hibited as follows. It is impossible to get rid of the conception of Design in nature; for, whether it is conceived as imposed on the objects of sense by our minds, or as gathered by our minds from those objects as already theirs, it is equally in nature; and if imposed by our minds, still our minds are a part of nature, and how came this to be the nature of our minds? Now this conception of Design is applicable to every phenomenon without exception, to what are called inorganic as well as to organic phenomena, for all stand related to each other. But it is not only from the universality of the applicability of the conception that I shall argue, but from its analysis which shows the ground of that universality. In its nature and analysis, Design is nothing else than the statical mode of regarding phenomena; and every phenomenon regarded statically, or as a whole, is organic, or exhibits design, reference of one part to another, and of the parts to the whole. Dynamically, phenomena exhibit succession and change, but no design; design is found whenever a comparison is made or relation perceived of two or more points in the succession; and this is to take the phenomena statically, or together. Time alone is the foundation of the dynamic mode of existence or consciousness; space is the foundation of the static mode; and a portion of time may be treated statically by marking it out from the rest of time by any two points in its content. A line of space has two ends; a surface has at the least three sides; a solid at the least four. All these exist only in reference to each other. The phenomena are organic or designed. The characteristic of design therefore is, that the beginning implies the end, though we may

not know in what the end will consist; the beginning is implied in the same way, if we know the end and treat it as a part of some whole, or statically. The same holds good of the very largest object we can conceive or imagine; for the static and dynamic modes of thought and imagination are founded in the formal element of consciousness itself, in time and in space, and we cannot transcend them. In regarding, therefore, the Ideal Object of religion in relation to the universe of thought, we necessarily treat the two together as statical, and this means mutually implying each other. At every point in the progression of consciousness and of history, which are existence, the End is implied; it is present at the beginning as at the end. But in what way we shall imagine this implicit presence to have realised itself in its explication, or in actual existence of history, this is a question comparatively, and for cur present purpose entirely, immaterial and unimportant. I lay, therefore, no stress whatever upon the images I have employed above, the sameness of characteristics in the beginning and in the end, the disintegration into Chaos, and the reintegration out of Chaos again. I affirm only that the Ideal Object of religion is eternal; ever present in the universe, at every point of time and of space, when we regard the universe statically; and that the statical mode of regarding it is a necessity of consciousness.

Book I. CH. II. PART V.

$ 45. The method of religious thought.

$ 46. The concord of

philosophy.

§ 46. 1. The foregoing considerations tend to prove the compatibility of religion with philosophy religion and and philosophy with religion; for they remove the difficulties which have hitherto beset the connection from a double source, first from a basis of belief in God having been sought in philosophy at all, and

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The concord of religion and philosophy.

secondly, in a philosophy the ultimate logic of which
consisted either in the imperfect notion of cause and
effect, the contradictory one of a first or uncaused
cause, or the illusory one of an ontological Sub-
stance, or Ding-an-sich, with its attributes or pro-
perties. But they do not base religion itself upon
philosophy, or any of the forms of man's knowledge;
they show, or attempt to show, that it is based, by
nature or by God himself, upon the emotional nature
of man.
The philosophical forms which it may as-
sume or combine with from time to time are like a
dress which it may wear or put off as the state of
our knowledge may compel; but the emotions of love
and of justice are continual and imperative, and, so
far as we can see, eternal. Men, even religious men,
have usually, all but universally, sought to base re-
ligion in some supposedly true system of philosophy.
One man finally and for ever, following in the steps
and repeating the words of his predecessors, Hebrew
prophets, of whom he himself was the greatest, took
the opposite course,-Jesus of Nazareth. "In vain
do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the com-
mandments of men." In the scope and spirit of this
denunciation are included not only practical and cere-
monial observances, which were its immediate occa-
sion, but all doctrines whatever so far as they bear
an intellectual character. They are always non-re-
ligious, and, when they obscure religion, anti-reli-
gious. Religion is not philosophy but "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all
thy mind and all thy strength, and thy neighbour
as thyself." "I will have mercy and not sacrifice;"
therefore, not philosophy. This was the whole pur-
pose, scope, and spirit, of his teaching. Not one

Yet

word did he utter in favour of the necessity of be-
lieving intellectually any doctrine whatever.
no sooner was the great teacher laid in his grave,
than there began to grow up, around him and around
his teaching, the impulse to which growth was the
very love and admiration which his life and teaching
had inspired,—a web of philosophy and theoretical
doctrine, held as a necessary part of religion, and of
a religion called by his name whose life had been
devoted to clearing religion from similar webwork.
To do him the more honour we have been undoing
his work; in his own name we have been disobey-
ing him.

2. When we reflect upon this we understand why it must have been so. The reason lies in the relation of the emotional to the cognitive element in consciousness, in the causes which make one comparatively unalterable, the other comparatively accrescent and progressive. This at first sight appears to conflict with the inseparability and complete correspondence of emotion and its framework; but it is not so. The intensity of religious emotion, as of all feelings, is not communicable to others so as to be felt by them; the quality corresponding to it in its framework is the vividness of the image; and it is the precise parallel to intensity or a high degree of intellectual power, the quality corresponding to which in the framework is clearness and distinctness of parts, or of their relation to other frameworks. Both kinds of intensity, the emotional and the intellectual, are alike incommunicable; both alike influence the disciples by inspiring affection and veneration for the master personally. But there is this difference, that the vividness in the one case has no

Воок І. CH. II. PART V.

$ 46. The concord of religion and philosophy.

CH. II.

PART V.

$46.

The concord of

religion and

philosophy

BOOK I. separate framework or part of the framework appropriated to it, while the clearness and distinctness in the other case are changes in the framework, separate additions to it, which can be expressed in words, and the knowledge of them communicated to men of less intellectual power. Hence the progressiveness of knowledge, science, philosophy, in contrast to the non-progressiveness of intellectual power and emotional vigour, the work of knowledge being carried on by all workers who add each his own separate elaboration. To use Bacon's image, the disciples are dwarfs, but dwarfs standing on the shoulders of a giant. Now it is the framework of the emotion of the great Master of those who feel that his disciples have taken up and elaborated, but without its vividness; a framework founded in great part upon the very words of the master himself, since he necessarily used the images, shared the intellectual beliefs, and expressed them in the language, which were current in his day. His disciples think that in elaborating the framework they are obeying the commands of the master; but surely they misconceive him; it was not these images, this framework, this philosophy, for which he cared, but his aim was to set religion free from being trammelled by any framework whatever.

3. I am far from saying that there is no progress in emotion, moral and religious; but the great groups or kinds of emotion are to be compared to the great kinds of classes of science, such as those, for instance, which form Comte's hierarchy of the sciences. In both these cases the list of kinds is complete; further changes, the arising of new emotions in the one, of new sciences in the other, will be by compo