in

that we

mistake something lse for it.

In saying interrupted perceptions for an identical object,' it follows that we have an idea of such an object-of a thing one with itself throughout the succession of impressions—an idea which can be a copy neither of any one of the impressions nor, even if successive impressions could put themselves together, of all so put together. Such an idea being according to Hume's principles impossible, the appearance of our having it was the fiction he had to account for; and he accounts for it, as we find, by a 'habit of mind' which already presupposes it. His procedure here is just the same as in dealing with the idea of vacuum. In that case, as we saw, having to account for the appearance of there being the impossible idea of pure space, he does so by showing, that having 'an idea of distance not filled with any coloured or tangible object,' we mistake this for an idea of extension, and hence suppose that the latter may be invisible and intangible. He thus admits an idea, virtually the same with the one excluded, as the source of the tendency to suppose' which is to replace the excluded idea. So in his account of identity. Either the habit, in virtue of which we convert resembling perceptions into an identical object, is what Hume admits to be a contradiction, a habit acquired by what was never present to the mind;" or the idea of identity must be present to the mind in order to render the habit possible.

Succession of like feelings mistaken

for an identical

the

feelings, as

such

304. The device by which this petitio principii is covered is one already familiar to us in Hume. In this case it is so palpable that it is difficult to believe he was unconscious of it. As he has to account for the belief of the vulgar with object: but regard to the existence of body,' he will entirely conform himself to their manner of thinking and expressing themdescribed, selves;' in other words, he will assume the fiction in question are already as the beginning of a process by which its formation is to be accounted for. The vulgar make no distinction between. thing and appearance. Those very sensations which enter by the eye or ear are with them the true objects, nor can they readily conceive that this pen or this paper, which is immediately perceived, represents another which is different from, but resembling it. In order therefore to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object and perception, according as it shall seem best to suit my

objects.

P. 487.

purpose, understanding by both of them what any common man may mean by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression conveyed to him by his senses.' Now it is of course true that the vulgar are innocent of the doctrine of representative ideas. They do not suppose that this pen or this paper, which is immediately perceived, represents another which is different from, but resembling, it; but neither do they suppose that this pen or this paper is a sensation. It is the intellectual transition from this, that, and the other successive sensations to this pen or this paper, as the identical object to which the sensations are referred as qualities, that is unaccountable if, according to Hume's doctrine, the succession of feelings constitutes our consciousness. In the passage quoted he quietly ignores it, covering his own reduction. of felt thing to feeling under the popular identification of the real thing with the perceived. With the vulgar' that which is immediately perceived' is the real thing, just because it is not the mere feeling which with Hume it is. But under pretence of provisionally adopting the vulgar view, he entitles himself to treat the mere feeling, because according to him it is that which is immediately perceived, as if it were the permanent identical thing, which according to the vulgar is what is immediately perceived.

6

thus im

plied as

source of the pro

which is to account for

it.

305. Thus without professedly admitting into conscious- Fiction of ness anything but the succession of feelings he gets such in- identity dividual objects as Locke would have called objects of actual present sensation.' When I survey the furniture of my chamber,' according to him, I see sundry identical objects' pensity this chair, this table, this inkstand, &c.2 So far there is no fiction to be accounted for. It is only when, having left my chamber for an interval and returned to it, I suppose the objects which I see to be identical with those I saw before, that the propensity to feign' comes into play, which has to be explained as above. But in fact the original survey during which, seeing the objects, I suppose them to continue the same with themselves, involves precisely the same fiction. In that case, says Hume, I suppose the change' (which is necessary to constitute the idea of identity) ' to lie only in the time.' But without succession of perceptions,' different however resembling, there could according to him be no change of time. The continuous survey of this table, or this

With
Hume

existence of perceptions a fiction different from their identity.

chair, then, involves the notion of its remaining the same with itself throughout a succession of different perceptionsi.e. the full-grown fiction of identity-just as much as does the supposition that the table I see now is identical with the one I saw before. The 'reality,' confusion with which of 'a smooth passage along resembling ideas' is supposed to constitute the fiction,' is already itself the fiction-the fiction of an object which must be other than our feelings, since it is permanent while they are successive, yet so related to them that in virtue of reference to it, instead of being merely different from each other, they become changes of a thing.

306. Having thus in effect imported all three fictions of continued imagination '-identity, continued existence, and existence distinct from perception-into the original 'perception,' Hume, we may think, might have saved himself the trouble of treating them as separate and successive formations. Unless he had so treated them, however, his natural history' of consciousness would have been far less imposing than it is. The device, by which he represents the 'vulgar' belief in the reality of the felt thing as a belief that the mere feeling is the real object, enables him also to represent the identity, which a smooth transition along closely resembling sensations leads us to suppose, as still merely identity of a perception. The very image which is present to the senses is with us the real body; and 'tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity." The identity lying thus in the images or appearances, not in anything to which they are referred, a further fiction seems to be required by which we may overcome the contradiction between the interruption of the appearances and their identity-the fiction of 'a continued being which may fill the intervals' between the appearances. That a propension' towards such a fiction would naturally arise from the uneasiness caused by such a contradiction, we may readily admit. The question is how the propension can be satisfied by a supposition which is merely another expression for one of the contradictory beliefs. What difference is there between the appearance of a perception and its existence, that interruption of the perception, though incompatible with uninterruptedness in its appearance, should not be so with uninterruptedness in its existence? It may be answered that there is just the 2 Pp. 494, 495.

1 P. 493.

6

exist when

difference between relation to a feeling subject and relation Can perto a thinking one-between relation to a consciousness ceptions which is in time, or successive, and relation to a thinking not persubject which, not being itself in time, is the source of that ceived? determination by permanent conditions, which is what is meant by the real existence of a perceived thing. But to Hume, who expressly excludes such a subject-with whom 'it exists''it is felt'-such an answer is inadmissible. He can, in fact, only meet the difficulty by supposing the existence of unfelt feelings, of unperceived perceptions. The appearance of a perception is its presence to what we call a mind,' which is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.' To consider a perception, then, as existing though not appearing is merely to consider it as detached from this heap' of other perceptions, which, on Hume's principle that whatever is distinguishable is separable, is no more impossible than to distinguish one perception from all others. In fact, however, it is obvious that the supposed detachment is the very opposite of such distinction. A perception distinguished from all others is determined by that distinction in the fullest possible measure. A perception detached from all others, left out of the 'heap which we call a mind,' being out of all relation, has no qualities-is simply nothing. We can no more consider' it than we can see vacancy. Yet it is by the consideration of such nonentity, by supposing a world of unperceived perceptions, of 'existences' without relation or quality, that the mind, according to Hume-itself only a heap of perceptions arrives at that fiction of a continued being which, as involved in the supposition of identity, is the condition of our believing in a world of real things at all.

6

further

307. It is implied, then, in the process by which, accord- Existence of objects, ing to Hume, the fiction of a continued being is arrived at, act that this being is supposed to be not only continued but from per'distinct from the mind' and 'independent' of it. With ceptions, a Hume, however, the supposition of a distinct and independ- fiction still. ent' existence of the perception is quite different from that of a distinct and independent object other than the perception. The former is the 'vulgar hypothesis,' and though a fiction,

Are these
Beveral

'fictions' really different from each other?

it is also a universal belief: the latter is the 'philosophical hypothesis,' which, if it has a tendency to obtain belief at all, at any rate derives that tendency, in other words 'acquires all its influence over the imagination,' from the vulgar one.1 Just as the belief in the independent and continued existence of perceptions results from an instinctive effort to escape the uneasiness, caused by the contradiction between the interruption of resembling perceptions and their imagined identity, so the contradiction between this belief and the evident dependence of all perceptions on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits' leads to the doctrine of representative ideas or 'the double existence of perceptions and objects.' 'This philosophical system, therefore, is the monstrous offspring of two principles which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embraced by the mind and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. The imagination tells us that our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence and different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects.'2

308. Here, again, we find that the contradictory announcements, which it is the object of this new fiction to elude, are virtually the same as those implied in that judgment of identity which is necessary to the 'perception' of this pen or this paper. That 'interruption of our resembling perceptions,' of which reflection' (in the immediate context 'Reason') is here said to tell us,' is merely that difference in time, or succession, which Hume everywhere else treats as a datum of sense, and which, as he points out, is as necessary a factor in the idea of identity, as is the imagination of an existence continued throughout the succession. Thus the contradiction, which suggests this philosophical fiction of double existence, has been already present and overcome in every perception of a qualified object. Nor does the fiction itself, by which the contradiction is eluded, differ except verbally from that suggested by the contradiction between