to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity and the relations of time and place; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects.' 1 a transition from or remem not so. 284. This passage points out the way which Hume's Inference doctrine of causation was to follow. That in any case the mind should go beyond a present feeling, either to discover an object the real existence or the relations of objects' other than perceived present feelings, was what he could not consistently admit. In bered to the judgment of causation, however, it seems to do so. From one that is the existence or action of one object,' seen or remembered, it seems to be assured of the existence or action of another, not seen or remembered, on the ground of a necessary connection between the two. It is such assurance that is reckoned to constitute reasoning in the distinctive sense of the term, as different at once from the analysis of complex ideas and the simple succession of ideas- such reasoning as, in the language of a later philosophy, can yield synthetic propositions. What Hume has to do, then, is to explain this assurance' away by showing that it is not essentially different from that judgment of relation in time and place which, because the related objects are present to the senses along with the relation,' is called perception rather than reasoning,' and to which no exercise of the thought' is necessary, but a mere passive admission of impressions through the organs of sensation.' Nor, for the assimilation of reasoning to perception, is anything further needed than a reference to the connection of ideas with impressions and of the ideas of imagination with those of memory, as originally stated by Hume. When both of the objects compared are present to the senses, we call the comparison perception; when neither, or only one, is so present, we call it reasoning. But the difference between the object that is present to sense, and that which is not, is merely the difference between impression and idea, which again is merely the difference between the more and the less lively feeling. To feeling, whether with more or with less vivacity, every object, whether of perception or reasoning, must alike be present. Is it then a sufficient account of the matter, according to Hume, to say that when we are conscious of contiguity and succession 2 Pp. 376, 384. Pp. 327, 375. 6 1 P. 376. Relation of cause and effect the same as between objects of which both are impressions we call it perception; but that when both objects are ideas, or one an impression and the other an idea, we call it reasoning? Not quite so. Suppose that I have seen that species of object we call flame, and have afterwards felt that species of sensation we call heat.' If I afterwards remembered the succession of the feeling upon the sight, both objects (according to Hume's original usage of terms') would be ideas as distinct from the impressions; or, if upon seeing the flame I remembered the previous experience of heat, one object would be an idea; but we should not reckon it a case of reasoning. In all cases wherein we reason concerning objects, there is only one either perceived or remembered, and the other is supplied in conformity to our past experience -supplied by the only other faculty than memory that can 'supply an idea,' viz. imagination.2 285. This being the only account of inference from the known to the unknown,' which Hume could consistently admit, his view of the relation of cause and effect must be this trans- adjusted to it. It could not be other than a relation either ition. between impression and impression, or between impression and idea, or between idea and idea; and all these relations are equally between feelings that we experience. Thus, instead of being the objective basis' on which inference from the known to the unknown rests, it is itself the inference; or, more properly, it and the inference alike disappear into a particular sort of transition from feeling to feeling. The problem, then, is to account for its seeming to be other than this. 'There is nothing in any objects to persuade us that they are always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover that the relation in this particular is invariable, we always conclude that there is some secret cause which separates or unites them.' It would seem, then, that the relation of cause and effect is something which we infer from experience, from the connection of impressions and ideas, but which is not itself impression or idea. And it would seem further, that, as we infer such an unexperienced relation, so likewise we make inferences from it. In regard to identity 'we readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, though several times absent from and present to the senses; and 2 Pp. 384, 388. Above, par. 195. 'P. 376. 3 ascribe to it an identity, notwithstanding the interruption of the perception, whenever we conclude that if we had kept our hand or eye constantly upon it, it would have conveyed an invariable and uninterrupted perception. But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connection of cause and effect; nor can we otherwise have any security that the object is not changed upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses.' other than is to be 286. This relation which, going beyond our actual ex- Yet seems perience, we seem to infer as the explanation of invariable this. How contiguity in place or time of certain impressions, and from this apwhich again we seem to infer the identity of an object of peace which the perception has been interrupted, is what we call explained. necessary connection. It is their supposed necessary connection which distinguishes objects related as cause and effect from those related merely in the way of contiguity and succession, and it is a like supposition that leads us to infer what we do not see or remember from what we do. If then the reduction of thought and the intelligible world to feeling was to be made good, this supposition, not being an impression of sense or a copy of such, must be shown to be an 'impression of reflection,' according to Hume's sense of the terin, i.e. a tendency of the soul, analogous to desire and aversion, hope and fear, derived from impressions of sense but not copied from them; and the inference which it determines must be shown to be the work of imagination, as affected by such impression of reflection. This in brief is the purport of Hume's doctrine of causation. resting on supposi tion of connection, fore that 287. After his manner, however, he will go about with his Inference, reader. The supposed 'objective basis' of knowledge is to be made to disappear, but in such a way that no one shall miss it. So dexterously, indeed, is this done, that perhaps to necessary this day the ordinary student of Hume is scarcely conscious to be exof the disappearance. Hume merely announces to begin plained be with that he will 'postpone the direct survey of this question connection. concerning the nature of necessary connection,' and deal first with these other two questions, viz. (1) 'For what reason we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause?' and (2) Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have Above, par. 195. 1 P. 376. Account of the inference given by Locke such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we repose in it?' That is to say, he will consider the inference from cause or effect, before he considers cause and effect as a relation between objects, on which the inference is supposed to depend. Meanwhile necessary connection, as a relation between objects, is naturally supposed in some sense or other to survive. In what sense, the reader expects to find when these two preliminary questions have been answered. But when they have been answered, necessary connection, as a relation between objects, turns out to have vanished. 6 288. With the first of the above questions Hume only concerns himself so far as to show that we cannot know either intuitively or demonstratively, in Locke's sense of and Clarke the words, that everything whose existence has a berejected. ginning also has a cause.' Locke's own argument for the necessity of causation-that 'something cannot be produced by nothing' as well as Clarke's-that if anything wanted a cause it would produce itself, i.e. exist before it existedare merely different ways, as Hume shows, of assuming the point in question. If everything must have a cause, it follows that upon exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself, or of nothing, as causes. But 'tis the very point in question, whether everything must have a cause or not.'1 On that point, according to Locke's own showing, there can be no certainty, intuitive or demonstrative; for between the idea of beginning to exist and the idea of cause there is clearly no agreement, mediate or immediate. They are not similar feelings, they are not quantities that can be measured against each other, and to these alone can the definition of knowledge and reasoning, which Hume retained, apply. There thus disappears that last remnant of knowledge' in regard to nature which Locke had allowed to survive the knowledge that there is a necessary connection, though one which we cannot find out." Three points to be explained in the in 289. Having thus shown, as he conceives, what the true answer to the first of the above questions is not, Hume proceeds to show what it is by answering the second. 'Since it ference ac is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new cording to Hume. 1 P. 382. 2 Cf. Locke Iv. 3, 29, and Introduc., par. 121. production,' it must be from experience;' and every general opinion derived from experience is merely the summary of a multitude of particular ones. Accordingly when it has been explained why we infer particular causes from particular effects (and vice versa), the inference from every event to a cause will have explained itself. Now all our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or senses, and of the idea of that existence which produces the object of the impression or is produced by it. Here, therefore, we have three things to explain, viz. first, the original impression; secondly, the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect; thirdly, the nature and qualities of that idea.'" from which pression the trans ition is made. 290. As to the original impression we must notice that a. The orithere is a certain inconsistency with Hume's previous usage ginal imof terms in speaking of an impression of memory at all." This, however, will be excused when we reflect that according to him impression and idea only differ in liveliness, and that he is consistent in claiming for the ideas of memory, not indeed the maximum, but a high degree of vivacity, superior to that which belongs to ideas of imagination. All that can be said, then, of that original impression,' whether of the memory or senses, which is necessary to any reasoning from cause or effect,' is that it is highly vivacious. That the transition from it to the idea of the connected cause or effect' is not determined by reason, has already been settled. It could only be so determined, according to the received account of reason, if there were some agreement in respect of quantity or quality between the idea of cause and that of the effect, to be ascertained by the interposition of other ideas. But when we examine any particular objects that we hold to be related as cause and effect, e.g. the sight of flame and the feeling of heat, we find no such agreement. What we do find is their 'constant conjunction' in experience, and 'conjunction' is equivalent to that contiguity in time and place,' which has already been pointed out as one of those 'natural relations' which act as 'principles of union' between ideas. Because the impression of flame has always b. The been found to be followed by the impression of heat, the idea transition را Above, par. 195. flame |