Are there general ideas? Berkeley said, 'yes and no'. How he accounts for the appearance of there being such His account implies that ' ideas' are conceptions, not feelings He virtually yields the point in regard to the predicate of pro- As to the subject, he equivocates between singleness of feeling and individuality of conception Result is a theory which admits predication, but only as sin- All propositions restricted in same way as Locke's propositions Not relations of resemblance only, but those of quantity also, He draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point as Locke; but is more definite as to probability, and Significance with him of such derivation It means, in effect, that colour and space are the same, and that Yet the parts of space are co-existent not successive Hume cannot make space a 'perception' without being false to his own account of perception; as appears if we put 'feeling' To make sense of them, we must take perception to mean per- ceived thing, which it can only mean as the result of certain If felt thing is no more than feeling, how can it have qualities? 200 The thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be Hume equivocates by putting coloured points' for colour. Can a disposition of coloured points' be an impression? The points must be themselves impressions, and therefore not The fact that colours mix, not to the purpose In his account of the idea as abstract, Hume really introduces Unites alone really exist: number a 'fictitious denomination' 215 Yet 'unites' and 'number' are correlative; and the supposed Idea of time even more unaccountable on Hume's principles His ostensible explanation of it. It turns upon equivocation between feeling and conception of In order to seem to do so, he must get rid of 'Infinite Divisi In Hume's instances it is not really a feeling, but a conceived What becomes of the exactness of mathematics according to The universal propositions of geometry either untrue or unmean- The admission that no relations of quantity are data of sense re- РАЗН His explanation implies that we have an idea virtually the same By a like device that he is able to explain the appearance of our Knowledge of relation in way of Identity and Causation excluded Inference a transition from an object perceived or remembered Inference, resting on supposition of necessary connection, to be explained before that connection Account of the inference given by Locke and Clarke rejected Three points to be explained in the inference according to Hume 244 a. The original impression from which the transition is made Yet he implies that we have such idea, in saying that we mis- With Hume continued existence of perceptions a fiction different Can perceptions exist when not perceived? Existence of objects, distinct from perceptions, a further fiction still Are these several ' fictions' really different from each other? Are they not all involved in the simplest perception? Yet they are not possible ideas, because copied from no impres- Comparison of present experience with past, which yields rela- tion of cause and effect, pre-supposes judgment of identity; If an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence, how can an event be an effect the first time it is observed? . Hume evades this question; still, he is a long way off the Induc- Can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived from se- With Hume the only uniformity is in expectation, as determined xxii SUMMARY OF GENERAL INTRODUCTION, VOL. 1. Hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account PAGE 276 276 This remembrance, as he describes it, supposes conception of a system of nature 277 This explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objective character to causation 278 Reality of remembered 'system' transferred to 'system of judgment' 279 Reality of the former 'system' other than vivacity of impressions 280 It is constituted by relations, which are not impressions at all; and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to 'system of judgment' 281 . Not seeing this, Hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit 282 เ But if so, system of judgment' must consist of feelings constantly experienced which only differ from remembered feelings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded. 283 But how can it have faded, if they have been constantly repeated? 284 Inference then can give no new knowledge Nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new phenomena, while it can prove relations, previously unknown, between phenomena 286 Such a distinction inadmissible with Hume 286 His distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature, as determining inference 287 But this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away 288 Laws of nature are unqualified habits of expectation 289 Experience, according to his account of it, cannot be a parent of As to Immateriality of the Soul, he plays off Locke and Berkeley 292 293 295 Yet can only account for it as a 'fiction' by supposing ideas which with him are impossible. 295 In origin this fiction' the same as that of ' Body 296 297 |