case for cave, that fact is interesting, but he can not arrest the interest of other students of Latin at this point. One wants to know not simply what the underlying feeling of Latin usage was in independent prohibitions and dependent prohibitions with cave, but what the Latin feeling was in prohibitions in general.
The same holds true of the subjunctive constructions with nec, nihil, etc. The fact that Elmer regards them as belonging to a different class is no reason why others, who do not so believe, should be debarred from considering them in endeavoring to settle the general question. While he does not mention these subjunctive uses in his first paper on the prohibitive, his treatment of certain passages in that paper and in Cornell Studies, VI is so inconsistent and arbitrary that it is impossible to be certain what his real position is. I will cite a few passages as illustrations.
In the review in the present number of the Journal, he says that I discuss, among other things, "subjunctives with nec, minime, nullus, nemo, nihil, numquam, non and vide," and a little later, "in that part of the Latin Prohibitive which prompted Clement's paper... not a word was said by me regarding the subjunctive uses with nec, nihil, numquam, etc., except an emphatic statement that they lay entirely outside of my theory and had characteristics very different from those of the instances I was going to discuss." Then they are not prohibitive. Very good. Let us see how Elmer himself classifies some of the examples: (1) Ne . . . quidem. In Cic. Tusc. 1, 41, 98 ne vos quidem mortem timueritis is, so Elmer implies (323; 46), not a prohibition; but ne mittas quidem in Ter. Hec. 342 (146; 14) and hoc ... ne Apellae quidem dixeris in Cic. Fam. 7, 25, 2 (150; 18) are placed by him among examples of the prohibitive. (2) Nullus. In Ter. Hec. 79 nullus dixeris is implied to be probably not prohibitive (323; 46); but nullam severis in Hor. Carm. 1, 18, 1 is classed (Studies, VI 26) with the prohibitives (it is plainly a translation of