made by the mind.

the complex ideas which are the workmanship of the mind.'
(Book II. chap. xii.) In his account of the latter there are
some curious cross-divisions, but he finally enumerates them
as ideas either of modes, substances, or relations. The charac-
ter of these ideas he then proceeds to explain in the order
given, one after the other, and as if each were independent
of the rest; though according to his own statement the idea
of mode presupposes that of substance, and the idea of
substance involves that of relation. 'Modes I call such
complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in
them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are
considered as dependencies on, or affections of, substances;
such are the ideas signified by the words 'triangle,'' grati-
tude,' 'murder,' &c. Of these there are two sorts. First,
there are some which are only variations or different combi-
nations of the same simple idea without the mixture of any
other as a dozen, or score-which are nothing but the ideas
of so many distinct units added together; and these I call
simple modes, as being contained within the bounds of one
simple idea. Secondly, there are others compounded of
simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one
complex one; e. g. beauty, .
and these I call mixed
modes.' (Book II. chap. xii. secs. 4, 5.) So soon as he comes
to speak more in detail of simple modes, he falls into apparent
contradiction with his doctrine that, as complex ideas, they
are the mere workmanship of the mind. All particular
sounds and colours are simple modes of the simple ideas of
sound and colour. (Book II. chap. xviii. secs. 3, 4.) Again,
the ideas of figure, place, distance, as of all particular figur
places, and distances, are simple modes of the simple idea of
space. (Book II. chap. xiii.) To maintain, however, that
the ideas of space, sound, or colour in general (as simple
ideas) were taken from things themselves, while those of
particular spaces, sounds, and colours (as complex ideas)
were made by the mind,' was for Locke impossible. Thus
in the very next chapter after that in which he has opposed
all complex ideas, those of simple modes included, as made
by the mind to all simple ones as taken from things them-
selves, he speaks of simple modes either as found in things
existing, or as made by the mind within itself.' (Book II.
chap. xiii. sec. 1.) It was not for Locke to get over this con-
fusion by denying the antithesis between that which the

mind 'makes' and that which it 'takes from existing things,' and for the present we must leave it as it stands. We must further note that a mode being considered as an affection of a substance,' space must be to the particular spaces which are its simple modes, as a substance to its modifications. So too colour to particular colours, &c., &c. But the idea of a substance is a complex idea framed by the mind.' Therefore the idea of space-at any rate such an idea as we have of it when we think of distances, places, or figures, and when else do we think of it at all?-must be a complex and artificial idea. But according to Locke the idea of space is emphatically a simple idea, given immediately both by sight and touch, concerning which if a man enquire, he 'sends him to his senses.' (Book II. chap. v.)

Such are

substance

must be

34. These contradictions are not avoidable blunders, due to carelessness or want of a clear head in the individual and relawriter. The complex idea of substance' will not be exor- tion which cised; the mind will show its workmanship in the very found in elements of knowledge towards which its relation seems every obmost passive-in the existing things' which are the condi- knowledge, tions of its experience no less than in the individual's conscious reaction upon them. The interrogator of the individual consciousness seeks to know that consciousness, and just for that reason must find in it at every stage those formal conceptions, such as substance and cause, without which there can be no object of knowledge at all. He thus substantiates sensation, while he thinks that he merely observes it, and calls it a sensible thing. Sensations, thus unconsciously transformed, are for him the real, the actually existent. Whatever is not given by immediate sense, outer or inner, he reckons a mere thing of the mind.' The ideas of substance and relation, then, not being given by sense, must in his eyes be things of the mind, in distinction from really existent things. But speech bewrayeth him. He cannot state anything that he knows save in terms which imply that substance and relation are in the things known; and hence an inevitable obtrusion of things of the mind' in the place of real existence, just where the opposition between them is being insisted on. Again, as a man seems to observe consciousness in himself and others, it has nothing that it has not received. It is a blank to begin with, but passive of that which is without, and through its passivity it becomes

Abstract

idea of substance

and complex ideas

of particular sorts of substance.

informed. If the 'mind,' then, means this or that individual consciousness, the things of the mind must be gradually developed from an original passivity. On the other hand, let anyone try to know this original passive consciousness, and in it, as in every other known object-matter, he must find these things of the mind, substance and relations. If nature is the object, he must find them in nature; if his own selfconsciousness, he must find them in that consciousness. But while nature knows not what is in herself, self-consciousness, it would seem, ex vi termini, does know. Therefore not merely substance and relation must be found in the original consciousness, but the knowledge, the ideas, of them.

35. As we follow Locke's treatment of these ideas more in detail, we shall find the logical see-saw, here accounted for, appearing with scarcely a disguise. His account of the origin of the 'complex ideas of substances' is as follows. The mind being furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick despatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterwards to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together; because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance.' (Book II. chap. xxiii. sec. 1.) In the controversy with Stillingfleet, which arose out of this chapter, Locke was constrained further to distinguish (as he certainly did not do in the original text) between the ideas of distinct substances, such as man, horse,' and the 'general idea of substance.' It is to ideas of the former sort that he must be taken to refer in the above passage, when he speaks of them as formed by complication of many ideas together,' and these alone are complex in the strict sense. The general idea of substance on the other hand, which like all general ideas (according to Locke) is made by abstraction, means the idea of a 'substratum which we accustom ourselves to suppose' as that wherein

the complicated ideas 'do subsist, and from which they do result.' This, however, he regards as itself one, the first and chief,' among the ideas which make up any of the 'distinct substances.' (Book II. chap. xii. sec. 6.) Nor is he faithful to the distinction between the general and the complex. In one passage of the first letter to Stillingfleet, he distinctly speaks of the general idea of substance as a 'complex idea made up of the idea of something plus that of relation to qualities." Notwithstanding this confusion of terms, however, he no doubt had before him what seemed a clear distinction between the abstract general idea' of substance, as such, i.e. of something related as a support to accidents,' but which does not include ideas of any particular accidents, and the composite idea of a substance, made up of a multitude of simple ideas plus that of the something related to them as a support. We shall find each of these ideas, according to Locke's statement, presupposing the other.

stract idea

cedes and

36. In the passage above quoted, our aptness to consider The aba complication of simple ideas, which we notice to go con- according stantly together, as one simple idea, is accounted for as the to Locke at result of a presumption that they belong to one thing. This once prepresumption is again described in the words that we ac- follows the custom ourselves to suppose some substratum, wherein they complex. do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance.' Here it is implied that the idea of substance, i. e. the general idea of something related as a support to accidents,' is one gradually formed upon observation of the regular coincidence of certain simple ideas. In the sequel (sec. 3 of the same chapter2) we are told that such an idea- an obscure and relative idea of substance in general -being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together.' Thus a general idea of

1 Upon a reference to the chapter on 'complex idens' (Book 1. chap. xii.), it will appear that the term is used in a stricter and a looser sense. In the looser sense it is not confined to compound ideas, but in opposition to simple ones includes those of relation and even 'abstract general ideas.' When Locke thinks of the general idea of substance apart from the complication of accidents

referred to it, he opposes it to the
complex idea, according to the stricter
sense of that term. On the other hand,
when he thinks of it as made up' of
the idea of something plus that of rela-
tion to qualities (as if there could be an
idea of something apart from such
relation), it seems to him to have two
elements, and therefore to be complex.
2 1. xxiii.

Reference

nature or

God, the

same as re

ference to

substance having been formed by one gradual process, ideas
of particular sorts of substances are formed by another and
later one.
But then the very same collection of such com-
binations of simple ideas as are taken notice of to exist
together,' which (according to sec. 3) constitutes the later
process and follows upon the formation of the general idea of
substance, has been previously described as preceding and
conditioning that formation. It is the complication of
simple ideas, noticed to go constantly together, that (accord-
ing to sec. 1) leads to the idea of substance in general.'
To this see-saw between the process preceding and that fol-
lowing the formation of the idea in question must be added
the difficulty, that Locke's account makes the general idea
precede the particular, which is against the whole tenor of
his doctrine of abstraction as an operation whereby the
mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular
objects, to become general.' (Book II. chap. xi. sec. 9.)

37. It may be said perhaps that Locke's self-contradiction of ideas to in this regard is more apparent than real; that the two processes of combining simple ideas are essentially different, just because in the later process they are combined by a consubstance. scious act of the mind as accidents of a something,' of which the general idea has been previously formed, whereas in the earlier one they are merely presented together 'by nature,' and, ex hypothesi, though they gradually suggest, do not carry with them any reference to a substratum.' But upon this we must remark that the presentation of ideas by nature' or by God,' though a mode of speech of which Locke in his account of the origin of knowledge freely avails himself, means nothing else than their relation to a substratum,' if not wherein they do subsist,' yet from which they do result.' If then it is for consciousness that ideas are presented together by nature, they already carry with them that reference to a substratum which is supposed gradually to result from their concurrence. If it is not for consciousness that they are so presented, if they do not severally carry with them a reference to something,' how is it they come to do so in the gross ? If a single sensation of heat is not referred to a hot thing, why should it be so referred on the thousandth recurrence? Because perhaps, recurring constantly in the same relations, it compels the inference of permanent antecedents? But the same relations' mean