BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. $ 38. History and Moral Sense. includes in its purview pleasures and pains which we experience at the hands of other persons, or as the result of their opinions, feelings, and actions, as well method of the as those which arise from our own self-government and immanent acts. Expediency covers the whole ground of feeling, and is as extensive as the moral sense itself, of one half of which, from beginning to end, it is in fact the expression. All pleasures and pains of enjoyment belong to expediency. Its results at the present day will certainly be admitted to be the entire subordination of the senses to the direct emotions, and of the direct to the reflective; and also, by most moralists, I am inclined to think, of the other reflective emotions to those of Love in its purest shapes, and to the Justice which belongs to it. Upon this point however it cannot be sufficient to assume an agreement; time and history in the future will decide it; but until that is the case, no judgment of expediency can be final, because all such judgments are decisions as to the quality of enjoyments, and there is no universally admitted criterion of judgment, in case one person prefers one quality of enjoyment to another; it is a question of what may perhaps be called moral taste, and we can get no farther than to Aristotle's umpire-s áɣalòs ógios. Ambition, or that form of it which is the ὁείσειε. love of fame "that last infirmity of noble mind," or honour in personal character and action, or perhaps even pride in its most refined shapes, may with different persons dispute the palm. 7. But the case is very different when we look to the second method of harmonising and subordinating feelings, which is founded upon the emotion of justice, the second half of the moral sense. Side BOOK I. CH. II. PART IV. § 38. History and Moral Sense. by side with the qualities of feeling, upon which the pleasures and pains of enjoyment depend, there exists the perception of their justice or injustice; and this attaches to every feeling in its character of means to method of the an end, or of its suitability or unsuitability to promote reflective emotions which are themselves just or unjust. For instance, the unrestrained indulgence of appetites is not only incompatible with the enjoyment of more refined pleasures, but is a hindrance in the way of our being just to other persons, by urging us to withhold what is their due, or take what is in their possession. But justice, besides this, sets up a standard which all must admit to be a valid criterion, by which to judge the relative value of reflective emotions. Pride, for instance, as defined above, is condemned entirely by the perception of justice, for it consists in ignoring other persons and their rights, and in acting as if they had no relation It is besides an uneasy emotion, being out of harmony with facts and an involuntary forgetting of them. There is in short no emotion but that of Love, in its best and noblest shapes, in which justice is secure from violation. Love alone "is the fulfilling of the law." And the other emotions which are in themselves pleasureable are all more or less uneasy, from the imperfect nature of the justice which they contain, and from their offering no guarantee for its continuance. The emotions of the comparison of having are rather hindrances to justice than otherwise, though in many respects beneficial to it, as vanity which defers to public opinion, for instance. But they require to be kept in subordination. Emulation is admissible only so far as it is consistent with love and honour. Honour itself is uneasy and is to us. BOOK I. PART IV. $ 38. History and method of the Moral Sense. closely akin to pride. The goodwill of allies has often its foundation in self-interest, and, where otherwise, is yet a feeble sentiment, without guarantee for justice in difficult circumstances. Anger can only be admitted in the form of indignation, which is its justice, and is but a partial and temporary emotion, depending upon the existence of injustice. Love, then, in the sense of the Charity of the New Testament, is the only emotion in which justice can be completely and permanently realised. It is capable of all degrees of intensity; and to produce it in high intensity, and to make it generally felt by all men and towards all men, is the command of justice. To this end justice commands that all the other emotions and sensations shall be made subordinate; it is the constitutional sovereign of the hierarchy of emotions, the constitution being the moral sense, of which justice is the informing principle. While therefore conscience or the moral sense must be defined generally, that is, in any of the stages of its history, as the perception of justice in the concrete, without distinguishing any kinds or modes of justice, or any kinds of objects or acts in which justice may appear, it may also be defined, in the highest stage of development we can at present perceive, as the perception, in the concrete, of justice in its highest shape, that is, the justice of love, or, in other words, analysed into the two elements of love and justice. TABLE OF REFLECTIVE EMOTIONS. A. Arising from the Matter. 1. The sympathetic group: Goodwill. Affection. Eros. Love. Friendship. 2. The antipathetic group: Illwill. Hate. Anger. Bitterness. Revenge. 3. Passions belonging to both groups: Passion of benevolence, of affection; High spirit; Rage; 4. Emotions of the comparison of Having: Passions: Envy. Jealousy. 5. Emotions of the comparison of Being: Humility. Admiration of essentials. Self-complacency. Scorn. 1. Justice and Injustice: Veracity. Equity. Mercy. Indignation. C. Arising from Matter and Form together. 1. The Emotion of Moral Sense: Good Conscience; Remorse. Modes: Expediency; Duty or Moral Right. CHAPTER II. PART V. THE REFLECTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE EMOTIONS. The spirit and the power, Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower Coleridge. BOOK I. CH. II. PART V. $39. The inner nature of the world consists in emotion. § 39. 1. No sooner have we formed empirical and remote objects in consciousness than we ask ourselves what they mean, what the whole scene of existence, as it unfolds itself before us, means. It has been shown in "Time and Space," how, out of the formal element occupied by each set of qualities, we imagine a substance, an essence, or a force, underlying, evolving, producing, and then supporting these qualities, and exerting itself, expressing its own nature, in the actions, movements, or effects of these upon other sets of qualities, and upon the substances, essences, or forces similarly imagined as underlying them. It is of such objects, consisting of substance and attribute, that we then proceed to ask ourselves the meaning or significance. The purpose of our question is to discover the nature of the substance, essence, or force, underlying the qualities; to discover it apart from the qualities in which it manifests itself, that is, |