Not relations of resemblance only, but those of quantity also, treated by Hume as feelings. found?-so Hume must be met in limine by the question whether, apart from such ideas of relation as according to his own showing are not simple impressions, so much as the singular proposition is possible. If not, then the singularity of such proposition does not consist in any singleness of presentation to sense; it is not the particularity in time' of a present feeling; and the exclusion of generality, whether in thoughts or in things, as following from the supposed necessity of such singleness or particularity, is quite groundless. 225. Hitherto the idea of relation which we have had specially in view has been that of relation in the way of resemblance, and the propositions have been such as represent the most obvious facts of observation '-facts about this or that body,' man or horse or ball. We have seen that these already suppose the thought of an object qualified, not transitory as are feelings, but one to which feelings are referred on their occurrence as resemblances or differences between it and other objects; but that by an equivocation, which unexamined phraseology covers, between the thought of such an object and feeling proper-as if because we talk of seeing a man, therefore a man were a feeling of colour -Hume is able to represent them as mere data of sense, and thus to ignore the difference between related feelings and ideas of relation. Thus the first step has been taken towards transferring to the sensitive subject, as merely sensitive, the power of thought and significant speech. The next is to transfer to it ideas of those other relations' which Hume classifies as 'relations of time and place, proportion in quantity or number, degrees in any quality' (p. 368). This done, it is sufficiently equipped for achieving its deliverance from metaphysics. An animal, capable of experiments The course which our examination of time and place, proportion in quan- Hume's own procedure. Whether he considered these relations merely equivalent to the natural ones' of resemblance and contiguity, he does not expressly say; but his reduction of the principles of mathematics to data of sense implies that he did so. The treatment of degrees in quality and proportions in quantity as sensible implies that the difference between resemblance and measured resemblance between contiguity and measured contiguity, is ignored. concerning matter of fact, and of reasoning concerning quantity and number, would certainly have some excuse for throwing into the fire all books which sought to make it ashamed of its animality.' the line Locke 226. In thus leaving mathematics and a limited sort of He draws experimental physics (limited by the exclusion of all general between inference from the experiment) out of the reach of his certainty scepticism, and in making them his basis of attack upon bility at and proba what he conceived to be the more pretentious claims of the same knowledge, Hume was again following the course marked out point as for him by Locke. It will be remembered that Locke, even when his suspicion' of knowledge is at its strongest, still finds solid ground (a) in particular experiments' upon nature, expressed in singular propositions as opposed to assertions of universal or necessary connexion, and (b) in mathematical truths which are at once general, certain, and instructive, because 'barely ideal.' All speculative propositions that do not fall under one or other of these heads are either 'trifling' or merely probable.' Hume draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point, nor in regard to the ground of certainty as to matter of fact or existence' is there any essential difference between him and his master. As this ground is the actual present sensation' with the one, so it is the 'impression' with the other; and it is only when the proposition becomes universal or asserts a necessary connection, that the certainty, thus given, is by either supposed to fail. It is true that with Locke this authority of the sensation is a derived authority, depending on its reference to a body now operating upon us,' while with Hume, so far as he is faithful to his profession of discarding such reference, it is original. But with each alike the fundamental notion is that a feeling must be true while it lasts,' and that in regard to real existence or matter of fact no other truth can be known but this. Neither perceives that a truth thus restricted is no truth at all-nothing that can be stated even in a singular proposition; that the 'particularity in time,' on which is supposed to depend the real If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school-metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning for quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experi mental reasoning concerning matter of fact and resistance? No. Commit it but is nite as to probability, certainty of the simple feeling, is just that which deprives it of significance because neither is really faithful to the restriction. Each allows himself to substitute for the momore defi- mentary feeling an object qualified by relations, which are the exact opposite of momentary feelings. If I myself see a man walk on the ice,' says Locke (IV, xv. 5), 'it is past probability, it is knowledge:' nor would Hume, though ready enough on occasion to point out that what is seen must be a colour, have any scruple in assuming that such a complex judgment as the above so-called 'sight' has the certainty of a simple impression. It is only in bringing to bear upon thecharacteristic admission of Locke's Fourth Book, that no general knowledge of nature can be more than probable, a more definite notion of what probability is, and in exhibiting the latent inconsistency of this admission with Locke's own doctrine of ideas as effects of a causative substance, that he modifies the theory of physical certainty which he inherited. In their treatment of mathematical truths on the other hand, of propositions involving relations of distance, quantity and degree, a fundamental discrepancy appears between the two writers. The ground of certainty, which Hume admits in regard to propositions of this order, must be examined before we can appreciate his theory of probability as it affects the relations of cause and substance. and does not admit opposition of mathe matical to physical certainty - here following Berkeley. 227. It has been shown that Locke's opposition of mathematical to physical certainty, with his ascription to the former of instructive generality on the ground of its bare ideality—the 'ideal' in this regard being opposed to what is found in sensation-strikes at the very root of his system. It implies that thought can originate, and that what it originates is in some sort real-nay, as being nothing else than the primary qualities of matter,' is the source of all other reality. Here was an alien element which empiricism' could not assimilate without changing its character. Carrying such a conception along with it, it was already charged with an influence which must ultimately work its complete transmutation by compelling, not the admission of an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but the recognition of the empirical as itself ideal. The time for 1 See above, paragraphs 45 and 97. See ab ve, paragraphs 117 and 125. this transmutation, however, was not yet. Berkeley, in over-hasty zeal for God, had missed that only true way of finding God in the world which lies in the discovery that the world is Thought. Having taken fright at the mathematical Atheism,' which seemed to grow out of the current doctrines about primary qualities of matter, instead of applying Locke's own admissions to show that these were intelligible and merely intelligible, he fancied that he had won the battle for Theism by making out that they were merely feelings or sequences of feelings. From him Hume got the text for all he had to say against the metaphysical mathematicians; but, for the reason that Hume applied it with no theological interest, its true import becomes more apparent with him than with Berkeley. His criti cisms of the doc 228. His account of mathematical truths, as contained in Part II. of the First Book of the Treatise on Human Nature,' cannot be fairly read except in connection with the chapters trine of in Part IV. on Scepticism with regard to the Senses,' and on primary the Modern Philosophy.' The latter chapter is expressly a qualities polemic against Locke's doctrine of primary qualities, and its drift is to reverse the relations which Locke had asserted between them and sensations, making the primary qualities depend on sensations, instead of sensations on the primary qualities. In Locke himself we have found that two inconsistent views on the subject perpetually cross each other.' According to one, momentary sensation is the sole conveyance to us of reality; according to the other, the real is constituted by qualities of bodies which not only are in them whether we perceive them or not,' but which only complex ideas of relation can represent. The unconscious device which covered this inconsistency lay, we found, in the conversion of the mere feeling of touch into the touch of a body, and thus into an experience of solidity. By this conversion, since solidity according to Locke's account carries with it all the primary qualities, these too become data of sensation, while yet, by the retention of the opposition between them and ideas, the advantage is gained of apparently avoiding that identification of what is real with simple feeling, which science and common sense alike repel. 229. Hume makes a show of getting rid of this see-saw. It will not See above, paragraph 99 and following. 2 Soe above, paragraph 101. do to oppose bodies to our feeling, when only feeling can give idea of body. Locke's Instead of assuming at once the reality of sensation on the that we conceive them To affirm that we paint either resolves them all as solid is to run on ad infinitum. 230. Our examination of Locke has shown us how it is shuffle of that his interpretation of ideas by reference to body is fairly 'body,' 'solidity, open to this attack. It is so because, in thus interpreting them, he did not know what he was really about. He thought he was explaining ideas of sense according to the only method of explanation which he recognises the method of resolving and 'touch,' fairly ex posed. A false idea,' that is, according to the doctrine that extension is a primary quality, while colour is only an idea of a secondary quality, not resembling the quality as it is in the thing. |