Book I. CH. II. PART IV.

$30. Emotions of

Self alone.

these appear to be the only two kinds of emotion which are peculiar to this mode of reflection, or arise in the representation of its peculiar object. When the different organs of the body and the different reflection on bodily and mental functions are compared with each other, we feel shame in contemplating some and pride in contemplating others, and are prompted to conceal and forget the one, to display and dwell upon the others. This in its earliest shape is the first moral judgment that we pass upon ourselves; and the shame which in this way takes its origin, so far from becoming outworn in the progress of reflection, is deepened and its sphere extended; in other words, we become more sensitive and more refined, and a greater number of things are classed among tacenda. The acts which minister directly to the health and nourishment of the body and the gratification of the sensations, and of some of the emotions, and the instruments of these, weaknesses of body and of mind, some kinds of ignorance and want of capacity for mental enjoyments, whatever betrays a low grade of endowment, we cover with a wise dissimulation, as "ills that flesh is heir to." The French term pudeur seems exactly to express the feeling which is called out painfully or wounded by any lifting of the veil of the tacenda. A certain kind of dissimulation appears to be the very condition of escaping from the burthen of these ills, which is only lightened by being forgotten. When however this forgetfulness is not a purposed dissimulation, but the powers and endowments which are its counterpoise are dwelt on as if they were alone the whole nature, then there arises the opposite emotion, pride, an overweening estimate of self. If we do not forget but purposely

BOOK I.
CH. II.

PART IV.

$30. Emotions of

reflection on Self alone.

repress the thought of what causes us to feel shame, so as to insist only on the comely and on the honourable, then we may be said to feel proper pride, as it is popularly called; and pride in this sense is better expressed by the name Self-respect, reserving the name pride for the overweening estimate of self, and for the further development of it now to be described.

2. If we suppose this emotion or passion of pride, for indulged emotion is passion, to be combined with the scorn for others of the foregoing group, there will arise the emotion which is most properly to be called Pride, a haughty isolation of self from all other beings, a refusal to admit them as equals, or even as objects of the antipathetic, still more of the sympathetic, emotions; a self-complacency and a selfsufficiency which is its own law, its own tribunal, its own motive, its own end; the opposite of whatever emotion tends to bind men together, the opposite at once of love and of vanity. It is only the root or first beginning of this pride that is the opposite of shame; in its development it is rather the completion of the scorn of the foregoing group, completing it however by carrying it up into a new mode of reflection, one that makes abstraction of the persons who in the former were necessary to the emotion. Here, who and what they are is matter of indifference. The proud man is "himself alone." Pride is, as it has been shown, founded on a delusion, the real forgetfulness of human weakness; it forgets also the laws of nature which bind man to man, not only by the mutual rendering of necessary services, but by the emotions which men feel for one another. The isolated man is then at discord with himself,

even by his attempted self-sufficiency. This is the
condemnation of pride. But it is not without vir-
tues. Its special virtue is honour. By the law of
its being it is only qualities represented as noble
which belong to pride, since everything that could
possibly belong to shame is excluded at the origin.
The law which the proud man is to himself is a law
of honour. But as pride itself differs from scorn, so
does the honour of pride differ from the honour of
emulation; it is not chivalry, but it is adherence to
the representation which any one has formed of him-
self; to fall short of this would be to him defeat and
disgrace; he is his own rival and his own standard
of rivalry. Whatever this standard consists in, what-
ever constitutes his image of himself, to that he is
bound by the law of his being to conform. Hence
the different kinds of characters which may be
equally and alike proud; whatever consists with
his standard of honour, and with his forgetfulness
of circumstances of shame, may be included in the
nature of the proud man. It is indifferent to many
virtues and to many vices; noble characters and
mean characters, as others judge them, may be proud;
Milton's Satan and Shakespeare's Iago would both
belong to the category. Lastly,
Lastly, pride in one or
other of its two shapes, that is, either as pride strictly,
or as self-respect, is the most intimate and ineradi-
cable of the emotions, ἀναγκαιότατον πάθος, it ceases
only with life; every one must have something to
take pride in, some adytum of reflection, some sanc-
tuary of refuge "when in disgrace with fortune and
men's eyes." Good or bad, he retires into himself.
Driven from one point, he takes refuge in another;
the thief says 'at least I am not a liar;' the liar'at

BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV.

$ 30. Emotions of

reflection on

Self alone.

Воок І. CH. II. PART IV.

§ 30. Emotions of reflection on Self alone.

§ 31. Reflective emotions

arising from the form. Justice and Injustice.

least I am not a thief.' Every one erects thus from time to time some theory of his life, some standard of attainment, which he can believe that he fulfils. Pride is the Proteus of the emotions; there is no shape which it cannot assume, no quality to which it cannot attach itself. At the same time, the emotion which arises in reflection on self alone, whether it takes the shape of self-respect, honour, pride, or their modifications, is the most deeply rooted of all the reflective emotions; the staple and basis of the character, the stem upon which all others may be conceived as engrafted, or out of which they may be conceived as growing.

§ 31. 1. In all the reflective emotions hitherto examined the pleasures and the pains appertaining to the emotions themselves, in their entirety, have been pleasures and pains of enjoyment. Or if they have arisen in comparison of two or more objects, as in the case of the emotions of comparison, they have not arisen directly from the comparison itself; or, in other words, the comparison has been not the object but the antecedent of an emotion, the object of which consisted in the persons compared, to which emotion the pleasure or the pain was attached, as in vanity or contempt, ashamedness or admiration of externals. But now comes for consideration the case of the comparison itself, the relation between the persons compared, being the object of an emotion with its peculiar pleasure or pain. pain. The case is parallel to that of surprise and wonder containing the logical instinct, in the direct emotions. (See

19. 2. The contrast or resemblance of the two persons and their emotions is itself the object or framework of the emotion now to be examined; and

there will be as many kinds of this emotion as there are distinct kinds of pairs of objects compared or contrasted. The comparison of emotions in this way will be the objective framework of the emotion of Justice or Injustice, just as, in the direct emotions, the parallel comparison was the framework of the congruity aimed at, the incongruity avoided, by the logical instinct arising in the emotion of wonder.

2. Hitherto we have not met with the sense of justice, or with the sense of right and wrong, among the emotions. This is not because the emotions hitherto analysed are not always in experience bound up with these perceptions; for we may always, for instance, feel justified or right in loving and in expecting love, in retaliating injuries and expecting retaliation; but because we have hitherto attended only to those qualities in the concrete phenomena which were indicated by the name of the whole. But now it is necessary to attend to this other element in the emotions, and to endeavour to point out its origin and primal source. Justice and the sense of right and wrong are in their origin the same, and have their ground in the same thing, namely, comparison. The difference or resemblance of two objects of reflective emotion, as different or similar, is the object or framework, the emotion pervading which is justice or injustice, right or wrong.

3. It is clear, in the first place, that the sense or perception of justice and of injustice is not a mere repetition of the emotions hitherto analysed. The difference in their nature is a proof of some differentiation in their source. And the purpose of statical analysis is not to point out the moment of development, in the history of mankind or in that of the

BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV.

$ 31. Reflective emotions arising from the form. Justice and Injustice.